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Friday, July 25, 2008

BLS BS Exposed

BLS BS Exposed: Commercial Bankruptcies Soar

By Mike "Mish" Shedlock | 20 July 2008

The McClatchy Washington Bureau is reporting Commercial bankruptcies soar, reflecting widening economic woes.

Commercial filings for the first half of 2008 are up 45 percent from last year, as the national climate for commerce continues to deteriorate amid rising energy and food costs, mounting job losses, tighter credit and a reticence among consumers to part with discretionary income.

From April through June, 15,471 U.S. businesses called it quits, according to data from Automated Access to Court Electronic Records, an Oklahoma City bankruptcy management and data company.

It was the 10th straight quarter that business bankruptcy filings have increased. Nearly 29,000 companies filed in the first half of 2008. Another 60,000 to 90,000 others probably have closed, because roughly two to three businesses fold for every one that files for bankruptcy, said Jack Williams, resident scholar at the American Bankruptcy Institute.

More than 20 percent of the newly shuttered businesses were in California, which logged 3,141 bankruptcies in the second quarter.

Texas fielded the next highest number of bankruptcies with 1,168, followed by Michigan with 702 and Florida with 635. New York was next, with 618 petitions, and Colorado had 547.

Commercial bankruptcy filings reported by Automated Access to Court Electronic Records are typically higher than official government figures due to a more thorough reading of the petitions.

BLS BS

With the above in mind, let's take another look at my July 3rd post: Jobs Decline 6th Consecutive Months.
Birth/Death Model From Alternate Universe

This was a very weak jobs report. And once again the Birth/Death Model assumptions are from outer space.



Every month I say nearly the same thing. The only difference is that the numbers change slightly. Here it is again: The BLS should be embarrassed to report this data. Its model suggests that there was 29,000 jobs coming from new construction businesses, 22,000 jobs coming from professional services, and a whopping 177,000 jobs in total coming from net new business creation. The economy has slowed to a standstill and the BLS model still has the economy expanding rapidly.

Repeating what I have been saying for months now, virtually no one can possibly believe this data. The data is so bad, I doubt even those at the BLS believe it.

....
This report was the 6th consecutive contraction. Service jobs were only positive because 29,000 government jobs were created. Yesterday in Downward Spiral In Jobs I commented on interesting stats from the ADP Small Business Report giving a breakdown of jobs by size of firm. Inquiring minds will want to take a look.

BLS

The BLS reported net expansion of new businesses in all but 3 of the past 15 months. January and July are months in which they partially correct for the ridiculous assumptions made in the other months. I expect a huge downward revision in the July data which will be published on August 1.

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Normxxx    
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The contents of any third-party letters/reports above do not necessarily reflect the opinions or viewpoint of normxxx. They are provided for informational/educational purposes only.

The content of any message or post by normxxx anywhere on this site is not to be construed as constituting market or investment advice. Such is intended for educational purposes only. Individuals should always consult with their own advisors for specific investment advice.

Thursday, July 24, 2008

You Know The Banking System Is Unsound When...

You Know The Banking System Is Unsound When...

By Mike "Mish" Shedlock | 24 July 2008

1. Paulson appears on Face The Nation and says "Our banking system is a safe and a sound one." If the banking system were safe and sound, everyone would know it (or at least think it). There would be no need to say it.

2. Paulson says the list of troubled banks "is a very manageable situation". The reality is there are 90 banks on the list of problem banks. Indymac was not one of them until a month before it collapsed. How many other banks will magically appear on the list a month before they collapse?

3. In a Northern Rock moment, depositors at Indymac pull out their cash. Police had to be called in to ensure order.

4. Washington Mutual (WM), another troubled bank, refused to honor Indymac cashier's checks. The irony is it makes no sense for customers to pull insured deposits out of Indymac after it went into receivership. The second irony is the last place one would want to put those funds would be Washington Mutual. Eventually Washington Mutual decided it would take those checks but with an 8 week hold. Will Washington Mutual even be around 8 weeks from now?

5. Paulson asked for "Congressional authority to buy unlimited stakes in and lend to Fannie Mae (FNM) and Freddie Mac (FRE)" just days after he said "Financial Institutions Must Be Allowed To Fail". Obviously Paulson is reporting from the 5th dimension. In some alternate universe, his statements just might make sense.

6. Former Fed Governor William Poole says "Fannie Mae, Freddie Losses Makes Them Insolvent".

7. Paulson says Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are "essential" because they represent the only "functioning" part of the home loan market. The firms own or guarantee about half of the $12 trillion in U.S. mortgages. Is it possible to have a sound banking system when the only "functioning" part of the mortgage market is insolvent?

8. Bernanke testified before Congress on monetary policy but did not comment on either money supply or interest rates. The word "money" did not appear at all in his testimony. The only time "interest rate" appeared in his testimony was in relation to consumer credit card rates. How can you have any reasonable economic policy when the Fed chairman is scared half to death to discuss interest rates and money supply?

9. The SEC issued a protective order to protect those most responsible for naked short selling. As long as the investment banks and brokers were making money engaging in naked shorting of stocks, there was no problem. However, when the bears began using the tactic against the big financials, it became time to selectively enforce the existing regulation.

10. The Fed takes emergency actions twice during options expirations week in regards to the discount window and rate cuts.

11. The SEC takes emergency action during options expirations week regarding short sales.

12. The Fed has implemented an alphabet soup of pawn shop lending facilities whereby the Fed accepts garbage as collateral in exchange for treasuries. Those new Fed lending facilities are called the Term Auction Facility (TAF), the Term Security Lending Facility (TSLF), and the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF).

13. Citigroup (C), Lehman (LEH), Morgan Stanley(MS), Goldman Sachs (GS) and Merrill Lynch (MER) all have a huge percentage of level 3 assets. Level 3 assets are commonly known as "marked to fantasy" assets. In other words, the value of those assets is significantly if not ridiculously overvalued in comparison to what those assets would fetch on the open market. It is debatable if any of the above firms survive in their present form. Some may not survive in any form.

14. Bernanke openly solicits private equity firms to invest in banks. Is this even close to a remotely normal action for a Fed chairman to take?

15. Bear Stearns was taken over by JPMorgan (JPM) days after insuring investors it had plenty of capital. Fears are high that Lehman will suffer the same fate. Worse yet, the Fed had to guarantee the shotgun marriage between Bear Stearns and JP Morgan by providing as much as $30 billion in capital. JPMorgan is responsible for only the first 1/2 billion. Taxpayers are on the hook for all the rest. Was this a legal action for the Fed to take? Does the Fed care? [[Does anyone care?: normxxx]]

16. Citigroup needed a cash injection from Abu Dhabi and a second one elsewhere. Then, after announcing it would not need more capital, is raising still more. The latest news is Citigroup will sell $500 billion in assets. To whom? At what price?

17. Merrill Lynch raised $6.6 billion in capital from Kuwait Mizuho, announced it did not need to raise more capital, then raised more capital just weeks later.

18. Morgan Stanley sold a 9.9% equity stake to China International Corp. CEO John Mack compensated by not taking his bonus. How generous. Morgan Stanley fell from $72 to $37. Did CEO John Mack deserve a paycheck at all?

19. Bank of America (BAC) agreed to take over Countywide Financial (CFC) and twice announced Countrywide will add profits to B of A. Inquiring minds were asking "How the hell can Countrywide add to Bank of America earnings?" Here's how. Bank of America just announced it will not guarantee $38.1 billion in Countrywide debt. Questions over "Fraudulent Conveyance" are now surfacing.

20. Washington Mutual agreed to a death spiral cash infusion of $7 billion accepting an offer at $8.75 when the stock was over $13 at the time. Washington Mutual has since fallen in waterfall fashion from $40 and is now trading near $5.00 after a huge rally.

21. Shares of Ambac (ABK) fell from $90 to $2.50. Shares of MBIA (MBI) fell from $70 to $5. Sadly, the top three rating agencies kept their rating on the pair at AAA nearly all the way down. No one can believe anything the government sponsored rating agencies say.

22. In a panic set of moves, the Fed slashed interest rates from 5.25% to 2%. This was the fastest, steepest drop on record. Ironically, the Fed chairman spoke of inflation concerns the entire drop down. Bernanke clearly cannot tell the truth. He does not have to. Actions speak louder than words.

23. FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair said the FDIC is looking for ways to shore up its depleted deposit fund, including charging higher premiums on riskier brokered deposits.

24. There is roughly $6.84 Trillion in bank deposits. $2.60 Trillion of that is uninsured. There is only $53 billion in FDIC insurance to cover $6.84 Trillion in bank deposits. Indymac will eat up roughly $8 billion of that.

25. Of the $6.84 Trillion in bank deposits, the total cash on hand at banks is a mere $273.7 Billion. Where is the rest of the loot? The answer is in off balance sheet SIVs, imploding commercial real estate deals, Alt-A liar loans, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac bonds, toggle bonds where debt is amazingly paid back with more debt, and all sorts of other silly (and arguably fraudulent) financial wizardry schemes that have bank and brokerage firms leveraged at 30-1 or more. Those loans cannot be paid back.

What cannot be paid back will be defaulted on. If you did not know it before, you do now. The entire US banking system is insolvent.

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Normxxx    
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The contents of any third-party letters/reports above do not necessarily reflect the opinions or viewpoint of normxxx. They are provided for informational/educational purposes only.

The content of any message or post by normxxx anywhere on this site is not to be construed as constituting market or investment advice. Such is intended for educational purposes only. Individuals should always consult with their own advisors for specific investment advice.

THE BEAR'S CASE

THE BEAR'S CASE— Bearish Waves From "Elliott Wave" Forecast

By Stockadvisors.Com | 9 July 2008

In January, Steve Hochberg, a leading authority on "Elliott Wave" technical analysis, had forecast that 2008 would be the "year that everything changes". His forecast called for a credit crunch, a housing collapse and a bear market. In his Elliott Wave Financial Forecast the advisor warns, "The bear market is far from over." Here, he again looks at stocks, housing and the case for deflation.

"The typical seasonal market patterns usual result in 'summer doldrums." But with a third wave lower starting to unfold, the traditional summer lull may turn into a real downside barn burner. "The Dow has broken its 34-year trendline, which confirms our bearish forecast." This trendline connected the market bottoms from December 1974 and October 2002. This break virtually eliminated any remaining bullish potential for a rise back to new highs.

"In addition, the nominal Dow, denominated in UD dollars, is now beneath its January 2000 high, leaving the stock's senior index with a loss for the past 8 years." The nominal S&P 500 and NASDAQ are down 17.5% and 53%, respectively, from their 2000 peaks, and the 'real' Dow as measured in terms of its gold value, is off by over 70%. "There certainly will be counter-trend rallies, but when they occur, they should be viewed as opportunities to add to established bearish positions."

"The recent stripping of both MBIA and Ambac's AAA ratings by Moody's came on the heels of previous downgrades by Fitch and S&P. We cannot overstate the importance of this event. Ratings on much of the debt backed by these insurers must now be cut in turn. A downgraded bond does not necessarily meant default. "But a decrease in the aggregate value of dollar-denominated debt in a credit-based economic system is deflation."

"The word on the street is 'inflation.' But there are huge holes in this widely-held assertion." For one, real estate, the #1 inflationary hedge through all prior inflations, is not rising. In fact, the fall in housing prices is the fastest on record. "The latest housing how-to books, eg, Foreclosure Investing for Dummies, captures the breadth of the belief that a decimated asset is a buying opportunity."

"Its appearance surely means that the housing debacle is hardly closer to ending than it was in January 2007 when we cited its predecessor— Flipping Houses for Dummies— as a sure sign that the downturn in housing was about to get nasty. Another inconsistency with a new era of inflation is the still-unfolding credit crisis. Inflation generally supports increased rates of credit expansion, as it allows borrowers to pay back their obligations in cheaper dollars. Currently, however, the credit bust is intensifying every day. Banks are tightening lending standards as borrowers curtail demand for new loans."

"Meanwhile, past due notices are piling up. In every sector, delinquency levels are rising. And banks are [[still : normxxx]]woefully unprepared for a flood of bad debts." When deflation rages, cash will get far more scarce and deliquencies will surge. "In a bear market, it is much safer to watch the 'knife-catching' rather than take part. The sooner that investors recognize the advantages of this approach, the more capital they will conserve and the smarter they will look at the bottom."



Bear Market: Where Do We Go From Here?

By Michael Santoli, Barron's | July 7, 2008 | 20 July 2008

Last week on the Dow's reaching "official" bear-market status with a 20% decline from a recent high is a bit like fixating on the moment that storm winds go from 73 to 74 miles per hour to formally become a hurricane. Either way, the gale is ominous, and the damage will be serious, regardless of whether the government declares an "official" disaster area afterward or not. A more practical definition of a bear market is one in which the overshoots occur to the downside. Cheap-seeming stocks keep going down, rallies are flashy but fleeting, and investors withhold the benefit of the doubt— and their capital— rather than bestow trust on the market.

As it happens, overshooting the 20% decline level has plenty of precedent. Robin Carpenter of Carpenter Analytical Services, while noting that this threshold "is arbitrary and much too 'neat' to be analytically credible," details the four prior times the S&P 500 has fallen at least 20%, dating to 1973. For no fathomable reason, or maybe no reason at all, each prior time the index fell significantly beyond that point, from 9% to— gulp!— 35% more. Looking back a bit further, the 1962 pullback went only about 5% lower. Bearing that in mind and without claiming to know precisely what it's worth, the S&P 500 now at 1262 is essentially where it gave way to appreciable rallies two prior times, in January and March.

Current conditions rhyme with, but don't perfectly echo, those earlier moments. Investor sentiment, as depicted in the usual surveys, is pretty much as sour as during those prior lows. Corporate insiders' selling has returned to rock-bottom levels. Chief Executive magazine's CEO Confidence Index is now 15% below the level of October 2002— a time when CEOs were a hunted species, remember. And the percentage of stocks under key averages and the tally of new lows— measures of how "oversold" the market is— also are in the range of prior bottoms. Retail investors are, again, pulling cash from stock funds and hoarding it.

Importantly, too, the recent momentum leaders in the fertilizer, coal and steel sectors were shellacked in the early July selloff. Weakness in leadership groups is often a prerequisite for a bounce, engendering a "no place to hide" vibe that can accompany capitulation. (Of course, these stocks can pull back an awful lot before endangering their long uptrends, and enough investors have been kicking their dogs in frustration for not owning them for so long that buyers may well step in before a deep correction takes hold.)

Set against these encouraging clues are a few large challenges. First— no less ominous for being obvious— is oil at $145 a barrel. It's up 25% since May 1, when the earlier trading lows were looking rather formidable and the market seemed to have discounted much of the soft economic and credit situations. The sheer velocity of the move has fed another major headwind: A Federal Reserve unwilling or unable to throw the market a rescue line, as it did in January and March.

Then there's the general lack of the screeching panic present the last time stocks were here. Yes, investors are evidencing deep concern, but the selling hasn't had the climactic, purgative character of the previous inflection points. The only thing more glaring than the refusal of the options market's volatility index (VIX), now near 25, to rise to the hoped-for heights of the first quarter above 30, is the constant commentary about this fact. Citigroup strategists argue that the VIX did get high enough above its 60-day average last week to hint that it was "high enough" to allow for a rebound before too long, incidentally.

If the market rushes to new lows and finally presses investors' panic buttons, it won't be because stocks are terribly expensive, or have failed to price in some recessionary risk to profits. Reasonable guesstimates imply that the S&P is now priced for 2008 earnings a good 10% below the formal consensus forecast of $92.

Leuthold Group last week, in the context of a "neutral" market view, told clients: "Our valuation models are indicating that there is not a huge amount of downside risk." Since 1945, the firm said, "70% of all bear markets bottomed out with P/E ratios around the historical median of 17.3-times normalized earnings." The market P/E on Leuthold's "normalized" profits was 17.3 at June 30. Normalized and median precedents and 70% tendencies can be useful. But they don't help in preventing those overshoots.

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Normxxx    
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The contents of any third-party letters/reports above do not necessarily reflect the opinions or viewpoint of normxxx. They are provided for informational/educational purposes only.

The content of any message or post by normxxx anywhere on this site is not to be construed as constituting market or investment advice. Such is intended for educational purposes only. Individuals should always consult with their own advisors for specific investment advice.

THE BULL'S CASE

THE BULL'S CASE— Corporate Confidence: Insiders Didn't Sell Into Market's Decline In June

By Mark Hulbert, Marketwatch | 8 July 2008

ANNANDALE, Va. (MarketWatch)— One of the most bearish signals that corporate insiders can send to investors is to sell their companies' shares into a declining market. So those who pay attention to what the insiders are doing have been waiting with bated breath to see what the June data reveal about their behavior last month. Well, those data are now in, and the news is good: Insiders significantly cut back on their selling in June.

Corporate insiders, of course, are a company's officers, directors, and largest shareholders. They are required to report to the SEC any transaction they undertake involving shares of their companies' stock. Many research organizations gather that data and analyze them. One such organization is Argus Research, which publishes its findings in a weekly newsletter called the Vickers Weekly Insider Report. According to their latest issue, which was published on Monday, the average insider last week sold 1.39 of his company's shares for each one that he bought.

For insider transactions reported in the first week of June, in contrast, the sell-to-buy ratio was 2.49-to-1, according to Vickers. So in the wake of the stock market's steep decline during June, the average insider markedly cut back on the ratio of his selling relative to his buying. Though you might concede that this is an encouraging trend, you still might argue that a sell-to-buy ratio of 1.39-to-1 is bearish, since it means that the average insider is selling more of his company's shares than he is buying.

But the presupposition of this argument is mistaken: It turns out to be entirely normal for insiders to sell more than they buy. In fact, according to Vickers, the 36-year average for the insider sell-to-buy ratio is between 2-to-1 and 2.5-to-1. Furthermore, according to Nejat Seyhun, a finance professor at the University of Michigan who has closely studied insider behavior, companies' increasing use of share grants and options in recent years has probably shifted the "normal" range of the sell-to-buy ratio upward to around 6-to-1.

From That Perspective, Insiders' Recent Behavior Would Appear To Be Even More Bullish. To be sure, insiders' behavior is not a foolproof market-timing tool [[— especially short-term; they have a STRONG 'normal' tendency to buy during dips and sell during rallies: normxxx]]. They were bullish a month ago, for example, and the stock market nevertheless proceeded to fall markedly. Indeed, their behavior has been bullish throughout the decline that began last fall.

But I shouldn't have to remind anyone that there is no foolproof market-timing tool. Successful market timing over the long term requires an intelligent playing of the odds at each point along the way. And following the lead of the insiders is based on the simple notion that they know more about their companies' prospects than the rest of us. That strikes me as an intelligent bet. [[BUT, while the logic is impeccable, and works reasonably well for indivdual stocks, once the stats are suitably 'corrected' for the 'noise' (something that Thompson Financial used to do very well— until Wall Street put a stop to it), it doesn't seem to work very well for the market as a whole.: normxxx]]



Subprime Loss Estimates: Consensus Is Too Pessimistic
Walk Through The Numbers, And You'll See Why


By Thomas Brown, Bankstocks.Com | 7 July 2008

We’ve been saying for a while now that the cumulative credit losses from the subprime mortgage market won’t be nearly as high as the consensus seems to think. Judging by how the financial stocks have been acting lately, not a single person on the planet believes us. Oh well. These things take time— so let me take another stab at this. In particular, allow me to walk you through some numbers that I believe show, compellingly, why it is that the consensus subprime loss numbers being thrown around are nearly mathematically impossible to achieve.

Ready? For the purposes of this discussion, let’s use as "consensus" the loss estimates lately being published by the analysts at UBS. UBS has been publishing numbers for as long as anyone on the Street, and the analysts’ work there is especially thorough. (If anything, in fact, the "real" consensus loss number might even be higher than UBS’s estimates.) At a conference call earlier this week, UBS said it believes the cumulative loss on the ABX 06-1 subprime mortgage index will come to 19.5% when all is said and done, and will be 29.6% on the ABX 06-2. As I say, that’s way too pessimistic.

I’ll explain why in a minute. First, a quick review of how we come up with our estimates. To get to expected cumulative losses, we look at the loans that comprise the ABX indices and add up a) realized losses to date, b) estimated losses from loans that are seriously (like, more than 60 days’) delinquent and real estate owned, and c) estimated losses from loans that are still current. As it happens, estimating a and b above isn’t all that hard. Essentially all of those loans will go bad, or have already. It’s just what will happen to c, the loans that are still current, that’s the area of conjecture.

Servicer Reports Filed Monthly

Anyway, as to how we come up with our numbers. Recall that each ABX index consists of 20 securitized mortgage trusts. The servicers of those trusts file reports on the 25th of each month that update the performance of the loans, through the last day of the month. The servicer reports filed June 25th capture loan performance through the end of May. We model each trust individually, then roll up the totals to arrive at a loss estimate for each ABX index.

Now to the numbers, using the a-b-c method of analysis described above.

First, the sum of the realized losses to date incurred by the 20 trusts that make up ABX 06-1 represents 2.8% of the sum of the trusts’ beginning balances. Next, we estimate losses that will come from seriously delinquent loans. We assume that 75% of loan dollars 61 to 90 days past due become real estate owned (REO), that 90% of loans 90 days past due go to REO, and 95% of loans in foreclosure go to REO. We then add these numbers to the REO total and assume 55% severity to arrive at our estimate of losses for past-due loans.

OK so far? The roll rates we assume are well above historic averages and even a little higher than what has occurred in recent months, so I feel comfortable that they’re conservative. Using these assumptions, we get to a loss rate on delinquent loans of 7.5%. Our story thus far: realized losses come to 2.8%, while "pipeline" losses on delinquent loans are another 7.5%, for a total of 10.3% in cumulative losses.

Getting to 19.5%

But UBS’s loss estimate for 06-1, remember, is 19.5%. Where will those losses come from? Well, one place they won’t come from is the loans in the trust that have already been repaid— which account for fully 58% of the index’s original balance. Rather, the 9.2% incremental losses UBS expects have to come from the loans in the trusts that are still current.

We’ve studied those loans closely. We’ve looked at their underwriters, the locations of the properties, loan-to-value ratios, levels of documentation, and borrowers’ FICOs, and have come up with an estimate that still-performing loans in the trusts will generate a cumulative loss of . . . 2.5%. That brings our estimate of total cumulative losses for 06-1 to 12.7%, rather than the 19.5% UBS expects.

Wait a minute!, I hear you saying. Losses of just 2.5% from the performing loans? That seems way, way too low.

No, it’s not. If anything, it’s likely too high. Here’s why. Remember, 61% of the beginning balance of the ABX 06-1 has either paid off or charged off, while another 14% of the original balance is 60 or more days delinquent or in REO. That leaves just 25% of the original balance as performing.

Higher Than The Loans Already Gone Bad

Again, if you assume 80% of loans 60 days past due roll all the way though to REO, and then 55% loan severity, that 2.5% loss estimate means that 22% of loans still performing will eventually go delinquent. That is a very conservative number. Why? It’s higher than the cumulative delinquency rate that has occurred already. And those loans, recall, included the weakest credits in the trust— the legions of speculators and con artists who walked away as soon as their properties were underwater.

So we’re assuming the performance of the still-current loans will turn out to be even worse than what’s already occurred with the loans that are in serious trouble and have been charged off!

So, then, what would have to happen to get to UBS’s 19.5% cumulative default rate? The bank doesn’t share the details about how it gets to its number. But we can back into it using our model, to see what their estimate implies. I do know UBS assumes severity of 60%. That would raise the cumulative losses from the past-due loans to 8.1%. That means that the loans still performing have to create an incremental 8.6% cumulative losses.

Unbelievable

Which gets us to the incredible-number portion of the discussion. If you assume an 80% roll rate and 60% severity, to get to the loss estimate UBS has in mind, 72% of the currently performing loans would have to default. That is not a typo: 72%.

I somehow don’t think that’s going to happen. As you see, the vast majority of the difference between our loss estimate for 06-1 and UBS’s boils down to how many of the loans still performing (for 2½ years!) will default. Given that the cumulative delinquency rate to date has been just 20%, and includes the frauds, speculators, and weakest credits, I have a high degree of confidence that our number, not UBS’s, will turn out to be closer to the mark.

Even so, Wall Street seems to be laboring under the impression that losses will zoom to stratospheric levels. Oh, they’ll be high, there’s no doubt about that. But even the numbers put out by relatively sober-minded analysts have essentially no chance of happening. Eventually investors will sooner or later figure that out.

Normxxx    
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The contents of any third-party letters/reports above do not necessarily reflect the opinions or viewpoint of normxxx. They are provided for informational/educational purposes only.

The content of any message or post by normxxx anywhere on this site is not to be construed as constituting market or investment advice. Such is intended for educational purposes only. Individuals should always consult with their own advisors for specific investment advice.

Wednesday, July 23, 2008

He That Sells What Isn’t His‘n

Investment Strategy: "He That Sells What Isn’t His‘n"

By Jeffrey Saut | 21 July 2008

"He that sells what isn’t his‘n must buy it back or go to pris`n" is an old stock market axiom that has stood the test of time. Loosely translated, it means that if you sell a stock "short" (betting that it is going down in price), you are responsible for ANY loss incurred if that stock rallies. And, last week that old market "saw" took on new meaning when the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) changed the rules on "naked" short-selling (see last Wednesday’s WSJ story).

Clearly, "naked" short-selling [[technically illegal for such as you or I, but not for certain Wall Street 'traders': normxxx]] has been a "dirty" little secret on Wall Street for years, but that has now changed with the revelations from the SEC. Indeed, last week the SEC changed the rules and required that "naked" short-sales, in certain securities, be settled like the majority of stock transactions. To us, this was the "lit match" for the already gasoline-layered environment in the equity markets.

Manifestly, the selling-stampede was already "long of tooth" since most such stampedes rarely last more than 30 sessions. [Recall that selling-stampedes tend to run 17 - 25 sessions with only 1 - 3 day countertrend pauses, and/or counter-trend attempts, before they exhaust themselves.] In fact, the longest "buying stampede" chronicled in our notes was the 38-session upside-stampede into the October 1987 "crash," while the longest selling-stampede occurred between May and July of 2002 and encompassed 44 sessions. Consequently, for the past few weeks we have been looking for some kind of "throwback" rally since 7-1-08 was session 30 from the DJIA’s May 19th high. As stated in our July 7th missive, "It’s not that we are turning aggressively bullish, but we think that unless the markets are in ‘crash mode,’ it is time to consider a corrective stock market rally."

Additionally, our proprietary oversold indicator was more oversold than it has been in a very long time, so the stage was set. And when the SEC changed the rules on "naked" short-sales, that "spark" lit the "gasoline" and the rest, as they say, is history. The result was an explosive rally, especially in the Financials, that began last Tuesday, lifting the Financial Select Sector SPDR (XLF/20.67) an eye-popping 13% by Thursday’s close. According to one savvy seer, that was an 11 standard deviation event (for comparison purposes, a 4 standard deviation event is an event that is supposed to occur only once every 31,000 years).

Given the SEC’s mandate, it was not surprising that the highest shorted stocks rallied the most (+15%), while the lowest shorted stocks rallied only 2%. It will be interesting, therefore, to see if last week’s "short covering" rally can sustain and broaden out this week. Whatever the outcome, we think the selling-stampede has ended. How far the rally will carry is unknowable, but we believe the equity markets have further "upside legs."

Does that mean we think this marks the end of the stock market’s and economy’s consternations? Well, not really, for while "things" may not get a whole lot worse from here, we have a difficult time believing "things" will get materially better either. Indeed, our longer-term thoughts were best summed-up in an email exchange with one particularly bright Raymond James financial advisor who emailed us last week.

"I started out in this industry near the end of one of the most devilish parts of the S&L crisis. I can remember my boss at a small IM&R branch saying ‘We can't make payroll this week and maybe next.’ I was 22 years old and just cutting my teeth in this business. What a wake up call! We got through it, but my question to you is what is worse. The $200 Billion loss in market cap of CitiGroup (C/$19.35) and $2+ trillion market cap losses in Financial Sector over the last year, or the $160 Billion taxpayer bill due to the S&L implosion of 747 thrifts in the late 1980's? Can you compare the magnitude of these events and is this worse?"

The response read:

"I started out my career 38 years ago as an analyst and this is the worst credit market environment I’ve seen. First, consumers are over-borrowed and their net worth is now in decline from lower residential real estate values and declining stock portfolios. Mortgage rate resets, and higher rates on credit card debts / personal loans, are squeezing the consumer even more [[and, by all acounts, will increasingly continue to do so: normxxx]].

"Therefore, consumers are getting squeezed; and retirees are even worse off. A recent Ernst & Young report (see bullet points below) states 77 million Americans will retire over the next several years and that
three out of five of them will outlive their retirement benefits. Consequently, most working consumers, and the vast majority of retirees, are being severely squeezed by declining asset values, rising prices of energy, food, medical costs, insurance, etc. and have inadequate, or insufficient, retirement benefits.

"I can’t compare today with the S&L crisis, but I think
the risks today are potentially greater because the amount of debt being carried by the average consumer is so much greater. A report I read late last year (I can’t remember the source) said that in 1994, 50% of average consumers’ annual household cash flow came from borrowings (the rest from salaries, wages, bonuses, commissions). By 2006, however, the borrowings component was up to an astounding 86% of average cash flow.

"Americans have taken down a lot of second mortgage debt, credit card debt, and personal loan debt to buy cars, boats and other high priced items; and, they are now unable to deal with the higher interest rates being charged on adjustable home mortgages [[we are NOT talking sub-prime mortgagers here: normxxx]] and credit card balances. I’m fearful that this could be the worst squeeze on consumer seen in the last fifty years."

So where do we stand? We think we are the middle of the envisioned "W" shaped economic pattern. To wit, the economic "slide" began in 2007, which is the downward-sloping left side of the "W." Said slide freaked-out the politicos, as well as the Federal Reserve, causing them to take Herculean efforts in an attempt to stave off a recession. Those efforts have caused the economy to enter the upward-sloping middle part of the "W" whereby the stimulus gives participants the feeling that the worse has been averted and the economy will accelerate from here with an attendant rally in the equity markets.

Unfortunately, we doubt that will be the way things will play. Our sense remains that with the over-stimulation comes higher than expected inflation, which will eventually lead the Fed to raise interest rates and cause the economy to slow again (the downward-sloping middle right side of the "W"), or the fabled economic doubled-dip. Nevertheless, aiding our near-term positive outlook was last week’s price breakdown in crude oil.

For months we have suggested crude was likely putting in a top. That "call" was driven by our sense the politicos were going to propose legislation to force the price of crude downward in front of the elections. While we think such proposals are wrong-footed, in the near term such rhetoric can be impactful; and last week oil broke below its rising trendline in the charts. If the slide continues, and it breaks below $120/bbl, "hot money" will think the top is "in" and act accordingly. This is the reason we have been shy of the energy complex for the past few months, as well as why we have recommended rebalancing ALL energy stocks in the portfolio.

Rebalancing (read: sell partial positions) allows long-term capital gains to accrue in the portfolio, and causes cash positions to rise, giving investors the "ammunition" to take advantage of new investment opportunities as they present themselves. For the last few weeks we have suggested, "At such a potential short-term downside inflection point, what you need to buy are those companies/indices with the best relative strength characteristics and those with the worst relative strength characteristics. Since we already own those with the best characteristics, we have concentrated on those with the worst characteristics. Consequently, our vehicles of choice were financials and real estate."

The call for this week: If the decline in crude oil continues to play, it should be bullish for stocks. Indeed, just as in horseshoes and hand-grenades, all you have to be is "close" when attempting to "catch" a bottom in the stock market to make a lot of money if you adopt a scale-in buying approach, which is what we have attempted to do over the past few weeks! As stated two weeks ago, "What a great time to be an investor" for if you are a well prepared investor, volatility breeds opportunity.

Ernst & Young Report (Highlights):

  • Three out of five middle class retirees can expect to outlive their financial assets if they attempt to maintain their current pre-retirement standard of living. Guaranteed income is projected to cover a decreasing share of retirement income, leaving households with increased responsibility for their retirement and at increasing risk of retirement vulnerability.

  • Middle income Americans entering retirement will have to reduce their standard of living by an average of 24% to minimize the likelihood of outliving their financial assets. Those Americans seven years out from retirement are even less prepared and the study estimates that they will have to reduce their standard of living by an average of 37%. Those Americans with Social Security as their only guaranteed income have a 90% chance of outliving their financial assets during retirement.

  • The very real possibility of living to age 90 or 100, combined with the volatility of inflation and investment returns, means that the risk of outliving one’s assets is quite high. Without additional guaranteed lifetime income streams, such as income provided by an annuity, middle-income Americans are at high risk of outliving their financial assets and living their final years in poverty.

.


Investment Strategy: "the System Will Hold Together!"

By Jeffrey Saut | 14 July 2008

. . . Maxwell Emory from the movie "Rollover"

"The system will hold together" is a line spoken by Maxwell Emory (played by Hume Cronyn) in the 1981 movie "Rollover." The film centers on a plot whereby Mr. Emory, who is the chairman of First New York Bank, is secretly moving "the Arabs’" money out of U.S. dollars and into gold using a mysterious bank account numbered 21214. When the plot is discovered, gold prices soar, the stock market crashes and Maxwell Emory puts a bullet through his head. And, we couldn’t help reflecting on said movie late last week as rumors swirled that Fannie Mae (FNM/$10.25) and Freddie Mac (FRE/$7.75) were insolvent. [[So!?! Why should only our hummongous investment banks be insolvent?: normxxx]] The result was a continuation of the crash in the "Bobbsey Twins’" (aka: Government Sponsored Enterprise, or GSEs) share price with an attendant swoon in the major market averages.

Eerily, we wrote about Fannie Mae years ago in a report titled,
"Measure Twice and Cut Once" (written 4-28-2005) suggesting that, in our opinion, NOBODY can figure out FMN’s accounting and therefore its shares should be avoided. We concluded those comments by stating, "By our method of chart interpretation the financials have ‘put in’ a massive top and are now in ‘bear mode.’ Additionally, the poster children of the financials, namely the over-loved Citigroup (C/$44.52 [$16.19 as of 07/11/08]) and Fannie Mae (FNM/$54.21), have completely broken down in the charts and should, from a technical perspective, be sold and/or reduced on rallies."

That said, in my opinion these two GSEs will not be allowed to fail because the collateral damage would be global, as well as enormous, since their "paper" is held by institutions around the world. Also, allowing these GSEs to fail would accelerate the current credit crunch and send the housing complex even further into a death spiral. While some are suggesting a "conservatorship" approach under the Federal Housing Enterprises Act, we peg the probability of that as low due to capital cushion/statutory capital issues. Similarly, we think the odds of a capital infusion by the government to be low, as is the government’s implicit backing of the GSEs’ debt.

I guess bringing the GSEs on to the federal balance sheet makes some sense because assertions that would increase the government’s debt by $5.3 trillion are an overstatement. Indeed, the $5.3 trillion figure refers to the GSEs’ holdings of mortgages/loan-guarantees, which are not the same thing as liabilities. Still, such a nationalization of the GSEs would require congressional approval and that would likely take a long time [[not with the fires of Hell to spur the assorted miscreants, from congress to the administration to the Fed to ... And, it's a wonder what corners can be cut if there is no one eager to prosecute. : normxxx]]....

Our guess is the solution lies in either a private capital infusion, with certain guarantees like with Bear Stearns [[not viable; they're simply too big: normxxx]], or giving the GSEs the ability to draw on lines of credit from the Treasury Department and/or the Fed [[I believe BB has already committed to such a course: normxxx]]. In any event, I would be shocked if some action is not taken and taken quickly. Manifestly, it appears the only entities showing decent growth in the mortgage business have been Freddie and Fannie, so impinging these two behemoths in any way would worsen an already dicey environment, which was punctuated yet again by the FDIC’s seizure of IndyMac (IMB/$0.28) over the weekend.

Clearly the GSE gottcha’ of last week cast a pall over Wall Street, which was already struggling with new all-time highs in the price of crude oil. Plainly, at least so far, we have been wrong with our "call" that the politicians are going to do anything and everything in an attempt to force the price of oil lower before the elections. Last week’s price surge seemed to be driven by fears that Iran’s 2.5 million barrels per day of oil exports will be interrupted, exhausting any spare OPEC capacity. While the GSEs’ situation is worrisome, our sense is that the current market mauling is mainly about the vertiginous rise in crude’s price. Indeed, we have been adamant since the beginning of this year that the U.S. would NOT experience a recession in 2008 as defined by two negative quarters of GDP. However, we are becoming increasingly worried about 2009’s recession prospects unless crude "cracks" and cracks soon.

Indeed, the "perfect storm" seems to be having an increasing impact on the American consumer. Most recently, we have argued that what we may experience is a "W" shaped economic pattern, often referred to as a "double dip." While it’s true that as of yet we haven’t had a severe economic slide (read: recession), said recession was prevented by the herculean efforts of the Federal Reserve and the politicians.

Those efforts muted the economic slowdown, but, in my opinion, have potentially only pushed the recession further out in time. Consequently, I think we are in the middle part of the "W" pattern where participants believe the worse is behind us. Unfortunately, unless the environment changes, and changes quickly, I think we will enter the right side of the "W" pattern, resulting in a double-dip. And, maybe this is what the equity markets are sniffing out.

Speaking to the equity markets, today is session 38 in the "selling stampede," and my oversold indicator remains more oversold than it has been in decades. In last week’s letter I related that Lowry’s point spread between its Selling Pressure Index (read: supply) and its Buying Power Index (read: demand) was at 265 points at the 1974 stock market "lows." Currently, that spread is over 500 points, the largest in the 75 year history of the Lowry’s Organization, and therefore VERY oversold. Meanwhile, the Bespoke Investment group notes:

"Want another frustrating fact about this market? Recently, it seems that every time the market goes higher, it goes lower by a greater amount the next day. We quantified this by looking at every time this has happened in a 50-day period going back to 1940. You guessed it. We’ve just completed the most ‘up one day, down the next’ events in a 50-day period in nearly 70 years."

In this whipsaw environment, trading has been difficult. However, our yield theme recommendations (read: dividends) are holding up pretty well. Some of the names that play to this theme and are favorably rated by our fundamental analysts remain Linn Energy (LINE/$23.37/Outperform), Alaska Communication (ALSK/$12.22/Outperform), Embarq (EQ/$43.50/Strong Buy), Inergy (NRGY/$24.98/Strong Buy), Legacy Reserves (LGCY/$24.70/Strong Buy), Magellan (MGG/$22.51/Strong Buy), and Teekay (TOO/$19.46/Strong Buy, to name but a few.

The call for this week: Friday felt like Bear Stearns II, since the news about the GSEs broke on Friday just as with Bear Stearns. Hopefully, this week will be a déjà vu dance of the week following the Bear Stearns’ news with the financials leading the way to the upside. Yet as Michael Steinhardt recently said, "There is rarely a moment such as this where as a contrarian, one sees so many reasons technically, [and] stock market-wise, to be bullish. I can’t imagine a circumstance where a market is more available, more ripe, for a rally than this one. Still, this time it is different."



Investment Strategy: "why It’s A Great Time To Be An Investor"

By Jeffrey Saut | 10 July 2008

Memo to investors:

"This is what you get paid for. Volatility. Stomach-churning drops. Watching your paper wealth evaporate. Stock market profits aren’t free. Garbage collectors (at least, in non-union towns) know they have to turn up in the morning and pick up people’s trash in order to get paid. Piano teachers know they have to teach piano to pay the rent. Shop keepers have to tend to a shop. Only investors in the stock market expect to be like the lilies of the field.

They toil not, neither do they spin. Could Wall Street just send us the checks every month please? The reality is that investors also have to earn their money— through brains and nerves. The brains can mean doing smart things— like buying Apple when it started to turn around.
More often, they simply are doing dumb things, like buying Pets.com. The nerves mean not panicking or getting swayed by fear, at the bottom, or greed, at the top."
. . .
The Wall Street Journal Online

"The nerves mean not panicking or getting swayed by fear, at the bottom, or greed, at the top;" indeed, this is why another long-embraced mantra hangs on the wall of our office stating, "The stock market is fear, hope, and greed, only loosely connected to the business cycle!" To be sure, this is the only business where when prices are LOW they let stocks go and when prices are HIGH they want to buy. And that, ladies and gentlemen, seemed to be the mood on the Street of Dreams last week as participants "sold" at what we think feels more like the end of the envisioned selling-stampede rather than the beginning of a another new "leg" to the downside. Accordingly, we scribed a special strategy alert last Wednesday (7/2/08), one of only four such alerts we have penned over the past 10 years. It read:

"In yesterday’s verbal strategy comments we stated, ‘These will be the last strategy comments of the week.’ But, little did we know that yesterday, and maybe today (last Tuesday/Wednesday), would mark the potential turning point for the equity markets, at least on a short-term basis.

Consequently, we thought we would share with you what we told institutional accounts all day yesterday. To wit, it is day 30 in the ‘selling stampede’ (today is day 31) and I can count on one hand when such skeins have lasted for more than 30 sessions. Moreover, our proprietary oversold indicator is more oversold than it has been in a few years. Additionally, the set-up looks right with EVERYBODY gone for the holiday-shortened week.

The clincher was that we told our early morning callers the ideal daily pattern would be a sharply lower opening followed by a rally attempt, which fails, leading to a lower low with the equity markets then firming into the closing bell.
And, that is exactly what we got! We further opined, ‘We don’t know if it will be Tuesday or Wednesday, so we recommend buying some trading positions today and tomorrow with close trailing stop-loss points to minimize the risk’."

"At such a potential short-term downside inflection point, what you need to buy are those companies/indices with the best relative strength characteristics and those with the worst relative strength characteristics. Since we already own those with the best characteristics (energy, agriculture, materials, water, etc.), we concentrated on those with the worst characteristics. Consequently, our vehicles of choice were financials and real estate. The exchange-traded funds we are using are: ProShare Ultra Financials (UYG/$19.54); Financial Select Sector SPDR (XLF/$19.94); ProShare Ultra Real Estate (URE/$26.66); SPDR S&P Homebuilders (XHB/$15.98); and ProShares Ultra S&P 500 (SSO/$59.82)."

"The call for today: Never say never; never say always; always reevaluate; and, never give up! Indeed, if at first you don’t succeed, try, try again!"

Consistent with our strategy of NEVER buying an entire position all at once, we told accounts to buy a one-third trading tranche last Tuesday, another one-third tranche on Wednesday, and complete the final one-third tranche on Thursday (before the long weekend) if the equity markets took another tumble. Our strategy was based on the belief that Wall Street was, "Moving the headstones around, but not moving the graves!" Manifestly, over the past few weeks every time the "bears" have wanted to drive stocks lower they have trotted out rumors that Israel was going to bomb Iran and the Hormuz Straits would subsequently be closed. The result has been a surge in crude oil prices with an attendant stock swoon. To us, this constantly repeated rumor is getting pretty "worn." Still, given last week’s holiday-shortened, limited audience environment, the "sellers" had a vacuum in which to sell (no buyers) and the results speak for themselves.

Our stance was/is that if there were no geopolitical events over the holiday weekend, participants might just return in "buy ‘em mode" with an upside "buying vacuum." Plainly, these thoughts have been reflected in our verbal comments where we suggested what we are experiencing is a "raindrop bottom" whereby if you bought scaled "in" trading positions last week you might get "hit" by a few raindrops, but were unlikely to get very wet. So far that stance has been generally correct, which brings us to this week.

For us, this week represents a critical week. Today is day 33 in the selling-stampede, and unless we are in "crash mode," our belief is that we are making a "raindrop bottom" on a trading basis. Yet, the situation is far from a "lead pipe cinch," for as the Lowry’s organization noted in Friday’s missive:

Major market trends in the stock market are largely reflections of the collective emotions of hope, fear or greed expressed by millions of active investors. . . . Last Friday, the DJIA finally fell 20% from its high, meeting the minimum requirement of an ‘official’ bear market. . . . This looked to a gaggle of analysts as convincing evidence that the bear market was over just one day after it officially began. . . . (But), several factors make it unlikely that a major market low will be formed in the near future.

Unfortunately, we agree with the good folks at Lowry’s about the longer-term scheme of things. In fact, we are one of the few people that wrote about the Dow Theory "sell signal" registered in November 2007, which is why we entered 2008 in a cautious mode with oversized holdings of cash. Yet, we think a tradable "low" is at hand and are positioning accounts accordingly. If we are wrong, we will be stopped-out consistent with another one of our mantras, "Better to lose face and save skin!"

As for the investing side of portfolios, we continue to embrace the dividend yield theme, and our stock recommendations that play to it, so often mentioned in these reports. We also urge you to read the addendum attached to this report. Said addendum reprises some verbal comments made by our fundamental analysts over the past few weeks. We continue to invest accordingly.

The call for this week: We began this week’s report with a quote from The Wall Street Journal that read, "The nerves mean not panicking or getting swayed by fear, at the bottom, or greed, at the top." Last November we wrote about the Dow Theory "sell signal" when prices were high yet participants wanted to "buy." Now we are writing about the Dow Theory downside non-confirmation and prices are low yet participants want to let stocks "go" (read: sell stocks).

Meanwhile, it is session 33 in the "selling stampede," our proprietary oversold indicator is more oversold than it was at the March 2003 "low" (we were bullish there as well), the spread between Lowry’s Buying Power Index (demand) and Lowry’s Selling Pressure Index (supply) is the widest in the 75-year history of Lowry’s (indicating that stocks are very, very severely oversold), corporate insiders’ selling is at rock-bottom lows, and we are seeing numerous other indices not confirming the D-J Industrial’s "downside dive." It’s not that we are turning aggressively bullish, but we think that unless the markets are in "crash mode" it is time to consider a corrective stock market rally as B.J Thomas warms up in the wings with the song "Raindrops."

Addendum:

Paul Puryear, Director Of Real Estate Research
We look for housing prices to continue to fall. In 18 countries over the past 40 years the average housing market decline has been around five years long, some have averaged seven years. Currently, the U.S. is in year three of the current cycle. Though the affordability index has improved and is back up to 100; only because of declining prices. The worst data point, at this time, is the level of inventory.

There are currently about four million houses for sale in the U.S. and about 1.5 million for rent. Inventories are continuing to build. Another negative in housing is the mortgage default rates. In the U.S. there are about 55 million mortgages and of these approximately 6.5 million are currently delinquent. Of the 6.5 million that are delinquent, about 2.5 million are in foreclosure. The subprime delinquencies have stabilized for now, but overall all loan categories are seeing increases in delinquencies.

On the REIT front, we still like defensive names. We favor commercial over residential REITs that tend to focus more on growth. Our favorites at this time are Corporate Office Properties Trust (OFC/$33.63/Outperform), Essex Property Trust (ESS/$107.61/Outperform), Kimco Realty Corporation (KIM/$34.06/Outperform), Cogdell Spencer, Inc. (CSA/$16.28/Outperform), Digital Realty Trust (DLR/$40.91/Outperform), and Washington REIT (WRE/$29.62/Outperform). These are the six names on the REIT Priority List.

Marshall Adkins, Director Of Energy Research
The Energy sector is still in a secular bull market. We are bearish on the natural gas complex. We believe speculators are correct on the current price of oil and analysts that have set lower target prices on crude oil are incorrect. Oil prices have been increasing since 2005 when OPEC decreased production by two million barrels per day. Most countries have been unable to make up this production shortfall. China only consumes what the U.S. consumed in 1900, based on per capita data.

In contrast, gas supply has been surging recently. In addition to production shortfalls, the weakness in the U.S. Dollar has quintupled the price of crude oil for the U.S. On the other hand, Europe has seen a doubling of oil prices. This shows the disparities. Most likely, drilling will continue to increase since shale is so cost competitive. For example, Barnett Shale is five to eight times more productive than average. In addition, electric consumption in the U.S. is up only 1% over the last year. This will most likely lead to record storage by August of 2008.

We are convinced that within six to nine months gas prices will take a significant downturn. Five out of seven years in the 1970s oil prices went up as the U.S. dollar went up. Therefore, there is really no argument that a strong dollar will lead to lower oil prices. Taking a look at price manipulation, the top 10 oil companies in the world own less than 4% of the world’s supply. We ask the question, "How are they manipulating it?"

They’re not. Our favorite area is Haynesville, because the costs of extraction are so low and it will continue to be drilled. Deepwater is also a great area right now— we favor Helix Energy Solutions Group, Inc (HLX/$37.71/Strong Buy), which we believe is a turnaround story. We also like National Oilwell Varco, Inc. (NOV/$85.12/Strong Buy).

Bill Fisher, Industrial And Logistics Services Analyst
Waste Connections (WCN/$31.12/Strong Buy) has increased prices by about 4% and these price increases seem to be sticking. At this time, Waste Connections is the best name in the category. Republic Services (RSG/$29.15/Strong Buy) was the best name for a period of time. We believe that money in RSG will most likely shift to WCN. 55% of Waste Connections’ business is monopolized.

Fuel expenses are hurting Waste Connections by about a nickel per share, but the company should be able to get this back with the increased prices. At this time, Waste Connections has about $500 million on its books for acquisitions. Many family-owned waste companies are in the market to sell out of fear that an election win for Obama may lead to an increase in the capital gains tax rates. In addition, if the Republic Services Group and the Allied Waste (AW/$12.44/Outperform) deal goes through, the justice department should push for divestiture. Waste Connections would be in a position to buy up some of the divested businesses.

Fuel surcharges on international shipments have hurt UPS (UPS/$59.47/Outperform). The increase in prices for premium air shipping has caused consumes to "trade down" in favor of lower cost ground shipping. Though UPS still has a 30% return on equity (ROE). With today’s (6/23/2008) hit in the stock price, UPS is trading at the same price it was approximately nine years ago. DHL is losing about $1 billion per quarter in the U.S. UPS has recently cut a deal with DHL.

John Ransom, Director Of Healthcare Research
In the healthcare area there is a lot of uncertainty due to the upcoming presidential election. Obama would be disastrous for managed care, Medicare providers, and pharmaceutical names. Stocks in these categories should be doing well in this economic environment since they are defensive, but fear of Obama winning the presidential election has hurt their performance. For the pharmaceutical names, bringing new drugs to market is no longer an easy task. Money is going back into genetic treatments. Another factor is the weaker economy, which should hurt healthcare companies. You need to look at the balance sheet, rising volumes, which is rare, a reasonable valuation, and earnings upside.

There are three names that we like. McKesson (MCK/$54.59/Strong Buy)) has 15% sales growth and 25% is healthcare IT. Compare this to Cerner Corporation (CERN/$44.22/Outperform). MCK is cheap with a tremendous amount of growth. We like this stock a lot. Amedisys (AMED/$49.03/Strong Buy) is another good choice. We estimate that Amedisys could earn approximately $4 per share in 2009. In addition, home healthcare is booming. Everyone saves money with home healthcare.

ß§

Normxxx    
______________

The contents of any third-party letters/reports above do not necessarily reflect the opinions or viewpoint of normxxx. They are provided for informational/educational purposes only.
The content of any message or post by normxxx anywhere on this site is not to be construed as constituting market or investment advice. Such is intended for educational purposes only. Individuals should always consult with their own advisors for specific investment advice.

The Point Of Maximum Danger

The Global Economy Is At The Point Of Maximum Danger

By Ambrose Evans-Pritchard | 21 July 2008

It feels like the summer of 1931. The world's two biggest financial institutions have had a heart attack. The global currency system is breaking down. The policy doctrines that got us into this mess are bankrupt. No world leader seems able to discern the problem, let alone forge a solution.

The International Monetary Fund has abdicated into schizophrenia. It has upgraded its 2008 world growth forecast from 3.7% to 4.1% growth, whilst warning of a[n increased] "chance of a global recession". Plainly, the IMF cannot or will not offer any useful insights.

Its "mean-reversion" model misses the entire point of this crisis, which is that central banks have pushed debt to fatal levels by holding interest too low for a generation, and now the chickens have come home to roost. True "mean-reversion" would imply debt deflation on such a scale that would, if abrupt, threaten democracy.

The risk is that these same central banks will commit a fresh error, this time overreacting to the oil spike. The European Central Bank has raised rates, warning of a '1970s wage-price spiral'. Fixated on the rear-view mirror, it is not looking through the windshield.

The eurozone is falling into recession before the US itself. Its level of credit stress is worse, if measured by Euribor or the iTraxx bond indexes. 'Core' inflation has fallen over the last year from 1.9% to 1.8%. The US may soon tip into a second leg of this crisis as the fiscal package runs out and Americans lose jobs in earnest [[but all of that stimulus by EVERYBODY, inflation be damned, will probably see us into early 2009, at least: normxxx]]. US bank credit has contracted for three months. Real US wages fell at almost 10% (annualised) over May and June. This is a ferocious squeeze for an economy already in the grip of the property and debt crunch.

No doubt the rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac— 5.3 trillion dollar pillars of America's mortgage market— stinks of moral hazard. The Treasury is to buy shares: the Fed has opened its window yet wider. Risks have been socialised. All rewards will go to capitalists [[as will all the soothing ointments: normxxx]]. Alas, no Scandinavian discipline for Wall Street. When Norway's banks fell below critical capital levels in the early 1990s, the Storting authorised seizure. Shareholders were stiffed [[not so for Bush's friends: normxxx]].

But Nordic purism in the vast universe of US credit would court fate. The Californian lender IndyMac was indeed seized after depositors panicked on the streets of Encino. The police had to restore order. This was America's Northern Rock moment.

IndyMac will deplete a tenth of the $53bn reserve of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. The FDIC has some 90 "troubled" lenders on watch. IndyMac was not one of them. The awful reality is that Washington has its back to the wall. Fed chief Ben Bernanke thought the US could always get out of trouble by monetary stimulus "à l'outrance*", and letting the dollar slide. He has learned that the world is a more complicated place.

Oil has queered the pitch. So has America's fatal reliance on foreign debt. The Fannie/Freddie rescue, incidentally, has just changed the US national debt from German 'AAA' levels to Italian 'AA-' levels.

China, Russia, petro-powers and other foreign states own $985bn of US agency debt, besides holdings of US Treasuries. Purchases of Fannie/Freddie debt covered a third of the US current account deficit of $700bn over the last year. Alex Patelis from Merrill Lynch says America faces the risk of a "financing crisis" within months. Foreigners have a veto over US policy.

Japan did not have this problem during its Lost Decade. As the world's supplier of credit, it could let the yen slide. It also had a savings rate of 15%. Albert Edwards from Société Générale says this has fallen to 3% today. It has cushioned the slump. Americans are under water before they start.

My view is that a dollar crash will be averted as it becomes clearer that contagion has spread worldwide. But we are now at the point of maximum danger. Britain, Japan, and the Antipodes are stalling. Denmark is in recession. Germany contracted in the second quarter. May industrial output fell 6% in Holland and 5.5% in Sweden.

The coalitions in Belgium and Austria have just collapsed. Germany's left-right team is fraying. One German banker told me that the doctrines of "left Nazism" (Otto Strasser's group, purged by Hitler) had captured the rising Die Linke party. The Social Democrats are picking up its themes to protect their flank.

This is the healthy part of Europe. Further south, we are not far away from civic protest. BNP Paribas has just issued a hurricane alert for Spain. Finance minister Pedro Solbes said Spain is facing the "most complex" economic crisis in its history. Actually, it is very simple. The country was lulled into a trap by giveaway interest rates of 2% under EMU, leading to a current account deficit of 10% of GDP.

A manic property bubble was funded by foreigners buying 'covered' bonds and securities [[guess they got 'short-sheeted': normxxx]]. This market has dried up. Monetary policy is now being tightened into the crunch by the ECB, hence the bankruptcy last week of Martinsa-Fadesa (€5.1bn). With Franco-era labour markets (70% of wages are inflation-linked), the adjustment will occur through closure of the job marts.

China, India, East Europe and emerging Asia have all stolen growth from the future by condoning credit excess. To varying degrees, they are now being forced to pay back their own "inter-temporal overdrafts".

If we are lucky, America will start to stabilise before Asia goes down. Should our 'leaders' mismanage affairs, almost every part of the global system will go down together. Then we are in trouble.


*"A l'Outrance" means "to the utmost" in French. This term was used to describe a combat or challenge in which the opponents engaged with an intention to kill each other, as opposed to trials of skill at festivals and such, where opponents only fought for their reputation or for prizes.

Normxxx    
______________

The contents of any third-party letters/reports above do not necessarily reflect the opinions or viewpoint of normxxx. They are provided for informational/educational purposes only.

The content of any message or post by normxxx anywhere on this site is not to be construed as constituting market or investment advice. Such is intended for educational purposes only. Individuals should always consult with their own advisors for specific investment advice.

Friday, July 18, 2008

America Is Lone Bright Spot

America Is Lone Bright Spot As Fund Managers Flee Stocks

[ Normxxx Here:  The following is especially ironic, given that Merrill Lynch has put the US financial system on a "death watch" for at least the next 6 months.  ]

By Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, Telegraph.co.UK | 18 July 2008

Fund managers across the world are dumping stocks and retreating to cash in a mood of extreme pessimism, fearing that the looming economic crunch is an even greater threat than inflation. The latest survey of (UK?) investors by Merrill Lynch shows that an unprecedented 41% now think that a world recession is either likely or very likely. The majority dismiss hopes of double-digit earnings growth next year as "fantasy".

"People are a lot more scared about the macro-outlook. The survey has never seen anything like this before since it began a decade ago," said David Bowers, the organiser of the report. "Recession risk has taken over from inflation risk. Fund managers believe the global economy is deteriorating so fast that a wage-spiral is never going to happen, at least in developed markets," he said. The survey is based on 191 funds managing assets worth $610bn (£305bn).

The US is emerging as the one bright spot in the global gloom, despite the credit mayhem. A net 7% of investors are overweight in US equities, clearly betting that most of the bad news is already priced into Wall Street stock prices [[Hah! But reason enough for a "summer rally": normxxx]]. The figure was negative in May [[and June!?!: normxxx]]. With the tailwind of 2% interest rates and a cheap dollar, America stands to benefit from the "first-in, first-out" principle. Others have yet to take their full punishment from the cycle. "The US has now become the country of cheap manufacturing. You've got 20% wage inflation in emerging markets so FDI (foreign direct investment) is flowing back from there," said Karen Olney, Merrill's chief European equity strategist.

The investor love affair with India, China, and Asian markets over the last nine months has turned decidedly sour. "That trade is off," said Mrs Olney. A net 75% are underweight Indian equities as the country's inflation reaches double digits. Chile (-69), Taiwan (-50), Korea (-50), Malaysia (-44) are not far behind. Mr Bowers said investors had woken up to the nasty reality that emerging markets have let rip with inflation and will now have to jam on the brakes.

Those with dollar pegs or dirty floats like China have, in effect, been "destabilised" by the US Federal Reserve's rate cuts. "These countries have used the Fed as their anchor. Rates of 2% have challenged their economic models," he said. Russia (+75) remains the darling of the emerging universe, but for how long? Almost two thirds of investors say oil is fundamentally overvalued. They appear to be hanging on to their oil and gas exposure as a late-cycle "momentum play". A net 42% think the Bank of England has kept interest rates too high given the housing slump and the consumer squeeze. Not a single respondent thinks that the UK is going to get better over the next year. They are ditching bank stocks (-83) and property (-92).

Europe is not faring much better. Some 96% think the economy will get worse over the next year, up sharply from the June survey. A majority believe inflation will fall, and a net 24% say the European Central Bank is engaging in overkill. Not surprisingly, a record 32% are now underweight eurozone equities. Few see stocks as cheap even after the rude sell-off this summer. "Investors think earnings are going into a free-fall," said Mrs Olney. "Healthcare companies offer immunity from the three horrors that are bugging investors: a rising oil price, the slowing economic cycle and the credit crisis."

Japan is sneaking back into favour after years in the wilderness, if only by default. "Japanese banks are the winner from the credit crunch. Japan now has the capacity to be the monopoly supplier of capital to the world once again," said Merrill Lynch.

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Normxxx    
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The contents of any third-party letters/reports above do not necessarily reflect the opinions or viewpoint of normxxx. They are provided for informational/educational purposes only.

The content of any message or post by normxxx anywhere on this site is not to be construed as constituting market or investment advice. Such is intended for educational purposes only. Individuals should always consult with their own advisors for specific investment advice.

US Faces Global Funding Crisis

US Faces Global Funding Crisis, Warns Merrill Lynch

By Ambrose Evans-Pritchard | 18 July 2008

The US Treasury is running out of time before foreign patience "snaps". Merrill Lynch has warned that the United States could face a foreign "financing crisis" within months as the full consequences of the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac mortgage debacle spread through the world.

Draining away: The US may struggle to plug its capital gap

The country depends on Asian, Russian and Middle Eastern investors to fund much of its $700bn (£350bn) current account deficit, leaving it far more vulnerable to a collapse of confidence than Japan in the early 1990s after the Nikkei bubble burst. Britain and other Anglo-Saxon deficit states could face a similar retreat by foreign investors.

"Japan was able to cut its interest rates to zero," said Alex Patelis, Merrill's head of international economics. "It would be very difficult for the US to do this. Foreigners will not be willing to supply the capital. Nobody knows where the limit lies." Brian Bethune, chief financial economist at Global Insight, said the US Treasury had two or three days to put real money behind its rescue plan for Fannie and Freddie or face a dangerous crisis that could spiral out of control.

"This is not the time for policy-makers to underestimate, once again, the systemic risks to the financial system and the huge damage this would impose on the economy. Bold, aggressive action is needed, and needed now," he said. Mr Bethune said the Treasury would have to inject up to $20bn in fresh capital. This in turn might draw in a further $20bn in private money. Funds on this scale should be enough to see the two agencies through any scenario short of a total meltdown in the US prime property market.

He said concerns about "moral hazard"stoked by hard-line free-marketeers at the White House and vocal parts of the US media [[eg, the Rush Limbaughs et al. : normxxx]] were holding up a solution. "We can't dither. The markets can be brutal. We have to break the chain of contagion before confidence is wholly destroyed." Fannie and Freddie— the world's two biggest financial institutions— make up almost half the $12 trillion US mortgage industry. But that understates their vital importance at this juncture. They are now serving as lender of last resort to the housing market, providing 80% of all new home loans.

Roughly $1.5 trillion of Fannie and Freddie AAA-rated debt— as well as other US "government-sponsored enterprises"— is now in foreign hands. The great unknown is whether foreign patience will snap as losses mount and the dollar slides. Hiroshi Watanabe, Japan's chief regulator, rattled the markets yesterday when he urged Japanese banks and life insurance companies to treat US agency debt with caution. The two sets of institutions hold an estimated $56bn of these bonds. Mitsubishi UFJ holds $3bn. Nippon Life has $2.5bn.

But the lion's share is held by the Central Banks of China, Russia and the petro-powers. These countries could all too easily precipitate a run on the dollar in the current climate and bring the United States to its knees, should they decide that it is in their strategic interest to do so. Mr Patelis said it was unlikely that any would want to trigger a fire-sale by dumping their holdings on the market. Instead, they will probably accumulate US and Anglo-Saxon debt at a slower rate.

That alone will be enough to leave deficit countries struggling to plug the capital gap. "I don't see how the current situation can continue beyond six months," he said. Merrill Lynch said foreign governments had added $241bn of US agency debt over the past year alone as their foreign reserves exploded, accounting for a third of total financing for the US current account deficit. (They now own $985bn in all.) By most estimates, China holds around $400bn, Russia $150bn and Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states at least $200bn.

Global inflation is now intruding with a vengeance as well. Much of Asia is having to raise rates aggressively, drawing capital away from North America. This may push up yields on US Treasuries and bonds, tightening the credit screw at a time when the US is already mired in slump. Russia's deputy finance minister, Dmitry Pankin, said the collapse in the share prices of Fannie and Freddie over the past week was irrelevant because their debt has been effectively guaranteed by the US government under the rescue package.

"We don't see a reason to change anything because the rating of the debt of those agencies hasn't changed," he said. Foreign policy experts doubt that the picture is so simple. Russia is likely to use its $530bn reserves as an implicit bargaining chip in high-stakes diplomacy, perhaps to discourage the US from extending Nato membership to the Ukraine and Georgia. Vladimir Putin, now Russia's premier, has stated repeatedly that his country is engaged in a new Cold War with the United States. It is clear that Moscow would relish any chance to humiliate the United States, provided the costs of doing so were not too high for Russia itself.

China is regarded as a more reliable partner, with a greater desire for global stability. Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson has intimate relations with the Chinese elite, dating from his days at Goldman Sachs when he visited the country over 70 times. Brad Setser, from the US Council on Foreign Relations, said the Chinese have a stake in upholding Fannie and Freddie, not least to ensure that their loans are "honoured on time and in full".

David Bloom, currency chief at HSBC, said fears that regional banks could start toppling after the Fed takeover of IndyMac last week were now the biggest threat to the dollar. "We have a pure dollar sell-off," he said. "It's a hating competition: at the moment the markets hate the dollar more than they hate the euro, even though German's ZEW confidence indicator was absolutely atrocious.

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Normxxx    
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The contents of any third-party letters/reports above do not necessarily reflect the opinions or viewpoint of normxxx. They are provided for informational/educational purposes only.

The content of any message or post by normxxx anywhere on this site is not to be construed as constituting market or investment advice. Such is intended for educational purposes only. Individuals should always consult with their own advisors for specific investment advice.

Harbinger Of Doom: European Recession Next?

European Recession Looms As Spain Crumbles

By Ambrose Evans-Pritchard | 18 July 2008

The eurozone is tipping into a deeper downturn than America itself despite the tremors in the US mortgage industry, and may already be in full recession for the first time since the launch of the single currency. Industrial production for the EMU bloc fell 1.9% in May, according to fresh Eurostat data. It is the sharpest one-month decline for the region since the exchange rate crisis in 1992. Officials in Berlin have warned that Germany's economy could contract by as much as 1.5% in the second quarter as export orders crumble.

Industrial output in both Italy and Greece has slumped 6.6% over the past year. Portugal is off 6.2%. "It is a very ugly picture: we're on maximum alert," said Emma Marcegaglia, head of Italy's business federation Confindustria. Rome is now lobbying for a "New Deal" to revive Italy's economy through massive infrastructure projects. The idea is to use bonds issued by the European Investment Bank, allowing EU states to circumvent the 3% limit on budget deficits imposed by the Maastricht Treaty.

Jacques Cailloux, Europe economist at the Royal Bank of Scotland, said a "reverse decoupling" is now under way as Europe goes down harder than the US— just as it did after the dotcom bust. "There is loss of momentum across the board. We can't exclude a recession," he said.

Spain is now spiralling into the worst crisis since the Franco dictatorship. "The economy is in dire straits," said Dominic Bryant, Spain expert at BNP Paribas. "Some of the housebuilders are going to go bust, it is as simple as that. Over 10% of Spain's economy has been building houses. This compares with 6%-7% in the US at the height of the bubble. The adjustment will be enormous," he said.

Fear haunted the Spanish property sector yesterday after the share price of developer Martinsa-Fadesa crashed by more than 50% in two days, leading to a suspension in trading by the Madrid bourse. The real estate and shopping mall group has so far failed to secure refinancing for its €5.1bn ($8.2bn) debt. The board held an emergency meeting yesterday. Finance minister Pedro Solbes said the Martinsa-Fadesa crisis was turning "more complicated" but denied that there is any risk of a chain reaction across the sector. Banco Popular is understood to be the most exposed bank.

The crunch engulfing Spain's property market is rapidly turning into a full-fledged national drama. The developers' association APCE said house prices had already fallen 15% since September. Unemployment has risen by 425,000 over the past year, reaching 9.9%. Deutsche Bank said the property crisis is more serious that the collapse in the early 1990s. It expects a 35% fall in real house prices by 2011 as the market slowly clears the vast overhang of property, now estimated at nearly 700,000 homes.

In Castilla-La Mancha— Don Quixote's region— some 69% of all houses built over the past three years are still unsold. Spain's premier, Jose Luis Zapatero, blamed the European Central Bank for making matters worse by raising interest rates into the teeth of the crisis last week. He called the move "irresponsible". More than 98% of home loans in Spain are priced off floating rates linked to Euribor, which has risen 1.45% since August.

Mr Zapatero has resorted to a fiscal boost worth 1.5% of GDP to help cushion the slump. But Spain's budget surplus is turning into a deficit as tax revenues collapse. Car sales, for instance, fell 31% in May. The Bank of Spain is concerned about the health of smaller regional lenders with heavy exposure to the mortgage market. Deputy governor Jose Vinals has called on banks to set aside more against bad debts. "Provisions need to keep rising throughout the year. Prudent coverage levels are needed to face this situation with confidence," he said.

The precipitous slide now under way in Europe has yet to cause investors to lose their ardour for the euro, but a number of analysts, including Bill Gross, head of the giant bond fund Pimco, say there is no justification for the euro's 25% to 30% 'over-valuation' against the US dollar. "We're turning incredibly bearish on the euro," said BNP Paribas. The counter argument is that the US has merely stolen growth from the future with this spring's one-off fiscal stimulus package. Dollar bears expect a nasty second leg to the crisis later this year, forcing the Fed to slash interest rates to 1% or lower.

Goldman Sachs said Europe is the "tie-breaker" for the whole global economy.



Spain Drops Reassuring Gloss As Crisis Deepens

By Ambrose Evans-Pritchard | 18 July 2008

Spain's finance minister Pedro Solbes has stunned the markets with an admission that his country faces the worst economic crisis in its history as the full effects of the property crash spread through the economy. "This crisis is the most complex we have ever lived through given the plethora of factors on the table at the same time," he told Punto Radio in Madrid, breaking with past efforts to put a reassuring gloss on events.

Mr Solbes said the Madrid bourse had suffered an "earthquake", crashing 27% since the start of June. He blamed the toxic cocktail of high oil prices, the global credit crisis and the sharp slowdown in the key export markets of North America and Germany. The comments follow this week's bankruptcy of Martinsa-Fadesa, Spain's biggest corporate failure. The property developer— with an empire of housing estates, hotels, shopping malls and hotels— collapsed after failing to refinance €5.1bn ($8bn) of debts. The company's demise was a textbook story of aggressive over-expansion at the top of the cycle, driven by high debt gearing. It has €11bn of assets.

Mr Solbes has pursued a rigorous "no bailout" policy, saying Martinsa-Fadesa took "excessive risks" and must now face the consequences. He has reportedly clashed with cabinet colleagues, who are now searching for any means to stop the downward spiral in the economy. El Pais reports that house prices crashed by 20% in the second quarter compared with a year earlier, based on 183,000 completed transactions.

The Martinsa-Fadesa collapse has sent tremors through the whole property and construction sector. The share price of giant developer Sacyr has halved over the past month. The two banks with most exposure to the Martinsa-Fadesa are Caja Madrid, at €900m, and Banco Popular, at €400m. Goldman Sachs has issued "sell" recommendations on a clutch of Spanish banks, including Bankinter, Banco Popular and Banco Sabadell, warning that the sharp turn in the credit cycle could prove worse than the recession in the early 1990s. "The consumer is more leveraged today than in any of the previous cycles," it said.

The ratings agency Standard & Poor's has not yet taken a decision on whether to downgrade Banco Popular and Caja Madrid.

In reality, this is unlikely to be the worst economic crisis in Spain's history. Philip II defaulted on his sovereign debts three times in the 16th century after he bankrupted the Spanish Empire to pay for his Counter-Reformation wars against Protestants. He crippled the Italian banking system in the process— much to the benefit of London and Amsterdam.


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Normxxx    
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The contents of any third-party letters/reports above do not necessarily reflect the opinions or viewpoint of normxxx. They are provided for informational/educational purposes only.

The content of any message or post by normxxx anywhere on this site is not to be construed as constituting market or investment advice. Such is intended for educational purposes only. Individuals should always consult with their own advisors for specific investment advice.

Thursday, July 17, 2008

Jaws Close In

Jaws Close In On Bernanke
Or, How Bush Sandbagged The GSEs


By Julian Delasantellis, AsiaTimes | 16 July 2008

As he was winding down his days of dissolution and reprobation, the 4th century Christian philosopher Augustine of Hippo, commonly referred to as St Augustine, begged for just a few more rounds of divinely sanctioned debauchery. "Lord," he cried out to the heavens, "Give me chastity and continence, but not quite yet."

Currently, as a result of the ever-worsening crises in US housing finance, a crisis being illustrated by the absolute devastation of the shares in the US government's semi-private semi-public secondary market mortgage wholesalers Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and in the government seizing control of mortgage lender IndyMac in one of the largest bank failures in American history, Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke must be raising his gaze to the heavens for a similar entreaty.

"Lord, give me credibility as, and the ability to be, an inflation fighter— but not quite yet." The history of the financial markets since the rescue of Bear Stearns last March 15 is similar to that of the fictional Amity Island in between the first Jaws movie, released in 1975, and its sequel, Jaws 2, from 1978.

At first, after the initial shark had been killed— after Bear Stearns had been saved by aggressive Federal Reserve intervention— everything seemed OK. The markets rallied into mid-May. I would imagine that the souvenir shops selling shark-themed toys and back scratchers on Amity's beaches did likewise. But, then, the markets rolled over: the Dow Jones Industrial Average, after topping out close to 13,200 on May 19, has since lost more than 2,000 points, or 15%. To borrow from the tagline of Jaws 2, "Just when you thought it was safe to go into the stockmarket ... "

Of course, the real danger lying in wait to devour the markets continues to be the crisis in US housing values, as it has now become obvious that the entire edifice of the US financial markets over the past few years has been built on a foundation just about as sturdy as a sandcastle on one of Amity's beaches— the inflated value of US real estate.

Yet, it had been thought that the crisis in subprime mortgages, the root of the financial crises, would leave Fanny and Freddy untouched, since both their respective charters forbade the two enterprises, called government-sponsored entities (GSEs), from investing in them. But it is truly indicative of just how pernicious and metastizing this crisis is that, after devastating all that it has come in contact with for almost a year and a half now, it now strikes deep at the heart of a target previously thought immune.

No one who has wealth or assets in any form, in any currency, is safe— you may as well consider yourself as being at least knee-deep in the shark infested waters of the financial markets. My colleague Chan Akya ably described this burgeoning crisis last week (see And now, for Fannie and Freddie, Asia Times Online, July 12.) He accurately described the possible grim consequences possibly resulting from it, especially a huge expansion of the US federal government's indebtedness, but one thing that needs to be stressed is that because of these events the fight against inflation will most likely once again be placed on the back burner.

"Roosevelt is dead!" the relentlessly rotund radio rabble-rouser Rush Limbaugh cries out every afternoon on the American airwaves, referring to Great Depression and World War II-era US president Franklin Delano Roosevelt. At first, this might seem to be something of an obsessive compulsion with the absolutely obvious, as Roosevelt took his last actual physical breath on earth in April, 1945, shortly before the Allied victory in Europe. But what is really being expressed by Limbaugh is less a declarative statement than a fervent wish that conservatism's triumphs and successes might some day, maybe today, be so overwhelming and comprehensive that, at last, the American public will begin to clamor for the dismantling of the government social safety net emplaced during the Roosevelt era and which has for so long tied the American public to the Democratic Party— and forced those 'malefactors of great wealth' to pay something towards the societal destruction they have wrought, in the form of higher taxes.

Shortly after his re-election victory in 2004, George W Bush apparently thought so, for he immediately staked his political capital on a laissez-faire free-market restructuring plan for the gem in the Roosevelt crown, old-age Social Security. That, and the unpopularity over the Iraq war, drove the Republicans from control of both branches of Congress in the 2006 mid-term elections. Former Republican Senator Rick Santorum of Pennsylvania, defeated in 2006, now probably wishes that he did not have supporters at a 2005 rally that included elderly Social Security pensioners chanting the phrase "Hey hey! Ho ho! Social Security's got to go!"

Like a fungus that dies on exposure to light, the Bush Social Security scheme was dead a few months after it was exposed. However, by then it was impossible for the general media to cover serious issues any longer— they had to come up for sweet draughts of clean and clear tabloid oxygen. Starlets were getting drunk and Brangelina was getting pregnant; both warranted more attention than what the Bush administration was doing with the rest of the government, particularly concerning the always riveting, ever-popular issue of financial markets' regulation.

Grover Norquist, the anti-government jihadist who once said that he wanted to shrink government to such a size that it could be drowned and killed in a bathtub, and his fellow zealots in the Bush administration, certainly got water under their fingernails in dealing with the GSEs. In responding to a series of accounting scandals at the agencies similar to what the rest of the private sector suffered in 2002 and 2003 (see The decline of US equity markets, Asia Times Online, May 10, 2007) Bush and Co pushed the line that these agencies, just like the rest of the government, were poor stewards of, and could not be trusted with, the public purse.

They may have aimed for a bridge too far with the attempted privatization of Social Security, but in then aiming squarely at Fannie and Freddie, which, by financing the suburbs that the GIs returning from World War ll populated en masse, influenced the shape of postwar American life as much as the automobile, the anti-government zealots were zeroing in on a very critical consolation prize. Hoping to hobble the decision making of the two housing agencies, Bush stopped making new appointments to the boards of the GSEs in 2004. He also restricted the amount they could underwrite. There were repeated calls for new regulation of Fannie and Freddie, probably just about the only calls for enhanced regulation that have come out of the US executive branch this millennium. Hearings in the then Republican-controlled Congress were laced with outrage for these two wasteful, bloated government enterprises, whose functions could obviously be carried out in a far superior fashion by the private sector.

The Internet from that era is littered with weighty think tank tomes by such reliably conservative outlets as American Enterprise Institute and Cato Institute, calling for a new, private-sector, risk-transfer mechanism that was not centered around the GSEs. As in the famous curse where the Greek gods would punish mortals by granting their every wish, the Bush free marketeers would get their every wish in the next few years, to their, and the rest of the financial markets, continuing mortification. The core of Freddie and Fannie's operations was to buy up mortgage-backed securities in the open market then either hold them to maturity or sell them back to the market as mortgage-backed securities with the US government's implied backing. Both dispositions transferred the risk of mortgage default away from the banks to Fannie and Freddie.

Up until the freeze up in the credit markets and the crash in subprime finance that occurred last summer, a new risk-transfer mechanism stood as competition in the wholesale mortgage markets. Market shills postulated that, since it did not require participation by the government, it was obviously superior. Instead of having Fannie and Freddie buy the mortgage securities, the new plan involved these being rolled up into mortgage-backed securities (MBS), then sold to other [unsuspecting] private investors, whether they be other commercial and investment banks, hedge funds, or even, as the New York Times reported last December, the city treasury of Narvik, Norway.

After they were sold off once, they were invariably sold off again and again and again, each time, due to the devastatingly alluring miracle of leverage, the original nominal amount of the mortgage being used as collateral for much larger amounts of borrowing and lending. But by not retiring the mortgages through the GSEs, whoever finally wound up with the bonds were still stuck with the risk that the mortgage holders might someday default on the loans. This eventuality was thought to be covered with an instrument called a credit default swap (CDS), in essence, a private insurance policy that the bondholder would purchase from a bank that [hopefully] would pay off in the case of a mortgage holder's default.

With the stranglehold that the Bush administration, and its threatened veto pen, had on any legislative attempts to modernize and adapt the GSEs to current times, slowly the US mortgage market began to evolve away from the purview of Fannie and Freddie.

Regulations prevented Fannie and Freddie from buying up— from "underwriting"— most subprime mortgages because these typically did not carry the substantial borrower downpayments and detailed financial documentation that the agencies' regulations required. Thus, about one third of all mortgage borrowing as the real estate boom frothed over from 2004-2006, went to the CDSs. So did the wholesale market for mortgage loans above the GSEs' statutory limits of $417,000; this meant that, by the end of the boom, even modest three-bedroom, one-bath bungalows in the coastal markets of California and the US Northeast were not longer being underwritten by Fannie and Freddie. By early 2007, as the greed crescendo peaked, Fannie and Freddie were underwriting a mere 40% of the US mortgage market, down from over 60% earlier in the decade.

The rest, of course, is the grim history of the past two years. The subprime market cracked, leading the holders of the CDSs connected with the subprime obligations to start demanding their promised payment from the specialized CDS private insurers, called "monolines". This essentially drove the monolines to the brink of bankruptcy. The shutdown of the market for credit default swaps is what lies at the heart of what we now call the credit crisis [[actually, that last is just phase II of the Credit Crisis; phase I was the shut-down/freezing of the commercial paper market where the MBS' had been traded— until their value dropped precipitously: normxxx]]. Even though they did not make many subprime mortgage loans, Fannie and Fannie still fell victim to the age's greed and arrogance. On any cul-de-sac, in any new housing development, the bankruptcy and forced foreclosure sales of the homes with the subprime mortgages are forcing down the real estate values of the rest of the homes, the ones underwritten by Fannie and Freddie, in the neighborhood.

As the US real estate market staggered and buckled before finally breaking last summer and autumn, some voices were raised advocating fighting the then still-nascent crises with greater participation by Fannie and Freddie, specifically, by allowing the two to buy more, and higher-priced, mortgages. This might have nipped the problem in the bud then, but back last year, Bush, still the free markets' ever-trustworthy troubadour, informed one and all that he would veto any legislation of that nature.

Bush finally saw the light (probably through feeling the heat that was being placed on his party's election prospects this year), and included in last winter's economic stimulus package a geographically limited, temporary increase in the GSE's statutory loan limits, in certain high priced markets, to just under US$730,000. Still, increased authority by Fannie and Freddie are key elements of the mortgage relief rescue package promoted by Democrats Representative Barney Frank and Senator Chris Dodd and now slogging through the Congress, weighed down by Republican legislative legerdemain. Bush has not said one way or another whether he will sign the bill should it reach his desk; every time he implies he might veto the bill, you can just hear the whoosh of the darts heading towards pictures of the president at John McCain's campaign headquarters.

Current reports are indicating that the GSEs are now purchasing about 80% of the new mortgages being made in the US. This is why the two's current financial difficulties, symbolized by the roughly 90% falls in the stock values of both Fannie and Freddie since last August, are so serious. Governments rush in to rescue endangered financial institutions when they are said to be "too big to fail"; if ever that was true, if ever the maxim had any real applicability, surely, with essentially the entire US housing industry now resting on the GSEs' shoulders, the US government cannot stand by disinterested as they bleed to death.

On Sunday evening, the US Treasury Department and Federal Reserve came out with a Fannie/Freddie rescue plan. President Bush was nowhere to be seen in this initiative— the Wall Street Journal reported that there were still free-market holdouts in the White House, apparently the last laissez-faire zealots left in the bunker as reality's punishing howitzers zeroed in, that opposed the deal. The initiative called for a temporary increase in what the GSEs could borrow from the Treasury, as well as increased US government equity investments in Fannie and Freddie stock. These will require authorization from Congress. For its part, the Federal Reserve announced that, for the first time, it was opening its emergency assistance facility, or discount window, designed for member banks (which the GSEs are not— they're not really "banks" at all) to the endangered pair.

Some called this a type of nationalization of the GSEs, akin to what the British government did with Northern Rock bank last year. Others noted that the rescue package did not include a full and clear expression that the US government will now stand behind the obligations of the two. Justin Fox of Time.com's Curious Capitalist blog noted that it seems that the implicit status of the US government's guarantee of the GSE's obligations has gone from "not guaranteed by the United States" to "not guaranteed by the United States, unless they really need to be". Fannie and Freddie shares, as well as the general stock market, rallied strongly on the news at the market's open on Monday, but quickly sold off.

Freddie Mac closed down 8% on the day, Fannie Mae 5%, the Dow Jones Industrial Average closed down 45 points. Perhaps the markets may be now pricing in the possibility that the Bush administration, in a last, flaming Gotterdammerung of free-market philosophy, may indeed put ideology over the fates and fortunes of the entire US financial system to prove that, indeed, no [government-backed] financial institution is too big to fail. What wasn't in the rescue package was a reduction in the interest rates the Federal Reserve uses to manage the short-term money markets, the Federal Reserve's target Federal Funds rate. That it didn't do, even though it did lower by 75 basis points that same rate for the rescue of Bear Stearns in March. The fact that it didn't on this occasion, with the potential insolvency of Fannie and Freddie posing a far greater systemic risk to the economy than the potential bankruptcy of a mere investment bank such as Bear, demonstrates much about the true dire nature of the current circumstances.

After dropping the Federal Funds Target Rate from 5.25% to 2% in eight months, starting in April the Federal Reserve looked around, and, to paraphrase Captain Renault (Claude Rains) from 1942's Casablanca, was "shocked, shocked" to find inflation going on. The standard remedy applied by central banks to an inflationary problem is a hike in interest rates, but, even with rising prices, led by surging futures prices for food and crude oil and its products, moving to the forefront of the Fed's concern since late April, Bernanke and Co have resisted pulling the trigger on a rate hike. Instead, they have resorted to attacking inflation with ever harsher and harsher language [[but they haven't used the F--- word yet!: normxxx]], culminating with the statement that followed the Fed's last meeting on June 25 that seemed to virtually guarantee a rate hike in the near future (see Bernanke's words strike false note, Asia Times Online, June 27, 2008.)

Bernanke's portion in the GSE rescue package is currently limited to the opening of the discount window. That correlates to how he has been dealing with the twin threats of inflation and financial system instability lately: let the endangered institution borrow from the Fed what it needs but limit the provision of excess liquidity to the general economy. How long can this policy bifurcation continue? [[At least until the Dems get back in.: normxxx]] The "Lex" columnist of the Financial Times, which on Saturday described Fannie and Freddie as being like "like a sweet old couple who have suddenly become unhinged and taken their neighbors hostage", also said that the crisis means that you can "forget about higher interest rates, complicating matters for central banks everywhere". This will be particularly likely if, as what seemed to happen with Fannie and Freddie's stock price on Monday, the market sees through the continuing lack of an explicit pledge to cover the GSEs' debts and starts to sell the stocks down hard once again.

Thus, the core dilemma. The market wants, and has been led to expect, higher US short-term interest rates, but with the credit crisis continuing to destroy wealth and value everywhere it goes, can the Fed really risk pulling more liquidity out of the system with a rate hike at either its upcoming August 5, or, at the very latest, its September 16 meeting? If it disappoints the markets again, if it is seen to be going back on its word, does it risk a massive loss of credibility in the US financial system, with potential huge subsequent selloffs in the US dollar and US equities? [[Credibility!?! Credibility!?! What's that?: normxxx]]

In Jaws, after it is discovered that the killer shark is still alive, shark expert Matt Hooper (Richard Dreyfus) tells Amity Police chief Martin Brody (Roy Scheider) that he has a bigger concern than just closing the beaches— "You got a bigger problem than that Martin, you still got a hell of a fish out there." Likewise, the killer shark of the credit crisis is still out there, chomping away on the flesh and sinews of the financial markets to its heart's content. The citizens of Amity finally gathered the cojones to hire shark hunter Quint (Robert Shaw) to kill the beast, but in today's totally politically dysfunctional and polarized America, it seems that the operating strategy is to let the monster continue to feed on the innocents until well satiated.

Julian Delasantellis is a management consultant, private investor and educator in international business in the US state of Washington. He can be reached at juliandelasantellis@yahoo.com.

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Normxxx    
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The contents of any third-party letters/reports above do not necessarily reflect the opinions or viewpoint of normxxx. They are provided for informational/educational purposes only.

The content of any message or post by normxxx anywhere on this site is not to be construed as constituting market or investment advice. Such is intended for educational purposes only. Individuals should always consult with their own advisors for specific investment advice.

I'm The Barn Owl...

I'm The Barn Owl Watching The Mouse

By Richard Russell, Dow Theory Letters Snippet | 13 July 2008
Extracted from the Jul 11, 2008 edition of Richard's Remarks


What am I thinking about these bright summer days? I'm thinking, as usual, about a long list of things, but one item I've been zeroing in on is the 50% Principle as it applies to the current market. The 50% Principle works like this: We have the Dow low of 7286 recorded in October 2002. And we have the record Dow high of 14164 recorded in October 2007. The 50% or halfway level between Dow 7286 and Dow 14164 comes in at 10725. As of today's close, the Dow was just 375 points above the 10725 halfway level. The 50% Principle tells us that if the Dow closes decisively below 10725, then there is a good chance the Dow will continue down to test the level from which the entire advance started— that level is 7286.

And I wonder to myself— what would happen if the Dow breaks below 10725 and then declines to the 7286 area? My immediate thought is— disaster. And probably a severe recession or even a depression. Remember, the Dow is only 375 points away from the halfway or 50% level. Anyway, that's one thing I'm thinking about, and that's one thing I'm watching. I'm watching it the way a barn owl watches a mouse— in other words, with extreme interest.

A second phenomenon I've got my eyes on is the extraordinary performance (at least so far) of the D-J Transportation Average. At today's close, the Transports were a big 635 points ABOVE their January 2008 low close of 4140.29. The Transport action is the most bullish event that has taken place in the market so far. What happens, I ask myself, if the Dow collapses through 10725 and the Transports still do not confirm, meaning that the Transports continue to hold above 4140.29? That's a question I can't answer, because I've never seen a situation like the present one before.

Here's oil (which almost all Transportation depends on) over 145 a barrel, here's gasoline near five dollars a gallon, here's diesel at record highs— and the Transports continue to hold up. Amazing. Something's going on with the Transports that I don't know about [[the RR, at least, are pulling it in, and making money hand over fist, moving grain and coal to the ports, and ethonol everywhere else (gasohol cannot be shipped via pipes, and the ethanol and gasoline must be combined near the point of use): normxxx]]. But I don't have to know— I don't have to know why, I just have to know what— what are the blessed Transports doing?

I do feel this in my guts. Between now and the fourth quarter of 2008 we're going to see some fireworks. And I'm wondering whether this market can possibly hit bottom somewhere during October-November period. I talked to Paul Desmond (head man at Lowry's) yesterday. He said that one reason for the huge spread between the Selling Pressure Index and the Buying Power Index (compared with spreads in the past) has to do with the massive increase in NYSE volume over recent years.

Paul also offered the opinion that the lows of this market maybe take place over an extended period of time such as the extended low base of 1980 to 1982. And I agree with Paul— I've been thinking the same thing. The problems now imbedded in the US (and the world) economies are so severe that it could take several years of a bottoming process before the next bull market can get started.

We both agreed that the next bull market, from wherever and whenever it starts— could be huge, could be a super-whopper. There's all that fiat currency in the world today— multi-trillion of dollars worth of it [[true; but we'll have seen the destruction of tens of trillions of 'ersatz' dollars, aka, 'credit': normxxx]]. One of these days, that money will be spent. But first we must somehow arrive at the bottom of the current damnable bear market or whatever you want to call it[!?!] [[Having called for a major Dow theory sell signal— then backed off— Russell appears understandably confused. I don't know about the next bull— though I'm inclined to agree with Russell— but I don't think it likely to start before about 2020— I think we will see a long period of lots of trouble and grief first; think of this as 1968 or 1928 (or even 1888, if you want to check out your history books). Meanwhile, ...(see Boomers Beware): normxxx]]

Dow vs. Gold— The ratio between the Dow and gold has hit a new low. Today, one share of the Dow will buy only 11.44 ounces of gold— that's down from 43.75 ounces back in July 1999. In other words, since mid-1999 the Dow has lost 73.8% of its value in terms of real money— gold. Talk about a silent and insidious bear market, you're looking at one.


Click Here, or on the image, to see a larger, undistorted image.


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Normxxx    
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The contents of any third-party letters/reports above do not necessarily reflect the opinions or viewpoint of normxxx. They are provided for informational/educational purposes only.
The content of any message or post by normxxx anywhere on this site is not to be construed as constituting market or investment advice. Such is intended for educational purposes only. Individuals should always consult with their own advisors for specific investment advice.

Spike In Inflation!?!

Fed Confronts Spike In Inflation:
Consumer Prices Surge, But Stumbling Economy Could Start To Curb Pressure
Economists React: Energy Prices Starting To Pass Through To Retail


By Anton Troianovski and Sudeep Reddy | 17 July 2008

WASHINGTON— Consumer inflation spiked to its highest level in 17 years, even as tentative signs emerged that an anemic economy may be starting to take the edge off oil prices. —Daily Economics Newsletter.

The consumer-price index rose 1.1% in June, the biggest monthly spike since September 2005, following the chaos of Hurricane Katrina. Prices last month were 5% higher than a year before, the Labor Department said, the biggest rise since 1991. "Core" prices, which exclude food and energy, rose 0.3% in June, faster than in the previous two months.

Meanwhile, however, oil fell sharply Wednesday, leaving crude off more than $10 a barrel in the past two trading sessions. And fresh data from the Labor Department suggested paychecks aren't following oil and other prices on their upward march. Federal Reserve officials are hoping they can sustain a delicate balancing act of fighting both quickening inflation and anemic growth at the same time. They must do that at a time of tremendous stress on the country's financial system.

The central bank's dilemma: If it follows the typical prescription for taming inflation— raising interest rates— it could add to the stress on the already weak financial sector and bring on an already threatening recession. If it keeps rates steady, it risks allowing inflation to get out of hand.

The sharp decline in housing prices in the past year has dealt one of the greatest U.S. financial and economic shocks in decades. Yesterday, in a rare bout of positive news after a week of jitters, bank shares soared, helping buoy the overall stock market. Investors turned bullish on oil's fall. They also responded positively to the government's move Tuesday to curb negative bets on the shares of financial stocks, which saw one of their biggest daily rises on record.

For now, most Fed officials believe that as the economy slows this year, demand for goods and services will decline, keeping prices from getting out of hand. So the Fed is putting financial stability and economic growth first, while expressing concern about inflation. On Wednesday, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke said in testimony before the House Financial Services Committee that inflation "currently is too high," but most analysts believe that the central bank will keep interest rates steady at 2% for the rest of the year.

The central bank would likely be raising interest rates by now if it weren't for the distress in the financial system. Banks have taken big losses on their mortgage-related investments, and their shares have been pounded. The failure of IndyMac Bank last Friday and the government's move to shore up mortgage titans Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac over the weekend has only added to public unease.

Core Rate Speed-Up

Underlying inflation— the core rate— is now at 2.4% compared with a year earlier, well above the 1.5% to 2% range that Fed officials consider price stability. The speed-up in the core rate "is really an unwelcome piece of news for the Fed," said Zach Pandl, a Lehman Brothers economist. Keeping core inflation in check "is really the objective of monetary policy, and any acceleration, if it continues in the next couple months, is really going to complicate the Fed's decision."

In minutes of the Fed's June policy-board meeting, released Wednesday, most Fed officials indicated that because of inflation concerns, "the next change in the stance of policy could well be an increase" in the Fed's benchmark federal-funds rate, at which banks lend to each other overnight. But the timing of any such increase remains uncertain amid the financial turmoil.

Slower growth in the U.S. economy may be starting to take the boil off a key part of the inflation problem: oil prices.

Oil for August delivery fell $4.14 Wednesday to $134.60 on the New York Mercantile Exchange. Oil futures have now dropped $10.58, or 7.3%, in the past two trading sessions. Oil has surged over the past year in large part due to worries that demand was growing faster than supply could keep up, and specifically whether global markets would have enough oil to sate fast-growing economies.

Signs of decreasing fuel demand in the U.S. pushed prices down yesterday. An Energy Department report showing increased crude stocks in the U.S. also led traders to think that sustained tightness in the market may be ending. The oil market, though, has seen a series of wild swings over the past several weeks, leaving analysts reluctant to say that prices are now turning steadily downward.

Gasoline prices remain high, meanwhile, and the costs are crimping consumers. Tanika Coates of Falls Church, Va., says she finds herself living from paycheck to paycheck. She rarely drives her SUV anymore and thinks she'll have to pull her 9-year-old daughter out of her soccer program. "I think it's going to get worse before it gets better, so I'm just going ahead and preparing myself for the worst," she says. Ms. Coates, 30 years old, says she's lucky that her employer, a Washington nonprofit, pays for her subway fare. Otherwise, she says she'd have to get a new job.

Purchasing Power

Fed officials, according to minutes of their June meeting, agreed that inflation risks had risen as the public comes to expect prices to keep rising, among other factors. But they were divided about the degree to which that dynamic has kicked in and might feed through to wage demands.

Some believe the slowdown in the economy will restrain wages and keep inflation in check.

For now, wages are not rising sharply enough to keep up with inflation. The Labor Department said Wednesday that the average weekly earnings of American workers rose 0.3% in June, but adjusted for inflation fell 0.9%. Real wages decreased 2.4% from June 2007. The drop in real wages means that incomes aren't keeping pace with prices— depressing the purchasing power of consumers. Retail sales were nearly stagnant in June despite the government's emergency stimulus package, according to another report this week.

It's not yet clear whether the recent uptick in price increases in goods and services other than food and energy represents a trend of accelerating inflation. "I don't think this was anything more than a one-month aberration for the core," said David Greenlaw, a Morgan Stanley economist. Other economic data are mixed, too. Separately, the Fed reported on Wednesday that industrial production reversed a downward trend in June, rising 0.5% as a heat wave lifted electricity production and employees at a big car-parts manufacturer ended a strike. But the report didn't necessarily signal much relief.

"In the coming months, industrial production can be expected to weaken again as the temporary factors, which boosted activity in June, wear off," Global Insight economist Nariman Behravesh wrote in a note to clients.



Economists React: Energy Prices Starting To Pass Through To Retail

By Phil Izzo, WSJ | 17 July 2008

Economists and others weigh in on the surge in consumer prices.

  • The June inflation data provides absolutely zero comfort to a Fed that as of yesterday looks to have thrown in the towel on inflation. When one looks at the data there is a bit of depressing news for everyone. The headline met our expectations of a 5.0% increase, which was well above the expected 4.5% consensus. If one chooses to ignore headline costs and is a devotee of the core rate, [which exclude food and energy prices,] the annual estimate was fractionally below arriving at 2.5%, well above the upper end of the Feds comfort zone. More importantly, the service component, which comprises 58.7% of the survey, increased 3.7% annually and 5.1% on a 3 month annualized basis. This does suggest that we are begging to observe a passing through of headline costs to the core— Joseph Brusuelas, Merk Investments.

  • The June uptick in the core rate provides an early indication that the tidal surge in energy and other commodity costs are trickling through to consumer prices at large. We expect the "pass-through" to intensify over the next year and look for year-on-year core PCE inflation to rise from its current level of 2.1%, to 2.6% in mid-2009.— Kenneth Beauchemin, Global Insight.

  • It is clear that inflationary pressures are building in the economy due to rising commodity prices and higher import prices more generally. While these increases have not for the most part been passed on at the retail level, it is inevitable that they will be at some point. Car dealers and other retailers cannot continue to absorb rising costs at the wholesale level and not pass some of these increases on to consumers.— Dean Baker, Center for Economic and Policy Research.

  • The twin inflation demons, food and energy struck again in June as consumer prices soared. Of course, that is hardly news to the average household who already knows that after filling up the tank and putting food on the table, there is little else left. Just about every food product is rising sharply except the most critical one, sweets. Thankfully, that was flat. As for energy, the government is finally catching up with the huge price increases we have all seen and there was a double-digit rise. Excluding food and energy, the inflation rate was a little less oppressive, but there were some areas where pressures are still building. For those who use the telephone or smoke, the news was pretty bad as well. There were some places where consumer costs were under control. Health care, clothing and motor vehicle prices were tame, at least in June. With consumer costs up 5% over the year it is little wonder that households are depressed.— Naroff Economic Advisors.

  • Consumption came in much higher We continue to believe that core inflation will hold reasonably steady over the balance of 2008. This reflects an expectation of continued deceleration in [owners’ equivalent rent] and residential rent as vacant properties are transitioned to the rental market. This anticipated deceleration in the key shelter category of the CPI (which accounts for about 40% of the core!) should help to offset any spillover effects tied to higher food and energy prices. Moreover, wage inflation is decelerating as labor market conditions deteriorate.— David Greenlaw, Morgan Stanley.

  • It is unclear at this point whether the pickup in rent inflation is likely to be sustained. Fundamentals for rent inflation are mixed. On the one hand, falling home prices have likely discouraged many would-be homebuyers, increasing the relative demand for renter-occupied housing. On the other hand, some of the massive supply glut in the owner-occupied housing market is likely spilling over into the rental market, restraining price increases.— Zach Pandl, Lehman Brothers.

  • While Bernanke may focus on some of the global forces behind food and energy price increases, we believe one of the main drivers of global inflation has been the transmission of easy U.S. monetary policy through relatively fixed exchange rates to the dollar in Asia, the Middle East, and other parts of the world. The Fed will likely play down the core increase, which can be viewed as an offset to April’s below-trend gain. For purposes of forecasting the core, the Fed is now focused on wage gains, which have been relatively subdued and the Fed will likely expect this to remain the case.— RDQ Economics.


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Normxxx    
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The contents of any third-party letters/reports above do not necessarily reflect the opinions or viewpoint of normxxx. They are provided for informational/educational purposes only.
The content of any message or post by normxxx anywhere on this site is not to be construed as constituting market or investment advice. Such is intended for educational purposes only. Individuals should always consult with their own advisors for specific investment advice.

Wednesday, July 16, 2008

Outlook: High Yield Bond Market

Spotlight: The Outlook For The High Yield Bond Market

By Mark Hudoff, PIMCO | 2 July 2008

Since turmoil in the financial markets began in mid-2007, new issuance in the high yield market has slowed almost to a halt. In the interview below, Mark Hudoff, lead portfolio manager for high yield, discusses the outlook for the high yield market in light of PIMCO’s expectation for a recession in the U.S. this year. He also explains the investment implications of that outlook.

Q: Given PIMCO’s expectation for a U.S. recession over the cyclical horizon of six to 12 months, what is PIMCO’s view on the high yield market?

Hudoff: The big picture is that there are two cycles at work: a financial cycle and a real economy cycle. Usually, the financial cycle is a hostage to the real economy cycle, in a situation where excesses in the real economy feed through to excesses in the financial economy. During the typical end-of-cycle period, the real economy deteriorates, and the financial economy deflates and is forced to deleverage. High yield spreads typically reflect the movement through these two cycles: spreads will widen as defaults increase (real economy cycle), and liquidity diminishes as balance sheet repair takes hold (financial cycle). The coincidence of these cycles usually amplifies the violence of credit spread volatility during these end-of-cycle periods.

This time may be different. It appears that the traditional concurrence of the real economy–financial cycle has broken down to a degree. The excesses of subprime mortgages, structured products and leveraged buyout (LBO) lending, accelerated realization of the need for balance sheet healing in the financial economy before traditional real economy influences could be fully transmitted.

The U.S. Federal Reserve signaled a commitment to facilitate this healing process with extraordinary measures like backstopping the Bear Stearns takeover by JPMorgan and providing brokers with access to the Fed lending collateral programs. In effect, this "put option" to the financial system was intended to prevent a complete collapse in the disintermediation function. So far, the Fed and other central banks’ actions appear to have stabilized the financial system. Moreover, the actions have made it easier for the financial system to deleverage through re-capitalization.

The open question is whether the healing will be sufficiently advanced in the financial economy to dampen credit spread volatility when the traditional real economy cycle slowdown arrives. It is an important question because entry points are important in high yield. In the past, the optimal entry point in high yield had been associated with periods of realized defaults rather than those periods that involve only mounting expectations for defaults. We witnessed the volatility that increasing expectations for future defaults can have in high yield over the first three months of this year. The Fed’s actions unwound much of that in recent months. Nonetheless, we are still concerned that the real economy may slip into recession.

At this point, we view high yield as bounded by the following considerations: Fundamentals are deteriorating and access to new lending remains strained. The balance between supply and demand in high yield, while much improved compared with the daunting LBO overhang of last year, is at best neutral. Valuation, however, has greatly improved. As such, we are cautiously optimistic about prospective opportunities for high yield investors. We think we are approaching the point where realized defaults will translate into wider high yield spreads, and this in turn makes high yield a potentially compelling risk-reward proposition.

Q: Are you seeing any deterioration in corporate fundamentals yet?

Hudoff: We have started to see some signs that things are getting worse. Earnings have begun to decelerate sharply, going from expectations of modest year-over-year growth to year-over-year declines in the first half of this year. We think earnings will continue to be under pressure and full-year earnings will be flat to lower. That will likely translate into vulnerability for the stock market.

Although corporate fundamentals are starting from a relatively solid basis today compared, for example, with the late 1990s, we expect them to continue to deteriorate in lock-step with the macro economy. We also think the housing problem in the U.S. will continue to weigh on growth. It remains to be seen whether the Fed will be able to put a bottom in the housing market in the near term or if it will be a more protracted process.

Q: Corporate balance sheets have been in good shape leading up to the financial crisis. Will that help soften the blow?

Hudoff: Heading into this period of turbulence last year, corporate fundamentals were the best they’d been in over a decade. We saw some excesses develop— for example, with the frantic pace of LBOs— but in general, companies pre-funded many of their liabilities. Cash was high, debt maturities low.

The healthy state of balance sheets has certainly softened the blow of the credit crisis for many firms so far. However, with a combination of balance sheet repair for financial firms and broad de-leveraging that is translating into tighter lending standards, many corporations that need access to market-based liquidity cannot find suppliers. As a result, we think default rates are going to rise.

Q: How high do you think defaults will go?

Hudoff: In January, Moody’s reported a global default rate of 1.1%. By April, the global default rate had risen to 1.75%. We think defaults will continue to march higher over the year and reach about 5% within 12 months.

We have some models that suggest it could be higher than 5%, but those models do not accommodate the number of "covenant-light deals" which are a characteristic of this market that is different from past markets. There were a lot of bank debt and capital structures created with very loose covenants because investors were flush with cash and there was a lot of competition for yield. In fact, according to S&P, covenant-light deals accounted for about 25% of the new issue market in 2007. We think these could help stave off a rapid acceleration in defaults because the trip wires, or triggers for default, do not get thrown until later— when the company has to prepay or faces amortization or another event.

Historically, 5% is about the average default rate, according to Moody’s. So we should move from well below the average to about average within 12 months.

Q: Markets seem to be pricing in much higher defaults than the long-term average. Why the discrepancy?

Hudoff: At the depths of the market uncertainty in March, spreads in the high yield market implied default rates that were about three percentage points higher than what we expected for 2008, according to PIMCO’s calculations. The main reason was the uncertainty regarding the trajectory of the economy and how successful the Fed would be in stemming the housing and subprime mortgage problems. Effectively, before the "Fed Put" was extended to the financial system in March, the market was increasingly discounting the full real economy–financial cycle paradigm that I already discussed. Now, the markets are discounting a roughly 5% default rate, according to our model.

Q: Is there a scenario in which defaults would rise to meet market expectations?

Hudoff: If the U.S. economy slows more than expected or the disintermediation problem doesn’t get solved in the next six months or so, the risk is that defaults will get worse than we expect. Those trip wires for covenant-light deals could start to get thrown earlier than expected, in the latter part of 2008 and 2009. Under those circumstances, defaults could pick up beyond 5%.

Q: The market for new high yield issues has been very slow. What are the supply and demand dynamics right now?

Hudoff: I would characterize the technical supply and demand picture in high yield as fragile. Usually, there is a rough equilibrium in the high yield market that is established on one side with new issues and credit migration from investment grade into high yield that is reasonably offset by flows into the asset class, bond maturities or retirements and credit migration out of high yield. This balance usually translates into annual new issuance averages between $120 and $150 billion. In concept, if supply exceeds this range, spreads have to increase to draw new investors into the game.

The problem we had last year was that we had a lot more supply than demand. The LBO calendar had produced more than $200 billion in loans and about $100 billion in bonds that had to be absorbed by the high yield market given the lack of structured product and other alternative sources of demand. That represented well over two times the annual new issue supply, according to JPMorgan.

Over the last few months, through a combination of cancellations, restructurings and placements, this overhang has been reduced. We currently think there is roughly $65 billion in bonds and $95 billion in loans that still need to be distributed. This still represents a very large calendar compared to historical periods.

This supply overhang must be worked off before a sustainable rally can take place, and the process will take some time. Volatility over the past few months has prevented supply from coming to the market. In fact, the first three months of this year saw the lowest supply in the high yield market in a decade, according to Merrill Lynch data.

On the demand side, market turbulence has continued to keep the marginal buyers for bank loans— structured products— completely on the sidelines, and it is unclear when they will come back. For now, the only bidders for bank loans and high yield bonds are traditional mutual funds and real money accounts. But even those buyers are mostly sitting on the sidelines with a lot of cash, trying to preserve their capital during this volatile time.

Q: How long before buyers come back and the excess supply is absorbed?

Hudoff: We think it will take at least six to 12 months.

Q: With both fundamentals and supply/demand dynamics fairly fragile right now, have there been any positive developments in the high yield market?

Hudoff: The good news is that valuation has improved. In the high yield market, investors are compensated for taking risk by credit spreads. When spreads widen, at a certain point the spread will properly compensate an investor for taking on the risk. That is when valuation dominates fundamentals and technicals.

Q: Is it time to buy high yield?

Hudoff: Almost. The weakening fundamentals and the technical supply overhang we discussed will continue to put pressure on spreads. So the question is, when will valuation dominate the equation and compel us into high yield because we’ll be compensated for the risk? In other words, when will spreads hit their peak for the cycle?

We have gone through the math, and all of our indicators point to the second half of this year. Looking at history, the recessions in the early 1990s and the early 2000s suggest that the latter part of the year is when spreads start to turn around.

Q: Is there a potential negative scenario that could delay a turnaround in the high yield market?

Hudoff: I think about downside scenarios a lot. In its least negative form, I think the most obvious scenario involves the emergence of another downward leg to the credit crisis. The most obvious source of this would be consumer finance–related exposures and a return to balance sheet uncertainty that tests all the progress made by the Fed in shoring up confidence in the financial economy. A more difficult iteration of this scenario would involve knock-on real economy effects that translate into a deeper and more protracted economic slowdown.

Q: Given PIMCO’s outlook for high yield, how are you investing today?

Hudoff: We will remain cautious and mindful of preserving our clients’ capital, because there is still a considerable amount of uncertainty. So we will try to focus on credits— either sectors or individual securities— that may benefit from the volatility or are immune to it.

We like sectors like utilities and healthcare and names that are relatively defensive. We would try to limit our exposure to companies that are very exposed to discretionary income, such as consumer cyclicals. We are a little concerned about cyclicals overall, including heavy cyclicals, because a moderating economy is not necessarily great for a levered cyclical company.

In general, we are focusing on credits that have good asset coverage so that our downside risk is limited. We like seasoned, big, liquid names that have more proven credit histories and which we have seen pay down debt in the past. Our sweet spot is high single-B, low double-B rated securities, and although that part of the market has been under pressure lately, we believe that is just the ebb and flow of valuation.

We will be very selective in the LBO pipeline. Many bank loans and bonds that were part of leveraged buyout commitments made last year have been sitting on the balance sheets of investment banks. Those that were sold in the third and fourth quarter of last year have since declined in value. We have not really bought any new LBO issues— either loans or bonds— although we have bought some in the secondary market after their prices fell.

This is the time when a cautious approach, with a heavy asset coverage requirement, could potentially pay off.

Q: What is your view on the bank loan market apart from LBOs?

Hudoff: We like bank loans, and we have increased our allocations lately. Why? First, the sector underperformed in 2007. We have never seen this kind of volatility in the loan market. At the same time, bank loans are a higher-quality part of the high yield universe. What we have experienced in the leveraged loan markets over the last few months could be called a "black swan event"— it has been way beyond the realm of normal expectations— and we are happy to take advantage of the opportunities that this dislocation has created.

Second, we like bank loans because they tend to be the first to benefit from a turnaround in the economy. As the economy starts to improve, investors typically start to bid up bank paper. Also, when banks come back to the market as investors, bank loans will most likely be the first kind of paper they buy, and that could provide a technical boost to the market.

Finally, bank loans are priced against LIBOR and eventually LIBOR should go up. The Fed cannot cut rates forever, and the forward curve is not going down at the front end in perpetuity. At some point, the process will reverse.

Q: So bank loans would be a potential long-term investment?

Hudoff: Yes, but bank loans could also benefit sooner than we expect. If the Fed manages to restore confidence in the financial markets quickly, everyone will then become concerned about inflation. In that case, there’s a very good chance that the Fed will take back all of the easing quickly. So the same forces that pushed floaters down and made them appear very unattractive on a yield basis will make them attractive again.

Q: Thank you, Mark.

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Normxxx    
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The contents of any third-party letters/reports above do not necessarily reflect the opinions or viewpoint of normxxx. They are provided for informational/educational purposes only.
The content of any message or post by normxxx anywhere on this site is not to be construed as constituting market or investment advice. Such is intended for educational purposes only. Individuals should always consult with their own advisors for specific investment advice.

You Knew It Was A Bear Market When…

Mean Street: You Knew It Was A Bear Market On Wall Street When…

, Deal Journal




A real bear market is supposed to start after major market indexes decline at least 20%. By that measure, the bear is just barely here. But who’s kidding whom?

You knew it was a bear market on Wall Street when:

1. You received yet another "Dear John" letter from your panicking money manager that started, "As I’m sure you know, the month of June has been very challenging…" and ends with the old tease that, "It is in the most challenging of markets that the greatest opportunities appear."

2. You told your wife that the crisis on Wall Street is actually a good thing, as it will bring New York real-estate prices down and make it easier to buy a bigger place. Even though you had bought your apartment less than two years ago, you have no children, your mother (who was living with you) died early this year, and you will be lucky to get any bonus this year.

3. You didn’t have to lie to your friends anymore about the drive time from New York City to the Hamptons. With the roads empty, it finally takes that hour and 45 minutes you always pretended it did.

4. You received an eerily familiar email from your company CEO full of resolve that the firm would come out of this difficult period stronger than ever. Then you realized– it was the same email you received three months ago, but from the CEO of a different company whose stock you own, and which has since gone BK.

5. Your cubicle was moved yet again as your office floor underwent its fourth reorganization/consolidation in less than a year. Your company now occupies only a fourth of a floor in a building where previously they had occupied six floors. Since the rest of the floor has not yet been sublet— after a year— it is hauntingly empty and has a tendency to echo. (There are rumors of ghosts of old customer reps who had died at their desks being seen wandering about.) You speculated on whether it was a good sign that you were sitting closer to your boss (who had lost his private office a couple of reorgs ago) until you found out you were the only two left in the department— and you were the one closest to the photocopier.

6. You recalled how you all laughed about the pilot program to outsource banking work to India. When it went fully operational and you were told to pack your things for an 'extended overseas assignment', you stopped laughing.

7.Your company medical plan was 'improved' yet again. To 'improve' fraud detection, medical claims were now only to be paid if the CEO personally approved/signed off, in advance— you hear the backlog is two years. The company life insurance plan now only pays off if you die of an approved disease or accident. Falls from high buildings are not on the list.

8. You felt relieved that the value of all your company vested and unvested shares and options was down only 50% from its peak nine months ago. Never mind that you could have easily dumped most of the shares at prices that won’t be seen for another 10 years, if then.

9. The retirement plan was further 'simplified/enhanced' to reward loyal, long-time personnel. The company 'match' is now a function of company profits. (However, the company has not been profitable in the last three years.).

10. After months of naysaying the agriculture boom, you finally succumbed and found tremendous value in the shares of a $72 billion fertilizer company that was worth a 10th of that two years ago. The stock price has not moved since you bought it.

11. You walked around smartly reminding everyone at the firm how you had warned them that the traders would finally get their comeuppance. That is, until you remembered that the traders are still running your bank and most of Wall Street.

Yes, Virginia, there is a bear market out there.

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Normxxx    
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The contents of any third-party letters/reports above do not necessarily reflect the opinions or viewpoint of normxxx. They are provided for informational/educational purposes only.
The content of any message or post by normxxx anywhere on this site is not to be construed as constituting market or investment advice. Such is intended for educational purposes only. Individuals should always consult with their own advisors for specific investment advice.

The Numbers Speak

The Numbers Speak For Themselves

By Bill Alpert | 13 July 2008

How Stock Analysis Based On Statistics And Computers Sabotaged Itself

[ Normxxx Here:  Or, how the quants managed to shoot themselves in the foot (but they are learning— and may very well be dangerous in a few years; especially if they ever learn to communicate with the behavioral economists.  ]

Wall Street's quants have been forced back to the drawing board— Again. In 2007, many of these computer-skilled fund managers underperformed their liberal arts peers for the first time in almost a decade. Returns averaged 6% last year for the traditional long-short equity funds measured by Lipper, while quantitatively-managed counterparts gained less than 1%. The reversals for many quants were worst in a few days last summer that left the rest of the market relatively unscathed.

The quant crowd's lackluster season followed a triumphant era that began with the burst of the tech bubble in 2000. Applying statistics and computers to the analysis of stock prices and company financials, quants enjoyed seven years of steady outperformance [[Gee! Just like the Egyptians under Joseph.: normxxx]]. Money flowed in. By some measures, the assets under management of quants grew at twice the rate of traditionally-invested money. If you count "enhanced" index funds and brokers' proprietary trading desks, you can conclude that quants run upwards of a trillion dollars.

But hand-wringing was the order of business at a June 17 assembly at a Cipriani restaurant in Manhattan, hosted by Joseph Mezrich, who runs quantitative research for Nomura Securities International. Mezrich asked the assembled eggheads if their Golden Era was over. Most speakers thought not, but worried aloud that too many quants were using the same data and mathematical models to pile in and out of the same investments [[Gee. Whoever would have suspected? Do you think that the fact that they had all come from the same B schools, and read the same books, and worshiped the same gods had anything to do with it?: normxxx]].

"So many people were looking at the same signals," said David M. Modest, an experienced quant who most recently ran a proprietary portfolio for JPMorgan Chase.

Quants often form portfolios based on "factors," which are generic characteristics of a stock, like: price-to-earnings, improving company profits or stock price momentum. If research shows that stocks drop when company earnings come from bookkeeping accruals instead of real cashflow, a quant might buy stocks with the lowest accruals and short those with the highest. Any broad phenomenon that seems to move stocks can become a factor. But in recent years, many quants favored value factors like price-to-book, in the spirit of a 1993 study by University of Chicago professor Eugene Fama and Dartmouth professor Kenneth French that helped establish the approach.

Value investing was a fruitful style after the excesses of the dot-com mania. From 2000 to 2007, the market awarded the longest winning streak in a quarter century to stocks that were cheap relative to their book value. But the streak ended last year, when the subprime credit crisis began.

In a credit crisis, investors shun stocks of companies they think might default, even if those stocks are already cheap. And value portfolios tend to include more than their share of companies considered likely to default (basing that likelihood on their balance sheets). In a chart (reproduced at right, below), Mezrich shows that cheap stocks have only gotten cheaper in today's subprime crisis and in the 2002 scandals that sank Enron and Tyco.

The link between valuation and default risk has clobbered quants who favor value factors. In the second half of last year, growth stocks did paradoxically well even though the overall market declined. This year, momentum stocks, with uptrending prices, have been the leaders. At the Nomura meeting, and in a timely new survey sponsored by the Research Foundation of the CFA Institute, the U.S. market's style rotation from value to momentum got much of the blame for quants' mediocre performance of late.

But quants generally blame themselves for the abruptly-bad days that many suffered last summer. Markets formerly unlinked have become correlated, thanks to financial engineering— as the upper lefthand chart shows. Since around 2001, S&P 500 index options have moved in step with the spread between corporate bonds and Treasuries. One after another, asset movements have become linked: commodities, emerging-market stocks, credit-default swaps...even wheat futures.

Newly-invented derivatives and computerized hedging strategies have increased the "connectedness" of the financial system in the U.S., and indeed, the world. So when an investor suddenly sells in one market— last summer's jolt was widely attributed to Goldman Sachs' quantitative Global Alpha Fund— the selling can spread to other markets as quants respond in unanticipated ways. "We've made the financial markets incredibly complicated," Modest said [[immodestly: normxxx]].

The heightened risk from systemic repercussions has been widely debated among quants since hedge-fund veteran Richard Bookstaber made it the theme of his influential 2007 book "A Demon of Our Own Design." Bookstaber's ideas have gotten high props from Mezrich and Modest.

Last summer's sandbagging convinced many quants that their discipline has neglected its study of risk. The typical quant analyst works diligently to model stock returns, said Tony H. Elavia, an investment fund chief at New York Life, to the Nomura audience. But he then outsources the modeling of risk, which is Wall Street's term for stuff that can cause a portfolio's performance to fluctuate too widely. Risk considerations can include the covariance of a portfolio's stocks with one another [[ie, the degree to which stocks in a portfolio are NOT independnt as assumed: normxxx]] or the portfolio's unintended exposure to macroeconomic factors [[but in any case is far less susceptible to 'pure' mathematical analysis and modeling, especially at the extremes— where genuinely 'new' conditions manifest themselves: normxxx]].

Most quants subscribe to the Barra risk modeling service of Morgan Stanley spinoff MSCI (ticker: MXB). And the Barra equity risk model has been virtually unchanged for decades, say many quants, apart from its ongoing recalculation of covariances. With so much money riding on the same risk model, quants found themselves all exposed to the same stocks last summer. In the rush for the exits, the Barra models proved poor guides.

Another cause for flagellation was the excessive use of leverage by quants at hedge funds and proprietary trading desks. When a quant has found a factor that produces modest investment returns, she's often tempted to magnify those returns by using short-sale proceeds and margin loans to lever up the bet ... sometimes five— to ten-fold. Leverage came in for harsh criticism among the several dozen money managers surveyed by the CFA Institute study authors, Yale finance professor Frank J. Fabozzi and researchers from the Intertek Group in Paris, Sergio Focardi and Caroline Jonas. "Everyone is greedy," said one of the study's respondents, "and they have leveraged their strategies up to the eyeballs."

Of course, stock picking has been hard for everyone in the last year, quants and traditionalists alike. In an unsettling illustration (shown above), Mezrich shows that since 2006 fewer stocks have been outperforming the market (delivering "alpha," in Street parlance), and stock performance has become more dispersed (increasing the penalty for picking the wrong stocks) [[and making the 'right' stocks less easily identified through 'traditional' statistical measures: normxxx]].

Mezrich's research tracks the performance of 55 popular equity-ranking factors, including measures of value, growth, earnings quality, profitability, analysts' estimates and stock momentum. Unhappily, the predictive power of these factors has eroded lately— approaching the lowest level in the past 20 years, except for the tech-bubble lunacy.

Twelve months of mediocre performance isn't enough data to disprove the quants' skills (or those of any other investors). Veterans like David Modest believe that quants need merely to roll up their sleeves and find return-generating factors that haven't been widely exploited [[very interesting; but the more arcane such measures that are found, the shorter their effective lifespan is likely to be and the more likely they are to prove spurious (i.e., holding true only for the data set analyzed, but failing when that dataset is enlarged with new data); ah the woes of Wall Street— and correlational analysis!: normxxx]].

And with the extreme performance of momentum stocks lately, even the tried-and-true value factors may be due for a revival. The spread between value and momentum is now more extreme than in any period in Mezrich's 35 years of data. Quants (and many other smart investors) like to bet that extreme values will revert to historical means. A Mezrich chart (at right) shows the depth of returns to a portfolio of stocks with a low price-to-book and a low price momentum (as measured by trailing year's return minus the latest month's). A turn may be coming [[or the results may be telling us something— like the 'traditional' definitions of value may be failing: normxxx]].

Wall Street's science-class dropouts have found something not quite displeasing in the misfortunes of their quant friends. Quants themselves see plenty of improvements they'd like to make, but they don't think their scientific paradigm has crumbled.

"Is the jig up?" No, says Mezrich. "Is it harder?" Yes.

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

E-Mail Comments To Mail@Barrons.Com

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Normxxx    
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The contents of any third-party letters/reports above do not necessarily reflect the opinions or viewpoint of normxxx. They are provided for informational/educational purposes only.
The content of any message or post by normxxx anywhere on this site is not to be construed as constituting market or investment advice. Such is intended for educational purposes only. Individuals should always consult with their own advisors for specific investment advice.

Coal's Run... Over or Not?

Coal's Run May Be Far From Over

By Jamie Dlugosch | 11 July 2008

The bear market pulls down Arch Coal and gives investors an opportunity to take advantage of a short-term[!?!] correction in the stock.

As if someone threw a light switch, the coal sector made an abrupt turn to the downside July 2 when investors decided to cash in on huge gains. In two days of trading in advance of the Fourth of July, shares fell nearly 20% across the board. Such is life in a volatile bear market. Even the sectors that are managing to perform in this environment can get crushed at the drop of a hat.

The price for speculation is certainly increasing, but what about investing? Can investors make a buck in this environment? Our participants in Strategy Lab Open have been making more than a buck or two investing in the entire energy complex, including coal. Does the recent pullback in the group, specifically as it relates to Arch Coal (ACI), provide a buying opportunity for long-term investors?

One of our best investors, Jim Van Meerten, is skeptical and states, "If you are looking at Arch as a long term play I think you may have come to the dance too late, the big money seems to already have been made and all the big players got here way ahead of you."

Blogger Tom Armistead concurs, "Arch Coal (ACI) has been a wonderful growth story, making its way from $27.76 to as high as $77.40 over the past year. It recently sold off to the tune of 15%, closing [today] at $59.89, which raises the question whether this is a good time to try to catch the falling dagger— a question I would answer in the negative."

I would tend to agree with the above, but I think we need to be open to the possibility that coal's run is far from over. Though I agree with those who say oil is a bubble waiting to pop, I am not certain such a deflation is imminent. Even then, I am not convinced falling oil prices would be detrimental to the coal sector. Specifically, coal offers some intriguing advantages over its carbon brother. Clean-burning technology allows coal to be considered an alternative to other, more-polluting sources.

With supplies of coal plentiful in the U.S., demand for Arch's reserves can be counted on to drive future earnings. Absent that, I would be less than enthusiastic. As for the bubble talk, I would contend that an end may be down the road. Check out any other bubble over the past decade and what you will see is a significant lag between the time of its identification and its collapse. That means investors can enjoy a period whereby the risk in speculating is fairly muted. Investors relying on momentum then can increase profits by adding to positions when stock prices drop unexpectedly.

That seems to be the case with Arch. After last week's two-day correction, Citigroup raised its rating of Arch, confirming the buy-on-the-dips thesis. The fundamentals certainly suggest doing so. Russ of RD's Picks pipes up with this: "ACI fundamentals still look strong. Despite a trailing PE of over 40, the stock sells for only 11 times 2009 estimates[!?!] and those analyst estimates have been climbing steadily over the past few months." Many investors have been burned by great fundamentals that suddenly go sour when earnings collapse. That was the case with the home-building sector. Will it be the same with coal?

I don't think so.

As I mentioned above, coal demand is fairly strong. If you include the potential of coal-to-liquid technology, we could see coal usage increase even if demand for oil drops. Add in the power-generation needs of the rest of the world, and you have the ingredients for long-term gains with Arch. I would be a buyer, taking advantage of a short-term 15% correction in the stock, but I'll let blogger Russ have the last word:

"Energy stocks in general have been doing well in this tough market. Although there's no way to know for sure if that will continue, I don't see any reason for energy companies to start underperforming." Given that strength, having some energy exposure in a portfolio makes a lot of sense, and Arch is a good way to get that exposure.

[ Normxxx Here:  Myself, I would wait until the trough of our oncoming recession; probably in 2009, certainly by 2010 (unless this IS the End of the World). Remember, prices of energy stocks don't usually peak until the last stages of a bull market; so, what's the hurry? We're surely past the last bull market and way early for the next.  ]

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Normxxx    
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The contents of any third-party letters/reports above do not necessarily reflect the opinions or viewpoint of normxxx. They are provided for informational/educational purposes only.
The content of any message or post by normxxx anywhere on this site is not to be construed as constituting market or investment advice. Such is intended for educational purposes only. Individuals should always consult with their own advisors for specific investment advice.

Soros, The Man Who Cries 'Wolf'

Soros, The Man Who Cries Wolf, Now Is Warning Of A 'Superbubble'

By Greg Ip, WSJ | 30 June 2008

He has cried 'wol' many times, but this time George Soros says the beast is surely upon us. George Soros admits his warnings haven't always panned out, but this time he insists it's for real.

Mr. Soros, the chairman of Soros Fund Management, is best-known as a speculator, philanthropist and political activist. He made a fortune by doing things such as betting against Britain's currency in 1992 and Thailand's in 1997. A Hungarian refugee, he has spent millions to promote democracy and learning in post-Soviet nations. He also has spent heavily to promote liberal causes and has been an ardent critic of President Bush.

But Mr. Soros, 77 years old, wants to be remembered most as a philosopher. Since he was a student in 1952, he has been promoting his economic theory, which he calls "reflexivity." In essence, he argues that markets don't simply reflect fundamental determinants but can change those determinants in a way that causes asset prices to go to extremes. In his latest book, "The New Paradigm for Financial Markets," he argues a "superbubble" has developed in the past 25 years and it is now collapsing.

Mr. Soros's predictions in his books have fallen far short of his track record as a hedge-fund operator. In 1987 he wrote that the world had to ditch the dollar in favor of a new international currency system or risk "financial turmoil, beggar-thy-neighbor policies leading to world-wide depression and perhaps even war." His 1998 book said, "The global capitalist system ... is coming apart at the seams." In recent interviews in Washington and New York, The Wall Street Journal asked him about his forecast— why he succeeds financially when his world view has been so wrong— and about his aspirations to be a philosopher. Excerpts:

WSJ: You've said this is the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. Yet at its worst, the stock market was only down 18%. That doesn't seem Depression-like. Is this as bad as it gets?

Mr. Soros: I think that the decline in housing prices is going to be more precipitous and go further than people currently expect. To expect [to come] out of the recession by the end of the year, I find that inconceivable. But I can envisage a very broad range of scenarios. One would be a very prolonged world-wide recession.

I cannot imagine a replay of the '30s. But you can have a 'muddle-through' replay of the Japanese scenario— 10 years of stagnation. The employment figures are still very, very satisfactory. Part of this is due to the impact of the lower dollar in stimulating exports and partly to the very strong position of the corporate sector. The economy turned out to be structurally in very good shape.

WSJ: You argue that the crises we've experienced in the past 25 years have been, in retrospect, "testing events" that convince us the system is stable, encourage us to take even bigger risks, leading to one, cataclysmic collapse. Could this be just another testing event?

Mr. Soros: Each time the authorities saved us, that reinforced the belief that markets are self-correcting. Each time when you bail out the economy, you need to find a new motor, a new source of credit and a new instrument that allows for the credit expansion. [It's] difficult to imagine what [more] you can do when you are already lending effectively 100% on inflated house prices.

I have a record of crying wolf at these times. I did it first in "The Alchemy of Finance" [in 1987], then in "The Crisis of Global Capitalism" [in 1998] and now in this book. So it's three books predicting disaster. [But, after] the boy cried wolf three times ... the wolf really came. If we can sail through this without a recession, then the 'superbubble story' is seriously impacted ... I [will] have cried wolf again. Unfortunately, if you go into a recession, [it is not] proof of reflexivity, or vice versa.

WSJ: How is that you are rich despite your world view having been wrong so far?

Mr. Soros: I'm only rich because I know when I'm wrong.

WSJ: How do you stay levelheaded in the middle of a bubble?

Mr. Soros: I don't. I panic. The same thing applies to me as to everybody else, so I'm given to euphoria and despair. And I would say that I basically have survived by recognizing my mistakes. I very often used to get backaches due to the fact that I was wrong. Whenever you are wrong you have to fight or [take] flight. When [I] make the decision, the backache goes away. I don't always make the right decision. I sometimes cut my losses when I shouldn't.

WSJ: Is reflexivity really behind your success, or are you just a good trader?

Mr. Soros: My performance currently is not that good, but taking the longer [view] it is kind of outstanding. There are two possible explanations. One is the theory [of reflexivity] and the other is the backache. And I think it's really the combination of both because recognizing reflexivity drives you to this constant re-examination.

WSJ: Would you prefer to be remembered as a philosopher than as a successful speculator or philanthropist?

Mr. Soros: Much more. You know, people have hang-ups and that's my hang-up. The most popular reaction to my philosophy is ... success has gone to his head and he wants to be more than what he is. That's obviously a very plausible theory. Certainly being a successful fund manager gave me a platform. But I would like the ideas to be judged on their own merit. I think I'm on the verge. For the first time, this book [his 10th] is a best seller. I was asked to testify [before the Senate Commerce Committee] because a staff member read the book.

WSJ: Are you getting recognition from heavyweights in academia or policy making?

Mr. Soros: It has certainly not penetrated academia, and not policy makers either. There was an article in The Wall Street Journal about people doing research on bubbles at Princeton, so I'm going to meet with one of them. I wish I could engage in a discussion with [the Federal Reserve]. I'm waiting for a phone call. I'm [meeting with] Alan Greenspan.

WSJ: But you are quite critical of Greenspan.

Mr. Soros: Greenspan is one of the great manipulators of financial markets. I mean it in a good way. He managed [in 2001] to forestall a more serious recession. He kept interest rates [low] too long. And he did not heed the warnings that lending standards were being lowered, that deceptive practices were being used. He was too much of a market fundamentalist. He believed that if you leave it to markets, everything will be all right. That's initially self-reinforcing, but eventually self-defeating.

WSJ: Greenspan argues that the benefits of innovation are worth the occasional bubble.

Mr. Soros: This is, of course, [Joseph] Schumpeter's creative destruction idea. However ... going overboard in generating change is not necessarily a good thing. Financial innovation may not be an unmixed blessing because it really prevents proper regulation [[resulting in severe financial dislocations: normxxx]].

If you look at the 19th century, you had creative destruction going on, one financial crisis after another. But each time you had a crisis, you had an examination of what went wrong, and you put in some instrument or some institution to prevent it from happening [again]. I'm not advocating ... central planning because that's worse than [free] markets. But the regulators need to learn from the mistakes that they have made. I think it's pretty clear that you've got to accept responsibility for moderating asset bubbles. ... That involves regulating credit as well as [interest rates].

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Normxxx    
______________

The contents of any third-party letters/reports above do not necessarily reflect the opinions or viewpoint of normxxx. They are provided for informational/educational purposes only.
The content of any message or post by normxxx anywhere on this site is not to be construed as constituting market or investment advice. Such is intended for educational purposes only. Individuals should always consult with their own advisors for specific investment advice.

Financial Meltdown?

The Bear's Lair: Are We Entering A Financial Meltdown?

By Martin Hutchinson | 16 July 2008

The financial crisis in the United States and worldwide entered a new phase this week, as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two huge US home loan institutions, began what appears to be a similar "death spiral" to that which claimed Bear Stearns four months ago. Fannie and Freddie are unique institutions, and will almost certainly be bailed out by the long-suffering taxpayer. However, for the first time, the specter has been raised of a general financial meltdown, such as the US managed to avoid in 1933 but Sweden succumbed to in 1991.

Sweden’s financial meltdown of 1991 involved the government guaranteeing the obligations of the entire Swedish banking system, and recapitalizing the major banks, with the sole major exception of Svenska Handelsbanken. The total cost of the rescue to Swedish taxpayers was around $10 billion, equivalent to about $1 trillion in the context of today’s US economy. The causes of the crisis would be familiar to most Americans today: misuse of off-balance sheet securitization vehicles to invest excessively in real estate and mortgage lending.

It is thus not impossible for the entire US banking system to implode. It didn’t happen in 1933 (though about a quarter of US banks failed [[mainly because the Fed was held back from the mission for which it had been created by Hoover's U.S. Treasury of Secretary Andrew W. Mellon, who "did not want to see those miscreants rescued." Thank God for Secretary William H. Woodin and FDR: normxxx]]). Because US banks in the 1920s had been relatively conservative in their lending, with many banks requiring a 50% down payment for home mortgage loans, for example, [[and rarely went beyond 5 years,: normxxx]] not so many banks were at risk of the housing collapse— which was, in any case, far more modest than today.

Stock margin lending got way out of control in 1928-29, but relatively few banks were significantly involved in that. The main problem in 1932-33 was quite simply liquidity; the Fed failed to supply adequate reserves to the banking system, so crises of confidence in individual banks led to panic withdrawals of deposits that caused the banks themselves to fail [[and, because of interbank loans, led to a crescendo of banks being toppled between 1930 and 1933— precisely the sort of panic/domino effect the Fed had been created to backstop: normxxx]].

This time around, the problem is the opposite. Whereas the Fed had been appropriately cautious in the late 1920s, so only in the [limited] area of stock margin lending [[and some speculation in the market with general bank funds: normxxx]] did the banking system get out of control, this time around the Fed has been hopelessly profligate in monetary creation for over a decade. The initial result of this profligacy, the tech bubble of 1999-2000, caused only modest problems in the banking system through telecom losses. The more recent profligacy and the housing bubble it caused have had much more serious consequences, mirroring those in Sweden leading up to 1991. The additional loosening since September has distorted the financial system further, producing a commodity price bubble that itself seems likely to have substantial further adverse consequences (one can at least argue that the earlier commodity price rise was legitimate and not a 'bubble').

Fannie and Freddie are probably toast, and about time too. Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke’s statement Friday that they can discount paper with the Fed may prolong the inevitable, but also increases its likely huge cost to taxpayers. There can be no economic justification for the government guaranteeing the great majority of the nation’s home mortgages, and the spurious "government sponsored enterprise" structure of Fannie and Freddie merely hid the likely consequences of their default. Their senior employees have been paid like Wall Street for performing a function that was economically entirely unnecessary, and they have survived for more than 50 years simply through their ability to offer lucrative consulting contracts to ex-Congressmen and other politically well-connected people.

It is thus necessary that any "rescue" for Fannie and Freddie be a euthanasia not a lifeline. They have extracted their rents from the market for too long, and have encouraged the growth of a securitized mortgage market that has proved entirely unsound because of its perverse incentives. Simply providing them with $100 billion or so of extra capital at taxpayer expense, probably structured as some economically unjustified form of subordinated debt so that the shareholders are left undiluted and allowing them to continue operating doesn’t solve the problem, it exacerbates it.

The simplest from of euthanasia for Fannie and Freddie would be a takeover by the Office of Federal Housing Oversight (OFHEO) their regulator, on the grounds that they were no longer able to operate independently. In Freddie’s case that could be carried out at any time, since the company has failed to follow through on a promise to OFHEO to raise $5.5 billion in new capital— which at Thursday’s closing share price would dilute existing shareholders by 55%. In any case, further declines in their share prices and withdrawal of funding by the bond markets are likely to cause a sufficient crisis in the next few weeks to make such a takeover inevitable if a rescue is not organized (which it shouldn’t be.)

Following a takeover, Fannie and Freddie would need to continue performing their current functions of guaranteeing home mortgages, as without such guarantees home mortgages are currently impossible to obtain. However, changes must be made to recognize the revised nature of the business. Since the new guarantees would be direct government obligations (OFHEO being an arm of the government) rather than simply implied obligations, the fees for obtaining them should be jerked sharply upwards, perhaps to 1.5% per annum on the outstanding amount of the mortgage.

That would allow mortgage finance to remain available at a cost that is still reasonable in current markets (Fannie Mae paper already pays a 0.75% premium over the government for its borrowings) but as markets recovered it would make Fannie/Freddie guaranteed mortgages highly uncompetitive against direct home loans, by far the healthiest way for housing to be financed. Together with the salary reductions outlined below, it would also begin to reimburse the unfortunate taxpayer for the gigantic costs of this non-rescue operation.

Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson has called for "covered bonds" similar to the German pfandbriefe to be used to finance housing. Since pfandbriefe, bonds issued by German banks to finance housing, remain on German bank balance sheets and retain the bank guarantee, allowing the banks only to escape the funding risk of lending for 30 years at a fixed rate, they avoid the moral hazards of the securitization markets, and are thus an attractive alternative.

To encourage their use, and to reduce the capital cost to banks of holding mortgages on balance sheet, the Basel 1 bank regulations, currently being phased out, should be retained; they allowed mortgages to carry only a 4% capital charge as against 8% for regular loans. By this and other means, the private banking sector would be encouraged to make sound home loans directly, without the unnecessary Fannie/Freddie guarantees.

The objective would be over a 5-10 year period for Fannie and Freddie to become insignificant participants in the mortgage market, after which they could be closed altogether. Meanwhile, costs in Fannie and Freddie could be cut drastically, particularly on the staffing side. Since Fannie and Freddie staff would now be government employees, they should be paid on the GS payscale, with the CEO, as a GS-15, receiving appropriate remuneration between $115,317 and $149,000, according to his years of service. Even if the CEO was able to argue himself onto the SES pay scale (after all, he has excellent Congressional contacts) he would be limited to about $205,000 in the Washington area.

Naturally many Fannie/Freddie employees would be outraged at this cut in their living standards, and would attempt to find alternative better-paid employment; I venture to suggest that few would succeed in doing so. That way, [termination/layoff] payments would be avoided while salary costs were slashed. There would be a devastating effect on the Northern Virginia housing market, where many senior Fannie/Freddie employees have overextended themselves with giant home mortgages for vulgar McMansions, but that problem too is probably survivable. More important, the now disgruntled employees would perform their job poorly, making applying for a Fannie/Freddie guarantee a bureaucratic and uncertain process, similar to negotiating with the IRS. That too should hasten their disappearance from the housing market.

Fannie and Freddie do not represent the entire US finance sector, far from it. Nevertheless their insolvency would further erode confidence in the rest of the sector, very likely leading to a cascade of death spirals among other institutions. After all the best run large non-global US bank, Wachovia, has itself got in trouble by its insanely foolish acquisition of the California mortgage lender Golden West Financial at the peak of the market in 2006, while Bank of America, the largest retail-oriented US bank, voluntarily took on more of the mess by its purchase of the diseased and probably criminal Countrywide Financial as recently as last January. Citigroup is in deep trouble in a number of areas, particularly relating to its over-enthusiasm for the discredited technique of securitization, while JP Morgan Chase CEO Jamie Dimon wrecked his credibility in May by announcing that the financial crisis was "mostly over"— presumably wishful thinking in the light of his huge holdings of dodgy Bear Stearns paper.

Only Goldman Sachs appears serenely above the fray, but don’t forget— at May 2008 its "Level 3" assets were $78 billion, more than twice its capital. Level 3 assets, you may remember, are those for which there is no market, so can be valued only by the internal mathematical models of the institution concerned. Since this arcane highly-illiquid paper is the most likely to suffer catastrophic erosion of "value" in a downturn, Goldman Sachs like Jamie Dimon must be keeping their fingers crossed that somehow this nightmare must end soon.

It needn’t; from past experience of such follies it probably has at least another year to go. Thus a total collapse of the US financial system, while hardly inevitable, is a contingency which should now be planned for [[as a natural consequence of CB ineptitude, and it should be remembered that 'those guys' are by and large paid for who they know, not what they know: normxxx]].

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Normxxx    
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The contents of any third-party letters/reports above do not necessarily reflect the opinions or viewpoint of normxxx. They are provided for informational/educational purposes only.
The content of any message or post by normxxx anywhere on this site is not to be construed as constituting market or investment advice. Such is intended for educational purposes only. Individuals should always consult with their own advisors for specific investment advice.

Tuesday, July 15, 2008

Recession ==> Depression?

This Recession Could Easily Tip Into A Depression

By William Rees-Mogg, The Times.UK | 14 July 2008

Today I am celebrating my 80th birthday, an age that seems less formidable when one has reached it than when one can see it only from afar. I was born on July 14, 1928, about 15 months before the American boom of the 1920s came to its rather abrupt end. Like everyone else, I am naturally curious to see whether the global credit crunch is going to be a brief interruption in global prosperity, or the prelude to a longer and deeper depression. But, the experiences of the 1930s makes me think that the present downturn will be relatively long and difficult.

I cannot claim to have clear memories of the 1929 Wall Street Crash, which occured when I was 1 year old, or of Britain leaving the gold standard in 1931, when I was 3 years old. I do however, remember newspaper articles about the later stages of the Depression. In the 1930s, my parents read The Times, the Financial Times and the Daily Mail. I can remember the news stories of the Jarrow march of the unemployed (that was in the UK; the US counterpart was the "Bonus March Army" of veterans of WWI). I also remember discussing with my mother a lead story which reported that farm workers' pay was to be raised 6 pence (2 new pennies, or about $0.02) to what would now be £1.50 a week (that's about $3.00 today, unadjusted for inflation). The depression was a fact of existence in the North Somerset coalfield up to the outbreak of war in 1939. Fortunately, there has only been one Great Depression in my lifetime, but there has also been a Great Inflation.

In 2006 Pickering and Chatto, which I refounded in the 1980s, had the good timing to publish a three-volume History of Financial Disasters, under the general editorship of Mark Duckenfield. His introduction to the 1929 crash on the New York Stock Exchange makes an important point: "Most of the stock market's loss in value took place in later years as the Depression deepened. Three years after its initial crash and shortly before the 1932 election, the Dow Jones Industrial Average had fallen to 34, a loss of more than 90 per cent in less than three years. The Dow did not return to its 1929 peak of 381 until a quarter of a century later at the end of 1954."

On that basis, stock markets would get back to their 2007 levels in 2032.

There are various ways of measuring a recession. These are reasonably useful when applied to minor fluctuations of the stock market, or to minor adjustments of the world economy. But the big booms and slumps need to be measured by their broader impact over time. The Great Depression can be regarded as lasting for ten years from 1929 to 1939; the Great Inflation ran for a similar period, from 1973 to 1982. Even these dates could be challenged, since both events were preceded by a build-up of debt and other warnings of trouble. Both were followed by aftershocks.

One can even argue about the correct date to take as the starting point of the present recession. It was certainly preceded by two great American bubbles, the dot-com bubble of the late 1990s and the US housing bubble of this century. On one view, the present recession began on August 7, 2007— only a year ago— when the sub-prime mortgage crisis came to the surface. That date could also be used to mark the bursting of the US housing bubble [[more accurately, the onset of the Credit Crisis— the housing 'boom' had probably peaked in the summer of 2005: normxxx]], which is still having so damaging an impact on mortgage banking.

Alternatively, one could reasonably start the present recession from the bursting of the dot-com bubble itself, which was the beginning of a bear market on Wall Street. That happened in the early months of 2000, already eight years ago. If this is a depression, it is a matter of choice whether one regards it as one or eight years old. A big inflation has many of the same consequences as a big depression. That is why many people made a dangerous mistake in the early 1970s. They saw that inflation was the immediate threat and assumed that it would raise the value of capital assets while liquidating debts. In fact, it raised interest rates on debt and actually reduced the real value of many capital assets.

The inflation of the price of oil after 1973 was accompanied by a collapse of the British property market and the insolvency of the secondary banking sector in London. It is obvious that a big depression is bad for investors; a big inflation is bad for them as well. The present recession has some characteristics which make me think that it will be a relatively long one. The recession is centred on banking and property. In an ordinary recession, one has to wait for consumers to regain their confidence, which, in turn restores the confidence of business. Now one has to wait for the bankers as well. At present, banks are too [full of anxiety] even to want to lend to each other, let alone to expand consumer credit or business loans.

This recession has produced a succession of nasty surprises. Things are always proving to be worse than anyone had expected. Last week the crisis spread to the American mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, created by President Roosevelt in 1938. These are far bigger than the investment bank Bear Stearns and Northern Rock put together. They have brought the crisis from the level of billions of dollars, to the level of trillions. No doubt they will be saved because the US would be bust if they went down. But you cannot save six-trillion-dollar institutions without suffering on a large scale.

The debt crisis, the banking crisis, the property crisis, the oil crisis, the shift to Asia, the bear market in stocks, are huge global adjustments that have all come together at the same time. If my birthday does not prove to be another Black Monday on Wall Street, I shall think myself rather lucky. There is now a momentum of negative events sweeping away financial flood defences; in the 1930s that force overturned democratic governments as easily as it overturned banks.

Before we get back to balance, we may see dramatic changes in politics, as well as in business and finance.

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Normxxx    
______________

The contents of any third-party letters/reports above do not necessarily reflect the opinions or viewpoint of normxxx. They are provided for informational/educational purposes only.
The content of any message or post by normxxx anywhere on this site is not to be construed as constituting market or investment advice. Such is intended for educational purposes only. Individuals should always consult with their own advisors for specific investment advice.

Saturday, July 12, 2008

Troubled Waters

Barron's Cover: Troubled Waters

By Lauren R. Rublin, Barron's | 16 June 2008

Eleven of Wall Street's most insightful investment experts weigh in on the uncertain prospects for the economy, stocks, bonds, commodities and more in our midyear Roundtable. Some good and bad news about oil and banks. And an early read on 2009— and yes, 2010.

Midyear 2008 Roundtable Report Card

You can't trust anything these days. Take the innocent-looking tomato— delicious, nutritious and now a weapon of mass digestive destruction. Or inflation, still soothingly low, so long as you don't eat or drive. Then there's Wall Street, where humongous earnings these past few years have fed similarly humongous bonuses. Sorry, wrong numbers. Just ask Lehman Brothers, which announced last week that it will report a loss of nearly $3 billion for the second quarter, wiping out numerous periods of supposed gains. [[Wonder if that was bad for bonuses?: normxxx]]

The Barron's roundtable represents a notable exception to the current bull market in duplicity and false impressions. Year in and year out, we can trust its members— 11 of Wall Street's most insightful investment experts— to give us the straight skinny on the economy, the financial markets and dozens of individual stocks and funds, even if the truth is sometimes painful, as it has been this year.

Brad Trent: When the Roundtable last met Jan. 7 with the editors of Barron's, our distinguished panelists minced no words: This year would be difficult to dismal for the economy and stocks, as the bubbles in housing and credit unwind. So far, so good (er, bad). Most still feel that way about '08, and even '09, though a handful see the skies clearing at last, even for decimated financial and home-building shares. [[dream on! : normxxx]].

In the pages ahead, we've distilled the latest views of the Roundtable crew. We hope you're enlightened, amused and provoked by them to discover your own truths about markets. And, should you disagree with any of the opinions expressed herein, please, no tomatoes.

Bill Gross

Barron's: What a year it's been for investors— and it's only June. How do things look to you, Bill?

Gross: The economy has fooled us. Pimco expected at least a quarter of negative GDP [gross domestic product] growth, but we haven't seen it yet. We don't expect a return to normalized growth rates in the next six months, however. There still are weaknesses in housing, and housing deflation affects employment and consumption. Also, the states, which had been reluctant savers, will have to cut back because they are over budget. Growth will stay positive, but very, very low.

How will the markets deal with this?

Relatively high inflation combined with meager economic growth sends a mixed message to the bond market. With the economy down, the Federal Reserve can't raise rates to tame inflation. Yet, higher inflation means it should, or at least should be thinking about it.

What advice would you give the Fed?

The U.S. should simply stand pat. About a month ago the Fed sent a clear signal that 2% was it on the downside for rates, and that further stimulation would come from policy changes such as its liquidity provisions for Wall Street and heavy lifting from the Treasury and Congress to ease the mortgage crisis. But it's difficult to raise interest rates in the face of a housing market that is falling by double digits.

Bill Gross's Picks
Company Ticker 6/11/08 Price
FairPoint Communications FRP $7.79
Countrywide Financial CFC 4.58
6/11/08 Yield
JPMorgan Chase 7.9%, due April 2049 8.30%
Source: Bloomberg

The good news for stocks is that economic growth hasn't turned negative[!?!] and that corporate profits haven't declined[!?!] A substantial portion of profits comes from outside the U.S., either through currency adjustments or greater growth in foreign markets. That said, financials play a dominant role in the market. That means lower profit margins, and lower profits. It's a tale of two stock markets.

Nonfinancial companies are doing better, you mean.

Finance companies are stinking up the joint, but the industrial economy is benefiting from a lower dollar and more exports. The railroads are doing well. The stock market might not have much upside, although foreign reserves have to go somewhere, and with oil prices at records, we're talking about an additional $500 billion of reserves generated in the past six months. That money will come to the U.S., and its owners don't want bonds. Almost by default— if you'll pardon the term— stocks are benefiting. They are the least bad choice. But be cautious: This is not a new bull market.

Your January picks— auto bonds and some closed-end funds— did well, especially relative to the market. How about a few new ideas?

Fairpoint Communications, a land-line phone company, acquired substantial properties from Verizon Communications [ticker: VZ]. Related to the deal, the dividend will fall to $1.03 from $1.59, for a yield of 11% for the next year. JPMorgan Chase has a 7.9% preferred stock due April 29, 2049. This is the crème de la crème of banks today; the Fed loves [CEO] Jamie Dimon. Why shouldn't you? This preferred can be bought for 96 cents on the dollar, for a yield of 8%-plus. Lastly, Countrywide Financial trades at a 10% discount to the price that Bank of America, its future parent, has agreed to pay in an all-stock deal. The deal will close in a few months, and Countrywide yields 10% while you wait.

Sounds like it's worth waiting. Thanks, Bill.

Oscar Schafer

Barron's: What is your second-half forecast, Oscar?

Schafer: We are in the 6th or 7th inning of losses taken on subprime and other financial instruments. But we are in the third or fourth inning of deleveraging the economy after four or five years of borrowing. Growth will remain slow as we reverse the trend of having spent more than we earned. And we haven't yet seen all the problems of the regional banks, which, although they hold less of the risky financial instruments, will have problems with customers defaulting on credit-card debt and auto loans.

Consumers will continue to be under pressure as house prices fall, mortgage-equity withdrawals decline and gas is at $4 a gallon. That's why companies like Wal-Mart Stores [WMT] are doing better than expected. The U.S. has $20 trillion in household wealth. House prices have come down 13% or 14%, so that's $2.6 trillion in wealth destruction.

Compare that to tax cuts, which have been all of $150 billion. The continuing erosion in household wealth will make consumers spend less. And the banks, with big write-offs, are constrained in lending money, even if the Fed lowers rates. The growth of the past few years was credit-driven, and credit is drying up.

Oscar Schafer's Picks
Company Ticker 6/11/08 Price
Tyco International TYC $42.91
CommScope CTV 52.14
Source: Bloomberg

How long will the deleveraging take?

It could last another 12 to 18 months. We look for companies that are somewhat immune to these problems. The further you get from housing and consumer spending, the less the impact is likely to be. If the rest of the world— China, India, Brazil— doesn't collapse, the industrial part of our economy will keep going.

Are you expecting them to collapse?

It's the $64 question. If it happens, all bets are off for the rest of the world. The stock market probably won't do much this year. There is a yin and yang between the financial sector and everything else. We'll have a standoff. As long as there aren't significant layoffs, the economy— and the stock market— will muddle along.

What stocks do well in this sort of market?

I've got two special situations. Tyco International sells for 43 a share and has a $21 billion market cap. After spinning off its health-care business into Covidien [COV] and electronics manufacturing into Tyco Electronics [TEL], the remaining Tyco is a diversified manufacturing and service company operating in several business segments. These include ADT, the nation's largest electronic-security provider; Flow Control, the largest manufacturer of flow-control products, and fire-protection, safety-products and electrical and metal-products businesses.

Tyco is significantly undervalued. The company has big opportunities to improve margins across various business segments and reduce corporate overhead. In particular, ADT's European business has operating margins less than half those in the U.S. The company is in the early stages of an operational turnaround. Also, the flow-control business is underappreciated, as its end markets— particularly oil and gas, power, waste and water— have excellent growth prospects, and it is 75% international. The growth in these end markets could continue for several years.

What do Tyco's financials look like?

The company is underlevered, with current net debt equal to EBITDA [earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization]. Tyco's businesses generate significant cash flow due to high recurring revenue, a strong service-revenue component and relatively modest capital-expenditure requirements. The company is making tuck-in acquisitions and is in the process of divesting its engineering and construction business, the proceeds of which will be reinvested and used to repurchase stock. Tyco has a great management team led by CEO Ed Breen, who can focus on the core businesses following last year's spinoffs.

Did Tyco retain a piece of the spinoffs?

No, though all the pieces are interesting. The company isn't economically sensitive; management is in control of its destiny. The stock is selling for about 6.5 times next year's estimated EBITDA, and about 11 times 2009 estimated cash earnings of just under $4 a share. Tyco could be worth in the mid-60s. If it doesn't get credit for hidden gems such as Flow Control, it could spin those off, too.

CommScope is a producer of antennas and cabling for wireless towers, data transport and cable companies. It is a leading producer in all its segments, domestically and internationally. The key to the story is the superb execution capabilities of the CommScope management team. The CEO, chief financial officer and chief operating officer have been running this company together for more than 30 years.

As an example, after acquiring Avaya's enterprise-cabling business in 2004 and doubling the revenue base, CommScope proceeded to grow its earnings per share by more than 400% from 2004 until 2007, on revenue growth of only 65%. Increased purchasing scale, manufacturing efficiencies and rationalization enabled significant operating leverage. At the end of 2007, CommScope's management embarked on its next large acquisition, buying Andrew Corp.

This is another doubling-of-revenue acquisition. Similarly, there are significant opportunities for cost synergy, including plant rationalizations, purchasing scale and the conversion of copper products to aluminum. CommScope's wireless antenna and cabling business should benefit from the rapid increase in wireless-data demand.

Where is the stock?

While the stock has run up 30% to $53 - $54 since the company reported its first quarter in April, there is at least 25% upside from current levels. Wall Street's estimate for this year is $3.36 a share. For next year, it's $4.10, and there is upside to both years' estimates. CommScope trades for 13 times '09 earnings. The market cap is $3.7 billion.

With both Tyco and CommScope, we are betting on the management, not the economy. You have to focus on management that can execute despite headwinds.

Good advice. Thanks, Oscar.

Archie Macallaster

Barron's: How's the year treating you, Archie?

MacAllaster: I have been neutral on the market for a year and a half. I've survived and my customers have survived. But these are brutal markets and you have to be careful. You wish everybody was off margin, because this is not a time to be speculating with borrowed money.

Tell that to Wall Street.

Lehman Brothers has reduced its leverage from 32 times equity to about 25 times in one quarter, which is good. But they have a long way to go. They raised $6 billion of equity and they are probably going to lose that $6 billion.

Archie MacAllaster's Picks
Company Ticker 6/11/08 Price
JPMorgan Chase JPM $37.13
Wells Fargo WFC 25.55
Bank of America BAC 28.85
Source: Bloomberg

The economy has performed well if you get away from housing and the financials. Companies with foreign operations have done well. McDonald's [MCD] reported good earnings and its stock is up. I'm an optimist. The economy hasn't had a negative quarter yet, and if it does, the downturn won't be deep. I have three bank stocks to recommend.

Surely, you're joking.

If nobody loves banks, at the least they're fairly priced[!?!] The five largest banks in America have 44% - 45% of the total assets of the banking system. They have increased that percentage year after year, and it won't be long before they own more than 50%. Two [Citigroup and Wachovia] have cut their dividends, but the other three are a good investment in the next 12 to 18 months. One is conservative, one a growth company and one speculative.

JPMorgan Chase has the most conservative balance sheet and the fewest problems. The stock sells at about $37. The high for the past year was $51, the low $36. The dividend is $1.52 a share and the stock yields 4%. JPMorgan earned $4.37 a share in 2007. The estimate for '08 is $2.50. If they pay out $1.52 a share, they will earn well in excess of the dividend. There is no reason it should be cut. You don't have to hurry to buy these things because they could go down in the next month or two. But in 12 to 18 months, the stock ought to be somewhere in the neighborhood of $46 to $48.

Which is the growth company?

Wells Fargo. It has a major problem in home-equity loans, but has reserved well. The stock is about $25, and the range is $38 to $24.38. Wells has had the best growth of all the large banks for many years, and it still will. It is well run. It does three or four different kinds of business with its customers. The market has knocked its shares down too far. Wells Fargo earned $2.41 a share last year, and the estimate this year is $2 to $2.10. This, too, is well in excess of its dividend, which is $1.24 a share. The stock yields almost 5%. My earnings estimate for 2009 is $3.10 a share.

Your speculative bet must be Bank of America.

Yes, because they may cut the dividend. Bank of America offers the greatest potential. It's trading around $29, the low for the year. The high was $53. The dividend is $2.56 a share, and it yields about 8.6%. They don't have to cut the dividend, but with the yield over 8%, the market is saying they will. Bank of America's pending acquisition of Countrywide Financial has been criticized; people are worried about the size of the reserves they'll have to take against Countrywide's loans. Long term, the deal will be a positive, though it's going to take 18 months to two years.

Bank of America also owns about 20 billion shares of China Construction Bank [939.Hong Kong]. It accounts for about $15 billion of the bank's market value. The first piece they purchased becomes marketable in October. They'll sell part of it. When they do, they'll have a big profit. That will allow them to offset some of the losses, and perhaps preserve the dividend. The bank earned $3.32 a share in 2007, and that's after taking big write-offs in the fourth quarter. My estimate for this year is $2.50 to $2.60, which is about equal to the $2.56 dividend. My 18-month target is $50 to $52.

Thank you, Archie.

Scott Black

Barron's: Some of your January picks did well, including Devon Energy, Ensco and Ross Stores.

Black: You didn't have to be a genius to do well in oil stocks, given oil is $134 a barrel and gas is $12.67 per million British thermal units— well above levels earlier this year. It's like having a big wind to your back as you're sailing off Newport to Block Island. Devon Energy [DVN] also is great with the drill bit. I originally thought earnings would be around $7.50 a share. Now they could top $11. It's a good company, but the price is a lot higher now.

Ensco International [ESV] also is doing well. They still have 45 rigs— 44 jack-ups and one semi-submersible— and six semi-submersibles on the way. The upside lies in the semi-submersibles; the first will be delivered next spring. The company is almost debt-free. Earnings estimates have been ratcheting up, and the stock still sells at nine times this year's estimates.

Scott Black's Picks
Company Ticker 6/11/08 Price
Bolt Technology BOLT $19.68
Belden BDC 36.05
Source: Bloomberg

As for Ross Stores [ROST], women like to shop. They like to buy name brands at a bargain. Ross sells name-brand merchandise at 25% to 40% off department-store prices. Comp-store sales [sales at stores open a year or more] were up 7% in May, versus estimates of 4%. I thought they would earn $2.10 to $2.12 a share. The estimates are now $2.25. But the stock— at 37, or 16 times this year's earnings— is too expensive to initiate a position.

Thanks for the update. What's ahead?

Analysts estimate the S&P 500 will earn $89.27 this year. Strategists say $79.25. If we use $84.25, which is in the middle, the P/E is 16. The market is fully valued. On a dividend-discount model, as well, it is efficient. In January and February we had the greatest opportunity to buy name-brand technology stocks since the Long Term Capital debacle in 1998. We bought Oracle [ORCL] at 12 times earnings, Texas Instruments [TXN], KLA-Tencor [KLAC], Xilinx [XLNX].

And now?

There are no more pockets of opportunity. We're ignoring consumer-discretionary stocks. Everyone is recommending financials. We aren't. We have the lowest weighting in financials since I started Delphi. The only major brokerage we own is Goldman Sachs [GS], because they seem to have weathered the storm. Elsewhere in the industry, the bloodletting continues. The meltdown in housing also is ongoing. The stock market won't get out of its own way until the banking system regains transparency. This also overhangs S&P earnings.

The unwinding of the housing bubble is killing the economy. Household net worth is dropping for the first time in five or six years. The average family income in America is $48,600. For Main Street, this is a recession. Real GDP growth in 2008 and '09 is going to be weak, at 1% to 1.5%.

That's robust compared with some estimates.

Everybody knocks [Federal Reserve Chairman] Ben Bernanke, but I give him kudos. He could have kept interest rates high and defended the dollar, and risked a massive recession. He did the right thing by cutting rates. Opening the discount window to the investment banks was smart. So was bailing out Bear Stearns. We could have had a banking crisis like 1928 and '29 if Bear had failed.

If the market thinks S&P 500 earnings can get up to $100 in 2009, as some predict, stocks will take off later this year. But if S&P earnings come in around $84-$87 this year, it is going to be a stockpicker's market. Treasuries are a fool's bet. With headline inflation at almost 4%, parking money in two-, five— or 10-year Treasuries yields a negative real return.

Where are you parking money for Delphi's clients?

We like Bolt Technology, based in Norwalk, Conn. It trades for 20, and has a market cap of $172 million. The high last year was 39.57, the low 14.67. We've been buying the stock at $18 - $19. Bolt makes a compressed-air gun for offshore seismology and has an 80% market share worldwide. It also makes underwater electrical connectors and cables, but the gun accounts for roughly 60% of sales. The company benefits from offshore seismology, and is in the sweet spot right now. Big customers include Schlumberger [SLB] and SeaBird Exploration [SBX.Norway].

For the year ending June 30, Bolt could do close to $67 million in revenue and earn about $1.65 a share. There isn't much Street guidance on '09, so I do my own. Conservatively, we have revenues going up 12%, to $75 million. Cost of sales is about 55%, and SG&A [selling, general and administrative expenses] is up 5%, to $9.6 million. Research and development spending is about $200,000. They have more than $2 a share in cash, no debt. There is about $300,000 in interest income. After taxes at 33%, you get $16.3 million in net income. Divide by 8.58 million fully diluted shares, and Bolt will earn $1.90 a share on the low end.

And on the high end?

Revenues will grow 16%, to $78 million, and they'll earn $2 a share, versus $1.65 this year. That's 20% growth and a 10 price/earnings multiple. They have a steady book of business. Schlumberger is a great company, but at a 20 P/E it is not a great value. Bolt, nobody ever heard of.

Belden, in St. Louis, isn't well known, either. It manufactures electrical cable and wire. It trades for $36 a share and there are 47 million fully diluted shares, for a $1.7 billion market cap. The high on the year was $60; the low, $30.28. I like industrial companies that have a big presence outside the U.S. Only 41% of Belden's revenue is U.S.-based. The company made acquisitions at the end of 2006, one in Germany and another in Hong Kong. Revenue guidance for '08 is around $2.25 billion. Operating margins are 12%. That gets you to about $270 million in operating income. They have $31 million in interest expense and $4 million in interest income, so before a recent acquisition, they would have made $243 million, taxed at 32%. I had them earning $3.51 on the low side and $3.68 after economies of scale. The acquisition will dilute '08 earnings by 30 cents a share. Belden is a mundane manufacturer in the right markets.

Thank you, Scott.

Marc Faber

Barron's: What do you make of '08, so far?

Faber: Measured in euros, the U.S. is down around 13%. But it has outperformed many other markets. The U.S. has many problems. One is the slowdown in credit growth. Another is recession. The statistics don't indicate the economy is in a recession, but we question the statistics.

The Federal Reserve's aggressive interest-rate cuts— to 2% from 5.25% last September— make equities relatively attractive compared to cash yields. But in the second half and the first half of 2009 it will become evident that '09 earnings for the S&P 500 won't meet consensus estimates of $110 per S&P share. Earnings instead are coming down and will stay down, and this will weigh on stocks. The recession won't be deep but it could be long. And it could be deep for corporate profits.

How much further will the market fall?

The situation is similar to 1973-74. It's water torture. We may have a rally here or there, but once investors notice that Mr. Obama has a good chance of winning the presidential election, this will be another negative for stocks. He's not going to be good for the market.

Also, the bond market's not acting well. Bond yields are higher than when the Fed cut rates between December and January. The bond market looks as though it could weaken considerably. Once interest rates go up again, that will be another strong headwind for stocks.

Marc Faber's Picks
Investment Ticker 6/11/08 Price
Japan
iShares MSCI
Japan Small Cap SCJ $47.85
Sumitomo Trust & Banking 8403.Japan ¥840
Mitsubishi UFJ MTU $ 9.49
Mizuho Financial 8411.Japan ¥549k
Currencies
Buy the U.S. Dollar/Sell the Euro 1 euro=$1.56
Airlines
AMR AMR $ 6.09
Lufthansa DLAKY $24.30
Singapore Airlines SIA.Singapore S$15.12
Japan Airlines 9205.Japan ¥235
Short
US Steel X $172.46
Source: Bloomberg

The U.S. is down just 8% this year in dollars. India is down 30%; China, 40%; Vietnam, down 60%. Are those markets buys at current levels?

Among emerging markets, only Mexico and Brazil have been strong. I'd get out of them. There is no hurry to buy anything in Asia, though stocks aren't expensive. Thailand, down 7%, could fall another 5% or even 10%.

Japan is the exception. The Japanese market has performed badly in the past 18 months, and stocks are low compared to cash yields. Some corporations have increased their dividends. Steel Partners' ouster of the management of Aderans Holdings [8170.Japan], a Japanese wig maker, was an important event. Pension funds and foreign investors are starting to have more power over Japanese management.

Do you still like the iShares MSCI Japan Small Cap exchange-traded fund, which you recommended in January?

Buy that, and some Japanese banks: Sumitomo Trust, Mitsubishi UFJ and Mizuho Financial. I would still go long the dollar against the euro, which is overvalued. The tightening of global liquidity and the contracting U.S. trade and current-account deficits are likely to be dollar-supportive. Mr. Bernanke does not understand anything about international economics; it's not a weak currency that leads via import prices to inflation, as he suggested, but inflated money and credit growth that leads to a weak currency.

Where is oil headed, now that it trades in the $130s?

Prices should ease a bit. It wouldn't surprise me to see oil dropping to around $80 a barrel. If you're bearish about oil in the next three months— though long-term, commodities will go higher— it's best to own Japanese stocks or airlines. A drop in oil might not help the airlines much, but sentiment toward airlines will improve considerably. Buy AMR, Lufthansa, Singapore Airlines and Japan Airlines.

And sell oil stocks?

Interestingly, they haven't done well relative to crude. One problem is declining reserves. Also, I would rather own physical commodities than commodity-related equities because resource nationalism is on the upswing. That's also true of gold, which has fallen to $870 an ounce from $1,000. The price could go down to $780 to $800 an ounce. If you have no exposure to gold, start buying it here. People are blaming speculators for the recent run-up in commodities, but they are a symptom rather than a cause of the problem. The cause lies in excess liquidity, and the Fed is responsible for that.

My last suggestion concerns steel. If world economies decelerate, the pace of building in places like China will slow, hurting demand for steel. Steel stocks have been among this year's best performers. Short U.S. Steel.

Thank you, Marc.

Mario Gabelli

Barron's: How does the big picture look to you, Mario?

Gabelli: The consumer, as we discussed in January, ran out of money and went off a cliff. Food and fuel costs have been a bigger negative than we expected. Rebate checks are hitting people's pocketbooks now, and we need another round of fiscal stimulation, focused on productivity. As for inflation, as Karl Otto Pöhl, a former president of the German Bundesbank, said, "It's like toothpaste. Once it gets out of the tube, it's very hard to put back." Inflation expectations have been accelerating. That will remain a challenge.

There will be less stress in the financial system in the second half of '08, but continuing uncertainty with regard to the underpinnings of that stress: the housing market. Likewise, the auto market needs help. A lot of auto loans are underwater because of the declining value of the cars they financed. In 2009, however, we'll be further along in correcting the housing balances, and we'll have an OK economy.

And an OK stock market?

Originally I thought the market would be flat to up 5%. It will probably close up. If the Democrats control Congress and the White House, they'll raise taxes. If you own a company, you may want to sell it and pay long-term capital gains this year. Companies may issue more special dividends over the balance of the year.

Mario Gabelli's Picks
Company Ticker 6/11/08 Price
Tyco International TYC $42.91
Telephone & Data Systems TDS $47.14
Tootsie Roll Industries TR 25.67
Tredegar TG 14.19
Herley Industries HRLY 15.54
Diebold DBD 39.16
Source: Bloomberg

There is no question the amount of money earmarked by pension funds, endowments and others toward commodities is having an impact on prices, well beyond Chinese or Indian demand. This speculative bubble should be nipped in the bud. Margin requirements on commodities accounts must be increased or we'll have another bust.

Where do you see value these days?

We like companies with an environmental focus. Going green is good for business. We also like companies with pricing power, and we like takeovers. Strategic buyers are at center stage.

Telephone & Data Systems has a takeover angle. There are 117 million shares outstanding, the stock is $45, and the company has two businesses: wireless, through U.S. Cellular [USM], and telephone companies in rural America. TDS has about $350 million in net cash. EBITDA is $300 million. Valued at six times, that's $2 billion. With every TDS share, you get 0.61 of a share of U.S. Cellular, which trades at about $62 but is worth $100 to $120 a share. In all, you're getting $5 billion of value for free when you buy TDS at $45. Alltel or Verizon might buy U.S. Cellular, and there is speculation that TDS received a bid in the $90-a-share range. It is a potential takeover target.

Next, Tootsie Roll Industries. It has about 55 million shares. Chairman and CEO Melvin Gordon— he's 88— and his wife, Ellen, the chief operating officer— she's 76— control the voting shares, which have 10 votes each. Tootsie Roll has $120 million in cash. Revenues are flattish around $500 million, growing about 3% or 4% a year. Earnings are about a buck a share, going to $1.20. A takeout in the low $30s per share is likely. The stock sells for $26.

Who are the logical buyers?

There are many. With capital-gains taxes at 15% and likely to rise, it may be time for the Gordons to look at alternatives.

Tredegar, located in Richmond, Va., makes diaper components. The number of children 4 years old and under is going to stay flat at about 600 million for the next 30 years, but the use of diapers for incontinence is rising dramatically with the elderly population. Third-party pay is increasing. Tredegar also makes a fiber shield for flat-screen devices, and has an aluminum-products business. The company has 34.5 million shares and has been buying in its stock, which trades for 14.50.

What is the market cap?

It's $500 million. A transaction is likely here, too. Management could take the company private, or continue to shrink its capitalization. Tredegar will earn about 70 cents this year, but earnings could rise 50% in the next few years.

Herley Industries, a maker of defense electronics, also may be taken over. The stock is $15 - $16. There are 13.5 million shares outstanding. Revenues for the year ending July 31 will be about $150 million, and profits will be break-even to a small loss. Herley could earn a dollar a share in the next 12 months.

Any other ideas?

Diebold, which makes automatic-teller machines, sells for $39.50. United Technologies [UTX] bid $40 a share for Diebold, which rejected the offer. Diebold could earn about $2.35 this year, $2.85 in '09 and $3.50 in 2010. The balance sheet is in good shape. They should announce a large capitalization shrink. Self-service at banks is going to be highly sought after in Europe and Asia, and Diebold knows how to work with the banks. NCR [NCR] has terrific management and we're buying it, as well, but Diebold is our official pick.

Thanks, Mario.

Art Samberg

Barron's: What gives with this market, Art?

Samberg: The commodities market has a lot of unfinished business. The bubble isn't going to burst; it's going to continue to expand. We haven't reached the animal-spirits stage yet. This run-up is economically justified. [[Even if we have a recession?: normxxx]]

As for the stock market, a narrower and narrower list of stocks will work. We played some tech and materials names when both groups had major corrections a few months ago. But the stocks have come back, and I'm not as interested any more. The lack of serious innovation is a huge problem for the country, and it gets manifested in technology stocks. The number of interesting IPOs [initial public offerings] is tiny, and the backlog is getting even smaller.

Because there are fewer compelling technologies, or because a choppy market is inhospitable to new stocks?

The venture-capital world is moving from a focus on information technology to green investing. There aren't a lot of new, green-oriented ideas that will be significant in the short term. Health care usually is a good feeder of IPOs, but the macros there are dismal. Much of what's new in tech focuses on consumers. Those stocks are boring.

At the beginning of the year financial institutions were way overlevered. They've brought leverage down quickly, and the rate of return on capital industrywide is falling. When the unwinding ends, financials will sell at book value, not multiples of book.

So they're boring, too?

They could be boring for another two, three or four years. The market will be down this year, and next year won't be much better. It could be worse. There will be bigger problems with consumer credit and trouble in commercial lending. Before it's over, every financial institution will be embarrassed in some way. This is the mother of all credit cycles, at least in my lifetime, and that's the way they end.

Will things improve by 2010?

I'm optimistic about 2010. The U.S. will look good relative to other markets. For now, the only thing left to invest in is inflating assets— copper, natural gas, coal. I recommended Ultra Petroleum in January. We still love it. Natural gas now trades above $12 per million British thermal units, up from $7 in January. Southwestern Energy is another natural-gas play. In the first quarter a lot of commodities rallied, but the related equities didn't. You're starting to get an equity catch-up play. Because gas is rising, there's a double play.

We're big owners of Freeport McMoRan Copper & Gold. Copper used to be obtained through surface mining, but the ore grade has deteriorated and now you have go underground. There isn't enough electricity in places like Chile, and there are water-scarcity problems near many mines. Nationalization is also an issue.

We also like Xstrata, the Anglo-Swiss copper miner. They have a lot of South African coal. Eskom, the South African electric company, can't produce enough electricity, so it's hard to get this stuff out of the ground. Prices will escalate until the infrastructure is built to accommodate the market, and the rate of return improves significantly.

Art Samberg's Picks
Company Ticker 6/11/08 Price
Ultra Petroleum UPL $ 94.96
Southwestern Energy SWN 48.33
Freeport McMoRan Copper&Gold FCX 120.09
Xstrata XTA.UK 4035 pence
CVRD RIO $ 34.44
Halliburton HAL 49.37
Source: Bloomberg

You've been a big fan of Companhia Vale do Rio Doce, or CVRD, the Brazilian commodity giant. Do you like it still?

It's super-cheap. I'm still recommending it. Nothing has changed. My last pick is Halliburton, which makes equipment for oil and gas exploration. The bad press surrounding Halliburton has gone away. [The company, which has close ties to Vice President Dick Cheney, was accused of profiting from government favoritism in Iraq.] I could mention almost any commodities producer: The story is the same. I'm either dead right on commodities, or dead wrong.

Here's hoping you're dead right. Thanks, Art.

Fred Hickey

Barron's: Do things still look bleak to you, Fred?

Hickey: A witch's brew is hitting the economy, including the biggest housing-market collapse in U.S. history. Home prices are declining by 14%, year over year. Oil is $135 a barrel, up almost 40% since January. Food prices are soaring, unemployment is rising and wages are stagnant. Lending standards are tightening. Auto sales are plunging. States have a budget crisis. This combination of problems is unprecedented unless you go back to 1929.

Which we're not. Are we?

Well, they haven't taken protectionist steps yet. But they're talking about it. The U.S. is in a recession. The only people who don't believe that are on Wall Street. The stock market has had a classic bear-market rally, triggered by the Federal Reserve saving the world again. Supposedly. Previously, significant declines in interest rates would lead to corresponding drops in mortgage rates. Not any more. Lending standards are tighter, and consumers have record debt and no savings. Who would want to lend to them?

Good point. How will these problems get solved?

They have to play out. Housing prices have to fall to the point where homes become affordable to the general population. So far, stocks aren't even down 20%. The market will get killed when companies admit the second-half rebound isn't going to happen.

I'm still buying gold and selling "horsemen," the most popular tech stocks. Gold hit $1,000 an ounce within a few weeks of the January Roundtable, which I expected. I slashed my position by 75%, and in March I got out of all my puts on stocks. I've been on the sidelines, though I bought tech stocks such as Microsoft [MSFT], Oracle [ORCL], EMC [EMC], Hewlett-Packard [HPQ] and Apple [AAPL]. Recently I sold them— my intention was to rent them— and re-entered my put positions.

What, specifically, are you shorting through puts?

The SOX, or Philadelphia Semiconductor Index. The severe downturn in the economy has led to lower sales of technology products. Inventories are building at wholesalers. SG Cowen recently calculated that inventories are at a five-year high. Cellphone sales have fallen 16% in Western Europe. A classic inventory correction is coming within a recession. Yet the SOX is up 20% from its lows! The SOX could correct at least to its March lows, and probably more. But don't short, except through put options.

Fred Hickey's Picks
Company Ticker 6/11/08 Price
Short (via Put options only)
Phila Semiconductor Index SOX $381.68
Long
Golden Star Resources GSS 3.00
StreetTracks Gold Shares GLD 87.02
Source: Bloomberg

Any longs these days?

Gold stocks have been hammered. Junior mining shares have been destroyed. Golden Star Resources isn't a junior. It has real mines, in Ghana. Yet its price is destroyed. A new CEO came on late last year from Newmont Mining [NEM], which also has big operations in Ghana. Recently he brought in a new chief operating officer, also from Newmont. Golden Star could become a takeover target, with Newmont a likely buyer.

Gold production in Ghana is expected to rise 60% this year. But it is dependent on technology. Golden Star was bringing on a new processing plant last year and ran into problems. If it can get this plant working properly, production will increase. The stock is at 3, and the market cap is $700 million. The shares could easily double. My biggest positions are in bullion. As fear returns to the market, gold will rise again. I'm buying mostly through GLD, or StreetTracks Gold Shares, an exchange-traded fund.

The horsemen continue to gallop. Research In Motion is up almost 30% since you recommended shorting it through puts in January. Are you skeptical still?

RIM has a market valuation of $75 billion, but just 1% of the cellphone market worldwide. Nokia [NOK] has a market cap of $100 billion, and a 40% market share. What kind of upside is there at this valuation?

Thanks, Fred.

Felix Zulauf

Barron's: You predicted this would be a rough year for investors, and so far, you're right. What now, Felix?

Zulauf: This bear market doesn't look like 2000-02. It is a much more drawn-out affair, but a high-risk environment. There are enough reflation efforts under way in the U.S. and enough economic momentum in other parts of the world to prevent a global recession now. The economic expansion could run another two years or more. The market will remain choppy, with a downward bias lasting three to four years, as macro liquidity deteriorates. Investors' risk appetite is lower. There isn't enough liquidity to push stocks to new highs, but there is still enough to support the dominant themes in the market.

It's a split market. Financials and consumer stocks will remain weak, and energy and agriculture-related issues will keep rising, with occasional corrections. Aside from the European Central Bank, nobody is tightening monetary policy to the point that it becomes restrictive. Therefore the business cycle will continue. Demand for energy will continue. China still has subsidized energy prices and accounts for 80% to 90% of incremental demand. In the short run, the oil complex could correct, but it's not the end of the trend.

Felix Zulauf's Picks
Investment Ticker 6/11/08 Yield
Short
10-year Treasury* 4.08%
Japanese Government Bonds 1.84
Long 6/11/08 Price
CME Nikkei Futures (Jun '08) ¥13900
Nikkei 500 Banks Index 1895.40
PowerShares DB Comm. Idx.Track Fd. DBC $ 43.89
*Enter short when yield declines below 4%.
Source: Bloomberg

Do you see any glimmers of a turnaround for financials?

Some of the value guys are beating the drums for bargains here and there, but I don't believe it. Restructuring bank balance sheets also will be a drawn-out affair. The markets could make an interim low this summer, marked by another selling climax in financials. Stocks then will attempt another rally. Financials could jump 50% or so on short covering. After the elections, stocks will go down.

What are you buying— or selling?

We're at the doorstep of the next inflationary period. You won't see greater inflation in the next one or two years, but prices will be much higher in 10 years. Bond yields will rise as inflationary pressures mount. The yield on 10-year Treasuries, now 4%, could hit 5.5% in 12 to 18 months. The U.S. Treasury bond is a short, though you'll probably get a better entry point below 4% in the next few weeks.

Another short is Japanese government bonds, or JGBs. They yield 1.8%. Inflation is returning to Japan, which may be a good thing for Japanese companies. JGB yields could go to 3% in the next 12 to 18 months. What correlates best inversely with these bond yields? The Japanese stock market. It was in a bear market for 17 or 18 years due to the deflationary environment. Inflation would mean profit margins are normalized. I like the Nikkei for the next 12 months.

How should you buy the Nikkei?

Buy the futures. Japanese banks have restructured their balance sheets. They are sound. As interest rates rise they could charge better spreads. You can buy the banks through the Nikkei 500 Banks Index.

Investors should also be long commodities, through the DBC, the PowerShares DB Commodity Index Tracking Fund. This is a trading market. Based on real-estate cycles in other countries, the U.S. housing market will decline for another two years, bottoming in 2010. The consumer will be in such a precarious position that the government will have to step in to increase spending and support the economy. The Federal Reserve, despite rising inflation rates, has no choice but to leave short-term rates low. That means the dollar won't strengthen much either.

And on that happy note...Thanks.

Abby Cohen

Barron's: How does the market look to you?

Cohen: The housing market peaked in the fourth quarter of 2005. Coming into this year, many people were concerned about what continued weakness in housing would mean for consumer spending and employment. On top of that, the financial markets, and financial intermediaries, ran into trouble starting last summer.

There are signs the U.S. economy may be stabilizing. The likelihood of a deep recession has lessened dramatically. Exports are strong. Business fixed-investment is ongoing. Some people say this will be the worst recession since the 1930s, but we never thought so. Not that things are wonderful, but the abyss? A saucer-shaped recovery is more likely.

Many financial companies have fallen into the abyss.

There were questions earlier this year not just about the price of capital, but whether capital was available at all. Now there are signs things are moving in the right direction, as some financial institutions show a willingness to sell assets below par. There's an important contrast here with Japan, where an illusion of health was kept up for years. Assets were kept on the books at purchase price. It wasn't until those assets began to move off the balance sheets of financial companies, albeit at lower prices, that the Japanese financial system was able to recover.

Why have oil prices skyrocketed this year?

There is the long-term structural move in energy, and a short-term, cyclical move. Long-term there is an imbalance in the market: Global demand is growing faster than supply. In the past two decades producers haven't invested much in additional sources or refining capacity. That's coming home to roost. Short term, people are talking about the impact of a lower dollar, the activities of oil investors as opposed to users of energy, and geopolitical concerns. Also, some producing nations aren't able to distribute out what they're producing. The general direction of oil prices is correct. On a trading basis, oil can move back toward the bottom end of its recent trading range. But on a long-term basis, the trend is up.

Financial dislocations and higher oil prices have helped sink the stock market this year. What is your S&P forecast?

The markets are in a tenacious trading range: 1325 to 1425 on the S&P 500. But by the end of the year, investors may become more comfortable with the outlook for 2009. We estimate fair value for the S&P will be 1500 at year end. In '09, growth will be OK, not great. If companies begin to feel more comfortable about the future and create more jobs, 2009 could turn out to be better than the consensus forecast.

Abby Joseph Cohen's Picks
Company Ticker 6/11/08 Price
Bank of New York Mellon BK $40.28
D.R. Horton DHI 11.19
SanDisk SNDK 24.48
Eli Lilly LLY 47.43
AT&T T 36.14
Source: Bloomberg

What sorts of stocks will do well in this environment?

Given that we don't see a deep recession, and that the Federal Reserve has done an outstanding job in trying to restore proper functioning to the markets, my first pick is in financial services. Bank of New York Mellon is a custodial company. It is a low-beta business, and the stock hasn't done much this year. It yields 2.3%. Bank of New York merged with Mellon, so we expect some enhancements to earnings from economies of scale. Also, a large trust bank benefits from global growth.

In honor of John Neff [the retired money manager and Roundtable member], my next pick is D.R. Horton.

John will be happy to read about one of his favorite companies, but why recommend a home builder now?

Horton is down 50%, to $11 and change. In housing, some regions of the country are closer to stabilizing than others. Goldman Sachs analysts think 2008 will be the last year of losses for Horton, and there's a chance profits re-emerge next year. We're talking about the most cyclical of industries moving into a healthier phase. The rating agencies recently downgraded many housing stocks, which wasn't unexpected. To be able to buy one of the better-managed companies in the industry, with historically strong cash generation, interests us.

How about another contrarian name?

SanDisk, which makes flash-memory cards, hasn't had a good year. The stock is down about 40%, to $24.48. Earnings have disappointed because sales of products that use flash memory are weak. However, our analysts believe the company has done a good job over the years in identifying new uses and products for flash memory. The company has been pretty clever about marketing itself. It has a brand name, captive market share, and leadership in technology.

We also like Eli Lilly; it's down 16%, to $47. There is always concern about pharmaceutical companies during election years, but the stock is yielding 3.9%, and that would seem to cover a lot of potential aggravation. Also, our analyst thinks Lilly's pipeline looks good. My last name is a golden oldie: AT&T. It's a play on the rapid growth of wireless technology, which accounts for about 40% of revenue. The stock is $36. We don't see tremendous earnings growth, but the dividend yield is 4.3%.

Sweet. Thank you, Abby.

Meryl Witmer

Barron's: What's your second-half forecast?

Witmer: We see what everyone sees. Things are slow, particularly in retail. The consumer is squeezed, although some businesses are benefiting from exports. Over time, inventory will clear in the housing market. Oil potentially comes down if this is indeed a bubble, and things pick up. But in the near term, it's slow. Yet, we see opportunities. Generally, we're still holding the stocks we recommended in January, and finding others. They're coming our way. The market could move up 10% to 15% from current levels. A lot of stocks are washed out.

You're the rare optimist.

Hopefully, the contrarian often makes the money. One stock we like a lot is Interface. The company makes carpet tile, square pieces of carpet with a flexible backing. Carpet tile is in the sweet spot of the flooring industry. Interface's product is made largely of recycled materials. Because it is "green" and easy to install, it is growing nicely.

The original market for carpet tile was office flooring, where its penetration is about 60%. Growth areas include the education market and the hospitality industry, including public spaces and hotel rooms. About half of Interface's sales are in the office market, 10% for new construction. The Americas account for about 60% of revenue.

Meryl Witmer's Pick
Company Ticker 6/11/08 Price
Interface IFSIA $12.87
Source: Bloomberg

Is it breaking into the consumer market?

It is trying, with modest success. The consumer business is losing money, but it is an opportunity. The stock has fallen to 13 from 20 last July, because of slowing growth in Western Europe. The company earned $1.02 a share in 2007. It has a legacy cost of high-coupon debt, which it should be able to retire and refinance in a couple of years.

If you add back the loss in the consumer business and adjust interest expense to a more normalized 7%, the company earned $1.18 a share last year. The stock trades for 11 times adjusted earnings. Assuming modest growth this year of about 5%, and adjusting the earnings the same way, we get earnings per share of $1.30 for 2008. Given Interface's roughly 35% market share, a strong management team and the fact that more than 85% of a tile is made from recycled materials, Interface deserves a higher valuation. Our target is 20 in a year or two. If growth reaccelerates or the product gains more popularity with the consumer market, the return could be even higher.

Sounds goods. Thank you, Meryl.

ß§

Normxxx    
______________

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Friday, July 11, 2008

End Of An Era

Up And Down Wall Street: End Of An Era

By Alan Abelson, Barron's | 7 July 2008

Prepare for meaner slumps and less exuberant recoveries. The jobs report tells only half the bad news.

It was, as Dubya might put it, a heck of a month. But that doesn't quite convey how very distinctive and how awfully bloody it was. Great for ghouls, vampires and short sellers. Bad for just about anyone else with a pulse who happened to own as much as one solitary share of stock. Of course, if you had invested your dough in a nice little oil well somewhere you probably feel like a million bucks and your net worth must feel even better. Or, if you were one of those dastardly speculators who, sneering all the while at the world's hungry millions, took a flier on wheat, while steering clear of zinc, June was a positively lovely month.

But if you're the diehard equity type, as so many of us innocents are, you suffered the agonies of poor old Job. For the sad truth is, to find an equal to how bad June's stock market was. you need to go all the way back to 1930, when the fall-out from the Great Crash was wrenchingly evident and the bodies were still hitting the pavement on Wall Street. If it's any consolation, the elite billionaires as well as we poor investment peasants have been roughed up by this year's cruel and vicious market. We can offer you that solace, thanks to the efforts of crack researcher Teresa Vozzo, who secured the data from an interesting Website dubbed GuruFocus.com.

As its fairly repellent name may give you a hint, GuruFocus tracks the stock picking performance of 55 mostly famous (and usually rich) investors including the likes of Warren Buffett, George Soros, Dave Williams, Glenn Greenberg, Carl Icahn, Ron Baron, David Dreman, Edward Lampert, Bill Miller, Marty Whitman and Seth Klarman. We know a number of these fine gents and even like a few of them. According to GuruFocus, in the first half of this year, only four of the 55 bought stocks that collectively scored a gain.

This lucky quartet was headed by T. Boone Pickens, the oil maven, whose stock purchases in the first half of the year were up a nifty 23%; Ken Heebner, whose equity buys averaged a 14.5% rise; Steve Mandel, who enjoyed a 10.1% average gain on the shares he bought in the opening six months, and David Winters, who posted a 3.8% appreciation. The worst losers were Marty Whitman, whose first-half picks were down 43.9%; Mohnish Pabrai, whose buys were down an average of 41.9%; and Bill Miller, whose purchases, on average, lost 38.5%. No need, we hazard, to pass the collection plate.

The bank for international settlements— BIS, for short, and blessedly less of a mouthful than the official moniker— has been around four score years and thus seen it all: panics and booms, recession, depression and bountiful prosperity, inflation, disinflation and that particularly ugly hybrid, stagflation. The bank, in the not unlikely case its existence has eluded your ken, is the central banks' central bank, a kind of global nanny keeping an eye cocked on the world's banking system and trying, regrettably not always with success, to persuade its charges to act with some semblance of prudence and reason.

For an institution coping with no fewer than 55 central banks, it somehow has contrived to retain its sanity and, perhaps even more surprisingly, its equilibrium. Indeed, for the most part, it manages to eschew those endearing qualities that conspire to make "smart banker" an oxymoron. Unlike so many vaguely official entities with "international" in their title, the BIS renders its analyses and opinions as guided by facts on the ground rather than revelations from on high.

We're grateful to our friends, Philippa Dunne and Doug Henwood at the Liscio Report, whose latest commentary on the economy prompted this little riff on the BIS. Like the diligent scholars they are, they plowed through the 260 pages of the bank's annual report and distilled some of the salient material it contains. Less scholarly and for sure less diligent, we, in turn, are distilling their distillate.

The BIS, incidentally, is based in Basel (forgive us our alliterations), which, we suppose, doesn't surprise you, for where else would the central bank of the world's central banks be based but in Switzerland? More to the point, its Swiss locale provides a suitably neutral perch from which to survey the global economic and financial scenes. What we found gratifying is that so much of the BIS' view of the way things are and what lies ahead of us is very much akin to what we've been scribbling here for months on end (vanity, thank heavens, is not a mortal sin).

Its take on inflation, for example, seems quite on the money. It doesn't much hold with the notion, so firmly held in Wall Street and Washington, that the concoction known as "core" inflation, which eliminates such insignificant stuff as the cost of food and energy, is the proper measure of inflation. Instead, the bank is convinced that in the U.S. and the Eurozone, headline inflation— which, of course, much to the chagrin of the no-inflation claque, includes prices of food and energy— has become a much better predictor of inflation.

As to whether the economy is done in by a violent flare-up of inflation in a redux of the 1970s or by the insufferable weight of debt aggravated by the brutal credit crunch, the BIS ventures with admirable impartiality that those on both sides of the argument might in the fullness of time be proved right. Which pretty much echoes our feeling that the current surge of inflation will worsen ponderably and be followed by a painful period of deflation [[something I've been warning about for several years: normxxx]]. The bank warns that resorting to "gimmicks and palliatives" to support asset prices and stymie an impulse among consumers to save will only make things worse.

The BIS lays the blame for the current financial mess we find ourselves in squarely on the vast buildup of debt over the years that has instilled in various global economies a dangerous tendency, fed by easy credit, to magnify booms and busts. From here on, in other words, you might as well kiss those comparatively mild recessions and moderate expansions that we've recently had goodbye. As Philippa and Doug sum up the message in the BIS annual, it increasingly looks "like the evermore freewheeling financial environment that we've taken for granted for the last 25 years is behind us." Or, as the Bank declaims "has run its course."

In sum, better buckle your seat belt; the ride ahead stacks up as pretty darn bumpy.

Another Month, Another Punk Employment Report.

We're always razzing the poor old consensus for its bum forecasts, often so very much off the mark, of monthly employment numbers. So we figure it's only fair to be nice for a change and commend the consensus for being smack on target. And we'll even refrain from pointing out that once in a very great while, the guy or gal with a blindfold on does pin the tail on the donkey. Anyway, the going estimate on the Street for June was a loss of 60,000 or so jobs and, by golly, the actual number was 62,000. All you members of the consensus, stand, please, and take a bow (it may be a long time before you get a chance to do it again).

The unemployment rate, meanwhile, which had taken a huge jump in May, the biggest, in fact, in 22 years, held steady at 5.5%. Revisions to April and May swelled the earlier reported totals of pink slips by a combined 52,000. The private sector lost 91,000 jobs, with, as you might expect, construction and manufacturing the heaviest hit. The good news was on the skimpy side: The biggest gains in hiring were by municipalities and states, and given the increasing financial pinch afflicting city halls and statehouses just about everywhere, that old reliable geyser looks due to dry up in a hurry. Governments of every stripe chipped in 29,000 to the job total. There were some 30,000 fewer temps working at the end of June than at its start, which tells you more about the economy than you'd like to hear. It's also a bit of an evil harbinger for employment.

That insightful pair, Philippa Dunne and Doug Henwood, cited above, are invariably spot-on when it comes to parsing the monthly job numbers and we've passed along their conclusions, many a time and oft. Our only reservation, and a modest one, has been, kindly souls that they are, they were too forgiving of the Bureau of Labor Statistics' birth/death model, which seeks to capture the jobs added and subtracted by, well, the birth and death of 'new' firms [[those not captured by the regular survey: normxxx]]. The device invariably strikes us as a fire alarm that works swell— except when there's a fire. And in the overwhelming majority of months, it perhaps conveniently serves to bloat the total of jobs added.

As it happens, we now have reason to forgive Philippa and Doug for being forgiving. Here's what they say in Friday's review of the latest jobs report: "Although we usually shy away from pointing to mischief coming from the birth/death model, this seems to be one of those moments when we should overcome our shyness: It added 177,000 to June employment." Duly noting that the birth/death calculation is made without seasonal adjustment, they nonetheless observe that save for it, private employment would have been down a formidable 268,000 or so. Other absurdities: The birth/death model miraculously added 29,000 to rapidly vanishing construction employment, 22,000 to professional business and professional services and— get this— a whopping 86,000 to leisure and hospitality. They comment dryly: "Given the weakness of the economy and the crunchiness of credit, we doubt there are enough start-ups around to match these 'imputations'." Exactly.



No Place To Hide

By Alan Abelson | 23 June 2008

A seasoned pro sees a global shakeout in equity markets.

This isn't the 1970s; ergo, inflation is not a worry.

We find that sentence freighted with interest, and not only because we wrote it. What's intriguing, as well, is that it contains two clauses, one of which is indisputably true, the other as clearly a non sequitur as you could ever hope to come across. What's also striking about the sentence is that it offers a striking example of how economists think (or, at least, make a pretense of doing so) and why their perceptions are often so alien to what's actually going on.

There's no record of the brilliant soul who discovered this isn't the 1970s, so we can't offer our congratulations. Too bad, really, because it matches in perspicuity the venerable observation that when people are out of work, unemployment results [[I believe that was one of 'silent' Cal Coolidge's: normxxx]]. Except for the calendrically challenged or the hopelessly infected with incurable nostalgia, no one would likely take exception to the remarkable insight this is not the '70s. Somehow, though, it doesn't ineluctably follow that because this is 2008 and not, say, 1978, we needn't shiver before the specter of inflation.

In fostering that notion, its numerous proponents, whether leaning left or right philosophically, triumphantly cite as proof labor's present emasculated state compared with the prowess it possessed three decades ago to score huge wage increases that provided tinder for the inflationary flames. No quarrel that globalization in particular has exerted enormous competitive pressure on working stiffs from their counterparts who labor for a pittance in faraway lands, compelling once truculent unions to ask rather than demand at the bargaining table. Nor that, in consequence, paychecks are not, as in the '70s, spiraling wildly upward.

But so what?

Where, except in standard economic texts, is it written that inflation comes in only one flavor? That without exploding wage costs, what naifs like us call inflation doesn't meet the definition of inflation? As it happens, our trusty dictionary, in fact, defines inflation as: "A persistent increase in the level of consumer prices or a persistent decline in the purchasing power of money, caused by an increase in available currency and credit beyond the proportion of goods and services."

Granted that dictionaries are the handiwork of people who are exacting about words and their meanings and not by professional economists, for whom even their native tongue is always a second language. But that quote perching in the paragraph above is not a bad description of what's happening out there in the real world, in contrast to the fantasy land where denizens of academe, Wall Street and Washington cavort and gambol.

We'll forgo once again listing the various and sundry conjuring tricks used to make inflation officially invisible and content ourselves with brief notice of a few of the more egregious ones. Like, of course, banishing oil prices from the anointed inflation measure— the sacred mythical core— because they're too "volatile." Volatile means wide and frequent changes up and down. The price of crude has risen for six and a half years in a row, from $20 a barrel to $135 barrel, and during this extended span it experienced only one rather brief and relatively modest decline worthy of mention.

That's volatility?

Food prices— which you may have noticed have been on a tear for quite a spell now and, according to the latest consumer-price index, rocketed upward in May alone— are also conveniently excluded by that purposively myopic crew from their pristine reckonings of inflation because of volatility. Add to the more serious sins of the no-inflationiks a tendency to overlook or shrug off the inexorably mounting cost of health care. Analyst Shirla Sum of Goldman Sachs, however, in a commentary released on Friday makes no bones about the painful bite rising health-care costs are taking out of the increasingly pinched consumer.

Last month, medical services were up an unhealthy 4.7% over the same month a year earlier. Moreover, Sum points out, anyone unlucky enough to have to check into a hospital had to fork over as much as 8.3% more than a year ago. And together with prescription drugs, hospital services account for nearly half John and Jane Q.'s medical outlays. But, hey, the consensus among any number of economic wise men who are never in doubt and rarely right is that there is no inflation. And, on reflection, we're forced to concede that maybe there isn't— unless you're one of those silly types who insist on driving, eating or getting sick.

Denial will get you only so far. That's true for inflation (even Ben Bernanke, of all people, is turning a bit green these days at the mere mention of the word). It's true of the economy at large (even President Bush seems to have vaguely sensed that the economy isn't what he cracked it up to be). And, as last week made emphatically clear, denial— much less delusion— just won't cut it when you're confronted by a big bad bear breathing fire from its flaring nostrils and nary a tree in sight to climb.

As we've been muttering aloud it seems like forever, the recession far from being over hasn't really gotten up a head of steam yet. The credit crunch, crush, crisis— whichever you prefer— is still very much with us and, by whatever name, doesn't give the slightest indication of packing it in. Very much the contrary, as the fresh drubbing administered to the banks, brokers and other assorted and often sordid financial outfits strongly suggests. Credit for at least two decades has been what made our world go 'round, and suddenly somebody pulled the plug and it was gone.

And gone, too, are the fabulous bubbles and booms that it so generously fed, leaving a horrible mess that we're nowhere near mopping up. What the stock market is belatedly waking up to is that the much-heralded and more fervently hoped-for 'second-half recovery' isn't going to happen [[this year, or even, maybe, next: normxxx]]. That housing may have another ugly, maybe longer decline ahead of it before it's close to a bottom. That unemployment, despite all the gimmickry used to disguise the real numbers, will continue its doleful push higher.

And as if all that weren't enough to make you hop the next shuttle to the moon, comes now S. Dewey Keesler to warn that "the global bear market in equities" triggered by our very own subprime credit mess "is now entering its next phase." A phase, he thinks, that will see the emerging markets transformed into submerging markets, an unwelcome change that will encompass the so-called BRIC quartet— Brazil, Russia, India and China— as well a full complement of the smaller fry.

Dee, as his intimates call him, is an extraordinarily bright and low-key chap, who has under his belt about 25 or so enormously successful years as a global investor. He was a founding partner back in 1986 of Oechsle International Advisors, which, as its moniker subtly hints, invested abroad, primarily for big institutions, including the endowment funds of top-notch (read: rich) universities. He eventually left to form his own shop, Boston-based SDK Capital.

Emerging markets are an accident no longer waiting to happen but very much in progress, he says, and while the severity of the further declines vary (Shanghai, for example, already down 50% from its peak, still has a long way down to go), they're all vulnerable. In the months ahead, he warns, "the concept of global economic decoupling will be thoroughly exposed as a naive fantasy." And we say amen to that.

He blames misguided monetary policies that tied the developing countries' currencies to the U.S. dollar and prevented them from controlling their interest rates. Thanks to the Fed's serial rate slashing in its effort to stave off a cataclysmic credit collapse, inflationary pressures were mightily increased in the developing world. Negative real interest rates and burgeoning money supply, Dee cautions, are destined to stoke overheated economies and kite inflation still higher.

To make matters worse— which is what governments universally do when they find themselves in a pickle— efforts to keep the masses calm in the face of rapidly rising food and energy prices have proved costly and counterproductive, yielding shortages in gasoline, diesel fuel and food (so what else is new?). This approach, Dee reports, is being pretty much abandoned, which, in the short run, is sure to mean more inflation. There's no way out for developing nations, he believes, but to adopt more stringent monetary policies, "which means higher interest rates and stronger currencies" and, inevitably, a sharp economic slowdown.

Investors who have been counting on more of the vigorous earnings growth that attracted them to emerging markets in the first place are in for a very big disappointment. Such expectations, Dee declares, "will be crushed." The great unwinding of emerging markets has just begun, he avers, "with much carnage still forthcoming." For financial markets in developing countries the vicious cycle he sees unfolding will bring pain aplenty issuing from lower multiples on lower earnings.

As we intimated, Dee knows foreign markets, and especially the emerging ones, inside out, and he has come up with more than his share of winners to prove it. We haven't the slightest hesitation in urging you to pay close heed to his forebodings. We might add that given the big chunk of U.S. corporate profits that flows in from the rest of the world, the prospect of a global shakeout doesn't exactly dissipate our own, more parochial forebodings about the market back here at home.


— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

E-mail comments to mail@barrons.com



  M O R E. . .

Normxxx    
______________

The contents of any third-party letters/reports above do not necessarily reflect the opinions or viewpoint of normxxx. They are provided for informational/educational purposes only.
The content of any message or post by normxxx anywhere on this site is not to be construed as constituting market or investment advice. Such is intended for educational purposes only. Individuals should always consult with their own advisors for specific investment advice.

Thursday, July 10, 2008

The Buck Doesn't Stop Here

The Buck Doesn't Stop Here; It Just Keeps Falling

By The Associated Press | 10 July 2008

In this February 27, 2008 file photo, euro coins and dollar bills are seen in Frankfurt, central Germany. The U.S. dollar has been declining steadily for six years against other major currencies, undercutting its role as the leading international banking currency. Associated Press © 2008

WASHINGTON July 6, 2008— Things in the U.S. sure are tough. Brother, can you spare a euro? Signs saying "We accept euros" are cropping up in the windows of some Manhattan retailers. A Belgium company is trying to gobble up St. Louis-based Anheuser-Busch, the nation's largest brewer and iconic Super Bowl advertiser. The almighty dollar is mighty no more. It has been declining steadily for six years against other major currencies, undercutting its role as the leading international banking currency. The long slide is fanning inflation at home and playing a major role in the run-up of oil and gasoline prices everywhere.

Vacationing Europeans are finding bargains in the U.S., while Americans in Paris and other world capitals are being clobbered by sky-high tabs for hotels, travel and even sidewalk cafes. Northern border-city Americans who once flocked into Canada for shopping deals are staying home; it's the Canadians flocking here now. Everything made in America— from goods to entire companies— is near dirt cheap to many foreigners. Meanwhile, American consumers, both those who travel and those who stay at home, are seeing big price increases in energy, food and imported goods.

The dollar has lost roughly a quarter of its purchasing power against the currencies of major U.S. trading partners from its peak in 2002. Since oil is bought and sold in dollars worldwide, the devalued dollar has made the recent surge in energy prices even worse for Americans, leading to $4 gasoline in the United States. Analysts suggest that of the $140 a barrel that oil fetches globally, some $25 may be due to the devalued dollar.

Further declines in the dollar will add to oil's appeal as a commodity to be traded; Oil, suggests influential energy consultant Daniel Yergin, is "the new gold."

The limp greenback has had one big benefit to the U.S. economy: Since it makes American goods cheaper overseas, it has helped manufacturers who export and other U.S. based companies with international reach. Exports have been one of the few bright spots in an otherwise darkening U.S. economy. Franklin Vargo, vice president of international economic affairs at the National Association of Manufacturers, welcomes the dollar slide, as do members of his organization.

"We can see that, when the dollar's not overpriced, that people around the world want American goods and our exports are going gangbusters now," he said. He doesn't see the dollar as undervalued. He sees it as having being overpriced in the 1990s— and what's happened since as something along the lines of a correction. Still, Vargo acknowledges the dollar's decline has brought a measure of pain to some consumers. "As the dollar has gone down in value, that has added to the dollar cost of oil. No question. So having the dollar decline is not unambiguously a plus. That's why we say there's got to be a balance there somewhere. What we want is a Goldilocks dollar. Not too strong, not too weak. But just right. And only the market can determine that," Vargo said.

Mark Zandi, chief economist at Moody's Economy.com, said expanding exports due to a weak dollar are "an important source of growth, but it doesn't add a lot to jobs, it doesn't mean very much for the average American household. For the average American, for the average consumer, these are pretty tough times." The loss of the dollar's purchasing power and international respect has some experts worrying that the euro might one day replace the dollar as the so-called primary reserve currency. And that could trigger a dollar rout as foreign governments and international investors flee from U.S. Treasury bonds and other dollar-denominated investments.

Making matters worse: The gaping U.S. current-account deficit— the amount by which the value of goods, services and investments bought in the U.S. from overseas exceeds the amount the U.S. sells abroad— and the low levels of domestic savings means that foreigners must purchase more than $3 billion every business day to fund the imbalance. Since roughly half of the nation's nearly $10 trillion national debt is held by foreigners, mostly in Treasury bills and bonds, such a withdrawal could have enormous consequences.

Yet Washington finds its options limited.

President Bush asserts longtime support for a "strong" dollar, and made that point again Sunday in a news conference in Japan with Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda. "In terms of the dollar, the United States strongly believes— believes in a strong dollar policy and believes that the strength of our economy will be reflected in the dollar." But not once in his presidency has the U.S bought dollars on foreign exchange markets— called intervention— to help prop up the greenback. [[That's 'W' alright, say one thing— do the opposite.: normxxx]] There's no telling where the buck will stop these days, although for the past few weeks it seems to be in a holding pattern. Even as three Bush Treasury secretaries in a row spouted the strong-dollar mantra, the dollar kept tumbling against the euro, the pound, the yen, the Canadian dollar and most other major currencies.

The Federal Reserve could prop up the dollar by increasing interest rates under its control. Increased yields would make dollar-denominated investments more attractive to foreigners. But that could undercut the already anemic economic growth in a frail U.S. economy rocked by soaring fuel costs, falling home prices and rising unemployment— and the lowest reading of consumer confidence in 16 years. The Fed must do a balancing act between keeping the domestic economy from going into recession and keeping inflation at bay.

Furthermore, no Fed likes to raise rates aggressively in a presidential election year. It seems more inclined to hold interest rates low for now to give financial markets time to recover from the housing meltdown and credit crunch. It did just that in its meeting on June 25, leaving a key short-term rate at 2 percent. The rate reached that level in April after a series of aggressive cuts that brought it down 3.25 percentage points since September. Those cuts helped ease the housing and credit crises— but drove the dollar further down.

In early June, Bush declared before his trip to Europe: "A strong dollar is in our nation's interests. It is in the interests of the global economy." That, plus a warning by Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke that the dollar's weakness was contributing to U.S. inflation, seemed to temporarily break the dollar's tumble. Presidents and Fed chairmen don't usually talk directly about the dollar and exchange rates— leaving that up to the Treasury secretary— and international bankers and investors took note of the high-level attention.

Over the past few weeks, the dollar has remained relatively stable, although it took a dip after the Fed decided to leave rates unchanged. The long slide may not be over. Still, if the Fed moves to lift rates later this year, as some traders and investors anticipate, it could buttress the dollar and spur an exodus of speculators from the oil market— helping to both prop up the dollar and drive down oil prices. But few economists are sanguine that the economy will improve any time soon. The other main tool to move the dollar— intervention in currency markets by buying dollars and selling other currencies— is risky.

It would take great sums of money to make any difference. The foreign exchange market is the largest in the world, with over $1 trillion traded each day. Seeing the U.S. trying to prop up the greenback by buying dollars could be taken as a sign of desperation and possibly trigger a renewed round of selling. Furthermore, there has been little encouragement for such a strategy from finance ministers from the Group of Eight wealthy democracies— Japan, Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Canada and Russia plus the U.S.

Leaders of the eight countries were to meet in Japan beginning Monday, but the falling dollar was not even on the formal agenda. It's too touchy an issue, and the dollar's relative stability over the past few weeks makes it easier for world leaders to steer clear. "People will be talking about it in the corridors," said Reginald Dale, a senior fellow with the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson has suggested that nothing is "off the table" including intervention. But Bush has made statements suggesting he intends to let market forces set exchange rates. Anyways, the dollar has fallen so far, it will be difficult to halt or reverse its slide.

U.S. efforts to persuade Saudi Arabia and other major oil-producing nations to increase their production— and help ease pressure on both oil prices and the dollar— have brought scant results. "There's no magic wand," said White House press secretary Dana Perino. "It's not going to be a problem that we solve overnight." The impact of the falling dollar is not always visible to the average consumer. Not like the big numbers on gas pumps that give stark evidence of price levels. But imported goods, from fuel to cars from Japanese automakers and toys from China— are getting more expensive just as U.S. wages are either stagnant or falling.

And, American companies suddenly look cheap to acquisition-minded foreigners, particularly those based in Europe. Belgian-based InBev's hostile bid for Anheuser-Busch is a recent example. It has bid $46 billion to acquire the company— a 30 percent premium above where Anheuser's shares traded before the June 11 proposal. A successful acquisition by InBev would put the last remaining mass-market American brewer in foreign hands. InBev is based in Belgium but run by Brazilians. Anheuser-Busch, which brews both Budweiser and Bud light, holds a 48.5 percent share of U.S. beer sales.

Anheuser-Busch rejected InBev's bid, but the Belgian brewer forged ahead, seeking to unseat Anheuser's 13-member board and take its offer directly to shareholders. If the takeover goes through, it might open the floodgates to other foreign takeovers of American companies. Some of the dollar's decline depends on hard-to-measure factors, like the psychology of foreign investors. When the U.S. economy is weakening, many investors stay away. The slide of the dollar has coincided with a long period of relatively low interest rates.

And some of the decline in the dollar's global role "is due to the foreign policy failures of the Bush administration, not just to recent economic developments and policies," suggests Adam S. Posen, deputy director of the Peterson Institute for International Economics and a former economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. In other words, some international investors unhappy with Bush's policy on Iraq or toward other parts of the world might not wish to invest in American companies or buy U.S. bonds.

Still, he argues that the euro is unlikely to replace the dollar as the world's main reserve currency, and that the euro may be at "a temporary peak of influence." David Wyss, chief economist at Standard & Poor's in New York, says he envisions a day when the dollar and the euro will share billing as the world's reserve currencies. He predicts that the dollar will remain roughly at its present levels "for a couple years." Still, he says, "We might not be done with this down leg."

Another big problem for the dollar is that the European Central Bank is likely to hike rates while the Federal Reserve stands pat, giving euro-based investments a bigger yield advantage. "I could see more downward pressure on the dollar, over the course of the summer, not dramatically, if the ECB does raise rates," said Robert Dye, an economist with PNC Financial Services Group. "If it is one and done, pressure will be minimal. But if it's an ongoing pattern of rate increases, there will be more substantial pressure."

A euro now buys as much as $1.57 in the United States.

The dollar has been the leading international currency for as long as most people can remember. But its dominant role can no longer be taken for granted. Paul Volcker, who headed the Federal Reserve from 1979-87, warned in April that the nation was in a dollar crisis, and that what is happening now reminds him of the early 1970s, when serious inflation erupted as economic growth stagnated. Then, as now, a weak economy limited the Fed's options.

The result was a spiral of rising prices and wages— until the Fed, led by Volcker, suppressed double-digit inflation with huge interest rate increases that pushed the economy into a steep recession in 1982. He recently criticized the current Fed as defending the economy and the market, instead of defending the dollar. Volcker said that will make defending the greenback much harder later.

Energy consultant Yergin, chairman of Cambridge Energy Research Associates, recently told the House-Senate Joint Economic Committee that oil had become "the new gold." "Oil has become a storehouse of value— reflecting broad global economic trends and imbalances. At the same time, oil is increasingly seen as an asset by financial investors, an uncorrelated alternative to equities, bonds, and real estate," he said. When the credit crisis broke last summer, the result was a sharp reduction in interest rates by the Fed. That, in turn, accelerated the fall of the dollar.

"Instead of the traditional `flight to the dollar' during a time of instability, there has been a `flight to commodities' in search of stability during a time of currency instability and a falling dollar," Yergin said. "There's a painful irony here: The crisis that started in the subprime market in the United States has traveled around the world and, through the medium of a weaker dollar, has come back home to Americans in terms of higher prices at the pump."

ß§

Normxxx    
______________

The contents of any third-party letters/reports above do not necessarily reflect the opinions or viewpoint of normxxx. They are provided for informational/educational purposes only.
The content of any message or post by normxxx anywhere on this site is not to be construed as constituting market or investment advice. Such is intended for educational purposes only. Individuals should always consult with their own advisors for specific investment advice.

Wednesday, July 9, 2008

Stagflation Sightings Multiply

Stagflation Sightings Multiply

By John Browne | 10 July 2008

We have long warned that stagflation, or economic contraction accompanied by inflation, would become so evident that even the most optimistic observers could not deny its virulence.

Last week, Warren Buffett was the latest to describe his encounter with the beast. The world's most famous investor pronounced that the current economy is in the middle stages of a stagflation episode. Although Mr. Buffett is not typically associated with either bullish or bearish sentiment, he asserted that both the
"stag" and "flation" aspects of the condition would intensify before they relent. So if we can all recognize the wolf at the door, can we agree on the best course of action?

Unfortunately for policy makers, different weaponry is called for to vanquish the two heads of the stagflation dragon. Recession can be held at bay by lowering interest rates, while inflation is usually tamed by raising interest rates. Given the impossibility pursuing both courses of action simultaneously, priorities come into play. Historically, inflation has been considered the greater long term economic menace, and has therefore been dealt with first.

This was the plan of attack successfully mapped out by President Reagan and Fed Chairman Paul Volcker in the 1980s. With the President's political backing, Volcker was able to kill stagflation with a short but heavy dose of double-digit interest rates. With the stable currency and low inflation that resulted, the stage was then set for a sustained and robust economic expansion.

Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke has recognized the stagflation threat for some time. But rather than studying the playbook of Volcker and Reagan, his gaze rests on events forty years earlier. A well known student of the financial history the 1930s, Bernanke is well aware that when the same beast raised its head following the Crash of 1929, the Fed rapidly raised interest rates. His conclusion is that this over reaction magnified the recession of 1930 into the Great Depression of the ensuing decade.

Scared stiff that these events could repeat themselves on his watch, Bernanke is loath to push up rates. In so doing, he is ignoring the much more recent and equally instructive lessons of the 1970s, in which a politically cowed Federal Reserve stood by while inflation raged uncontrollably.

Across town, the stagflation reality is gradually dawning on Congress. But, despite calls for higher interest rates from the likes of Mr. Buffett and his peers to strike at inflation first, the reality is that the powerful political influence will be for lower interest rates and more government spending.

However, stagflation is not simply an American concern, and policy makers around the world are showing that their priorities have not been similarly realigned. As the U.S. Fed lowered rates to 2 percent over the past years, the ECB has held firm. Given this difference in priorities, it should come as no surprise that the dollar has plummeted to levels which draw into question its privileged 'reserve currency' status. The Euro, in contrast, has risen to heights that are now hurting European Union exports and causing severe national political strains within the federation.

In this climate, all eyes were turned towards Frankfurt on July 3rd for the ECB's expected rate increase. Although ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet did deliver the increase, he unexpectedly announced that the ECB was putting its series of rate increases on hold. Why had Trichet suddenly gone weak in the knees? Had he been influenced by Bernanke to abandon the Germanic bias to control inflation and to adopt the acute Anglo-Saxon fear of recession? [[Or, perhaps by Secretary Paulson, who visited with him just before the announcement?: normxxx]]

If the ECB has thrown in the towel, stand by for lower rates, and intensified inflation throughout the world. In the United States, hyper-inflation is a distinct possibility. In such an environment investors should think not only of buying the financial 'insurance' of gold but of devising ways to hang on to it in the face of possible government confiscation, as happened in the 1930s. Given Bernanke's reverence for FDR era policy, such a move is not beyond the realm of possibilities.

[ Normxxx Here:  I have long warned that we face successive waves of inflation and deflation (or even both simultaneouslty) in the oncoming financial breakdown; BB seems to be right on track!  ]

ß§

Normxxx    
______________

The contents of any third-party letters/reports above do not necessarily reflect the opinions or viewpoint of normxxx. They are provided for informational/educational purposes only.
The content of any message or post by normxxx anywhere on this site is not to be construed as constituting market or investment advice. Such is intended for educational purposes only. Individuals should always consult with their own advisors for specific investment advice.

Point Of No Return?

Point Of No Return Or Perfect Buying Opportunity?

By Bespoke Investment Group LLC | 23 June 2008

The recent declines in many Financial stocks have put them in unprecedented negative territory. Below we highlight historical charts of the percentage from 52-week highs for Lehman (LEH), Wachovia (WB), Citigroup (C), Merrill Lynch (MER) and Bank of America (BAC). At its low point earlier this month, Lehman was 72% below its 52-week high, making it the furthest below it has ever been. Wachovia is 68% below its highs over the last year, and Citi got down to 66% below back in March. Merrill Lynch and Bank of America aren't quite at record territory yet, but they're getting close. Back in 1998, Merrill got down to 65% below its 52-week high, and it is at -60% now. In 1990, BAC was 66% below its 52-week high, and it's at -50% now.

The consensus view is that the struggling Financials still have much further to go on the downside before the pain is over. But if they fall much further, they might have dug a hole they can't get out of. Taking a longer-term view of one, two, or even five years from now, will these charts have marked a screaming buy, or a clear sign that the companies were "toast?"

[ Normxxx Here:  As usual, if you buy here and the stocks go up— for more than a few weeks, anyways— you'll be a hero; contrariwise, if you buy and they go down significantly further (eg, through dilution, even if the market may be bottoming here), you will be the thrice-warned dunce!  ]











Normxxx    
______________

The contents of any third-party letters/reports above do not necessarily reflect the opinions or viewpoint of normxxx. They are provided for informational/educational purposes only.
The content of any message or post by normxxx anywhere on this site is not to be construed as constituting market or investment advice. Such is intended for educational purposes only. Individuals should always consult with their own advisors for specific investment advice.

Stagflation Grips Eurozone

Stagflation Grips Eurozone As ECB Interest Rates Rise

By Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, Telegraph.Co.UK | July 2008

Eurozone inflation surged to an all-time high of 4% in June despite worrying signs of a slump in manufacturing, confronting the European Central Bank with the toughest challenge since its creation a decade ago. Soaring oil and food prices guaranteed the quarter-point rise in interest rates to 4.25% on Thursday, further widening the gulf in rates between Europe and America. The only question is whether the ECB opts for a "one-and-done" move or sets the course for yet more rises in the autumn.

Jean-Claude Trichet, the bank's president, has warned of an "acute risk" of a wage-price spiral unless inflation is wrung out of the system. But a growing chorus of critics fears that overkill could tip the eurozone into a severe downturn at this delicate juncture, and risk a dangerous chain of political events in southern Europe and Ireland— where voters have already thrown the EU into chaos by rejecting the Lisbon Treaty.

The Irish economy contracted at a rate of 1.5% in the first quarter and is now facing the worst recession since the crash of the mid-1980s. Investment fell 19.1%. House prices have now fallen for 15 months in a row. Spanish premier Jose Luis Zapatero was forced to reassure his nation's media this weekend that he was still on speaking terms with his finance minister Pedro Solbes, who has refused to endorse the government's economic crisis plan.

Both Mr Zapatero and Italy's Silvio Berlusconi have lashed out at the ECB in recent days, but even Germany's finance minister Peer Steinbrück has begun to question Frankfurt's hard-line policy. "An interest rate increase could have a pro-cyclical impact at a point when the economy is slowing down," he said. The comments come after five months of falling orders in Germany, the worst run since the early 1990s. Siemens, Volkswagen and other big industrial exporters have begun to cut jobs.

The ECB has held rates steady at 4% since the credit crunch began last summer, even though Euribor lending rates have jumped 120 basis points. The euro has rocketed against the dollar, sterling, yen and yuan. The full effects of the monetary and currency squeeze will slowly feed through the eurozone over the next year or so. There is a risk that the full impact could hit just as the global economy slows sharply.

France's finance minister, Christine Lagarde, praised the apparent policy shift in Berlin. "For the first time my German colleague, who was resolutely determined to back the ECB whatever it does, is telling Mr Trichet, 'Be careful'. There is more than one concern. There is inflation, certainly, but there is also growth. Quite a few of us would like Mr Trichet to keep his eye on both barometers. Until now he has had only inflation on his radar," she said.

Her choice of words is significant. EU ministers have the ultimate power— under Maastricht Article 109— to shape the eurozone exchange rate, giving them a backdoor means of forcing a change in the ECB's policy. The implicit threat to invoke this clause is a warning to ECB hawks that independence has limits.

The remarks by Paris and Berlin come as US Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson visited both Mr Trichet and Bundesbank chief Axel Weber. The Bush administration is reportedly furious with the ECB for undercutting US efforts to stabilise the dollar and halt the oil spike in very dangerous circumstances. The ECB is playing with fire, forcing the US to pursue a more restrictive monetary policy than it might think safe at a time when the financial system is already in dire trouble. The dispute has echoes of the Transatlantic rift before the stock market crash in October 1987.

Oil jumped $16 a barrel in two days earlier this month on the back of a rising euro after Mr Trichet merely signalled an ECB rate rise. The market response was a prize exhibit for those who argue that hedge funds have now run amok on the oil markets, using crude futures as a sort of "anti-dollar" currency— with multiple leverage. It also revealed that ECB tightening in this environment is counter-productive since it pushes inflation even higher. Critics say the bank is chasing its own tail, failing to adapt to the complexities of the modern global economy.

Stephen Lewis, chief strategist at Insinger de Beaufort, said the ECB was right to raise rates, despite the risks. "If they had backed off now after signalling a rise it would have caused a catastrophic loss of credibility that would further harm global stability," he said. "The bank cannot formulate policy on the basis that this might be a short-term price spike. It would destroy consumer confidence and blast economic growth prospects if it lets inflation run ahead."


News Item: Another Reason Mr. Trichet Hiked Rates On Thursday

In case you missed it, the euro pushed to $1.5775 last Wednesday, overnight 1 July. And as luck would have it, the European Central Bank (ECB) met on Thursday last week. Yes, while most of the markets' participants in the U.S. dreamt of barbequed ribs, fireworks, and a long weekend, the ECB hiked rates again by 0.25%.

The most important part of Thursday's decision was ECB President Trichet's press conference following the rate hike. It was important for Trichet to remain hawkish on the economy as otherwise, the profit takers would be quick to swallow up all momentum from the rate hike. And, as it happens, the euro didn't get to enjoy the higher rates for more than a few hours. Trichet cited risks to euro-zone economic growth while sounding dovish about additional rate increases. That outcome caused investors to buy dollars as positions were adjusted.

Late Friday, the dollar was trading at $1.5699 against the euro, compared with $1.5701 late Thursday, and was fetching 106.77 yen, from 106.74 yen. The dollar was also little changed against the pound sterling, at $1.9823 from $1.9828 a day earlier, and against the Swiss franc, dipping marginally to 1.0254 francs from 1.0266.

Meanwhile, Trichet received an arrow for his rate hike quiver. German unemployment for June fell to a 16-year low. This tells me, and should tell you, the barber, and the guy down on the corner selling bakery pretzels that Germany is resisting the global slowdown so far. Germany is the Eurozone's largest economy, so this report carries a lot of weight with Trichet and the other ECB ministers. Annual growth in Germany remains above that in the U.S. and the employment picture is healthier than the U.S.'s— but then again, that's not difficult these days.

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Normxxx    
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The contents of any third-party letters/reports above do not necessarily reflect the opinions or viewpoint of normxxx. They are provided for informational/educational purposes only.
The content of any message or post by normxxx anywhere on this site is not to be construed as constituting market or investment advice. Such is intended for educational purposes only. Individuals should always consult with their own advisors for specific investment advice.






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Normxxx    
______________

The contents of any third-party letters/reports above do not necessarily reflect the opinions or viewpoint of normxxx. They are provided for informational/educational purposes only.
The content of any message or post by normxxx anywhere on this site is not to be construed as constituting market or investment advice. Such is intended for educational purposes only. Individuals should always consult with their own advisors for specific investment advice.

Barclays Warns Of A Financial Storm

Barclays Warns Of A Financial Storm As Federal Reserve's Credibility Crumbles

By Ambrose Evans Pritchard, Telegraph.co.UK | 28 June 2008

US central bank stands accused of unleashing an inflation shock that will rock financial markets: Barclays Capital (and the RBS) has advised clients to batten down the hatches for a worldwide financial storm, warning that the US Federal Reserve has allowed the inflation genie out of the bottle and let its credibility fall "below zero". "We're in a nasty environment," said Tim Bond, the bank's chief equity strategist. "There is an inflation shock underway. This is going to be very negative for financial assets. We are going into tortoise mode and are retreating into our shell. Investors will do well if they can preserve their wealth."

Barclays Capital said in its closely-watched Global Outlook that US headline inflation would hit 5.5% by August and the Fed will have to raise interest rates six times by the end of next year to prevent a wage-spiral. If it hesitates, the bond markets will take matters into their own hands. "This is the first test for central banks in 30 years and they have fluffed it. They have zero credibility, and the Fed's is negative if that's possible. It has lost all credibility," said Mr Bond.

Strategists At Barclays Accuse Ben Bernanke Of A Policy Blunder

The grim verdict on Ben Bernanke's Fed was underscored by the markets yesterday as the dollar fell against the euro following the bank's dovish policy statement on Wednesday. Traders said the Fed seemed to be 'rowing back' from rate rises. The effect was to propel oil to $138 a barrel, confirming its role as a sort of "anti-dollar" and as a market reproach to Washington's easy-money policies. The Fed's stimulus is being transmitted to the 45-odd countries linked to the dollar around world. The result is surging commodity prices. Global inflation has jumped from 3.2% to 5% over the last year.

Mr Bond said the emerging world is now on the cusp of a serious crisis. "Inflation is out of control in Asia. Vietnam has already blown up. The policy response is to shoot the messenger, like the developed central banks in the late 1960s and 1970s," he said. "They will have to slam on the brakes. There is going to be a deep global recession over the next three years as policy-makers try to get inflation back in the box."

[ Normxxx Here:  I am predicting a double dip recession for the US: a small, shallow one this year; a small recovery, and a much deeper recession late next year and into 2010.  ]

Barclays Capital recommends outright "short" positions on Asian bonds, warning that yields could jump 200 to 300 basis points. The currencies of trade-deficit states like India should be sold. The US yield curve is likely to "steepen with a vengeance", causing "a bloodbath for bond holders."

David Woo, the bank's currency chief, said the Fed's policy of benign neglect towards the dollar had been stymied by oil, which is now eating deep into the country's standard of living. "The world has changed all of a sudden. The market is going to push the Fed into a tightening stance," he said. The bank said the full damage from the global banking crisis would take another year to unfold.

Rob McAdie, Barclays' credit strategist, said: "The core issues have not been addressed. We're still in a very large deleveraging cycle and we're seeing losses continue to mount. We think smaller banks will struggle to raise capital. We're very bearish— in the long-term— on high-yield debt. The default rate will reach 8% to 9% next year."

He said investors had taken their eye off the slow-motion disaster engulfing the US bond insurers or "monolines". Together these firms guarantee $170bn of structured credit and $1,000bn of US municipal bonds. The two leaders— MBIA and Ambac— have already been downgraded as the rating agencies belatedly turn stringent. The risk is that further downgrades could set off a fresh wave of bank troubles. "The creditworthiness of many US financial institutions will decline in coming months," he said.

The bank warned that engineering and auto firms were likely to face a crunch as steel and oil costs surge. "Their business models will have to be substantially altered if they are going to survive," said Mr McAdie. A small chorus of City bankers dissent from the view that inflation is the chief danger in the US and other rich OECD countries. The teams at Société Générale, Dresdner Kleinwort, and Banque AIG all warn that DEflation may loom as housing and household-dependent markets crumble under record levels of housing and household debt.

Bernard Connolly, global strategist at Banque AIG, said inflation targeting by central banks had become a "totemism that threatens to crush the world economy". He said it would be madness to throw millions out of work by deflating part of the economy to offset a rise in imported fuel and food prices. Real wages are being squeezed by oil, come what may. It may be healthier for society to let it happen rather more 'gently'.

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Normxxx    
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The contents of any third-party letters/reports above do not necessarily reflect the opinions or viewpoint of normxxx. They are provided for informational/educational purposes only.
The content of any message or post by normxxx anywhere on this site is not to be construed as constituting market or investment advice. Such is intended for educational purposes only. Individuals should always consult with their own advisors for specific investment advice.

Diverging From Expectations

U.S. Inflation: Diverging From Expectations

June 02, 2008

U.S. core consumer inflation, as measured by the PCE price index, remains near 2%. In contrast, consumer inflation expectations continue to soar, courtesy of gasoline and food prices.

U.S. inflation worries have intensified, as the surge in highly visible gasoline and food prices continues. Government data are not trusted because they show that core consumer price inflation has failed to rise. The build up of pipeline price pressures from rising input costs is a long-term concern, but higher core consumer inflation will only become a threat after the economy gains significant momentum, i.e. not a danger for 2008. Sub-par economic growth ensures that there will be minimal leakage from producer prices into retail/consumer prices. Moreover, housing accounts for about one third of the PCE index, and the decline in this sector is not over.

Bottom line: It is still premature to worry about higher inflation, and bond yields should soon calm if oil prices stop rising.


Is A Commodity Correction Approaching?

May 28, 2008

Our global Leading Economic Indicator (LEI) is signaling that some contagion from the U.S. slowdown is spreading beyond the G7 countries, which could finally trigger a shakeout in commodity prices.

Since the end of 2006 there has been an unprecedented divergence between the G7 and non-G7 LEI. However, the steady decline of the non-G7 indicator warns that some contagion may soon develop. Though the worst of the U.S. economic slide may be past, a long period of sluggishness seems probable, and there remain downside risks given the ongoing housing slump and relentless rise in energy prices.

Bottom line: A slowing in non-G7 economic growth at a time when the U.S. is still weak could be the catalyst for the long overdue correction in commodity prices. We would hold back from putting fresh funds to work until overbought conditions and sentiment ease.

U.S. Home Builders: No Light At The End Of The Tunnel

May 20, 2008

Sentiment among U.S. home builders remains at rock bottom levels— builders expect no improvement in sales over the next six months.

The fundamentals for housing remain weak, especially since the employment outlook has deteriorated this year and mortgage rates have not fallen in line with policy rates. The budding rebound in mortgage refinancing activity faltered the minute Treasury yields blipped up, underscoring that borrowing rates are too high to support the housing market. The spring selling season so far has been disappointing, implying that inventories will remain excessive.

Bottom line: The housing market will stay depressed for the foreseeable future, acting as a limit on the upside in Treasury yields.

Natural Gas: Stay Bullish

May 13, 2008

Long-dated natural gas (NG) prices have adjusted upwards in recent months, but have lagged crude oil. We remain bullish and believe that it is too soon to scale back long/overweight positions.

Canadian natural gas production and rig count remain weak because of cost inflation and the strong Canadian dollar. U.S. natural gas production has rebounded but depletion rates are high and the rig count may be topping out. In addition, significant exploitation of non-conventional gas shale deposits will be expensive and take years before bearing fruit. Moreover, the plunge in liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports during the second half of last year underscored that they will not be a panacea with Asia and Europe competing vigorously for LNG.

For example, Guangdong Dapeng, operator of China's first LNG receiving terminal, is looking to double its spot cargoes in 2008. North American liquefaction facilities are unlikely to come onstream before 2011, at the earliest. As for NG substitutes, the prices of residual fuel and coal continue to hit new highs. Finally, speculators remain net short NG in contrast with net long crude oil exposure.

Bottom line: Continue to hold long-dated natural gas futures in absolute terms and relative to crude oil.

Fundamentals Remain Negative For Small Cap Stocks

May 08, 2008

The bounce in small cap versus large cap stocks is over.

The recent bout of small cap outperformance has been primarily driven by the relative weakness in large cap bank shares, due to their outsized sub-prime-related write-downs. However, this drag should diminish going forward since the bulk of the losses have been disclosed. Moreover, bank lending standards could stay restrictive for some time to come as banks work to stem the rise in non-performing loans.

Tightening lending standards have historically weighed on small cap relative performance vs. large caps, given the riskier credit profiles of small firms and the ability of large firms to secure financing from global sources. Meanwhile, sluggish domestic demand growth, persistent house price deflation and a weakening dollar continue to point to a relatively bleak operating environment for small companies.

Bottom line: Stay underweight small versus large caps.

U.S. Leading Economic Indicator: Economic Mush, At Best

April 21, 2008

The Conference Board's Leading Economic Indicator (LEI) showed a small uptick in March.

It was slightly positive news that the LEI did not continue to erode, but the index is still well below its boom/bust line (based on a deviation from trend), which implies a weak economy for another six months. Further interest rate cuts, and possibly more non-conventional tactics, are probable, especially because credit sector problems have not been resolved. Interbank spreads have failed to narrow and mortgage rates remain stubbornly high.

Bottom line: A sustained breakout in risk assets (i.e. a rising stock/government bond ratio and decisive narrowing in corporate bond spreads) awaits a solid rebound in the LEI.


The Sources Of U.S. Consumer Misery


April 16, 2008

Consumer confidence in the U.S. may not improve significantly until house prices stabilize.

In the 1970s and 1980s, consumer confidence closely tracked the so-called Misery Index, the sum of the unemployment and inflation rates. However, this relationship has broken down, with sentiment at the lowest level since 1982, despite a historically low unemployment rate and relatively modest inflation. The relationship is re-established if the Misery Index is adjusted by adding in the change in house prices. The implication is that, even if the U.S. labor market holds up, some stabilization in house prices will be needed before there is a rebound in confidence. Unfortunately, that is not imminent. While tax rebates will provide some temporary relief to consumers over the summer, the underlying trend in consumer spending will be sluggish for some time.

Fed Looks For Second Half Revival

April 04, 2008

In Congressional testimony, Fed Chairman Bernanke spent most of his speech explaining what has happened in credit markets and why the Fed bailed out Bear Stearns. However, he also suggested that the worst for the economy is almost over.

Specifically, the Fed Chairman commented that "much necessary economic and financial adjustment has already taken place, and monetary and fiscal policies are in train that should support a return to growth in the second half of this year and next". While we agree that much adjustment has taken place, it seems complacent to bank on a growth revival in the second half with housing prices melting down, leading economic indicators still falling, elevated food and oil prices weighing on consumer sentiment, and unemployment claims on the rise. One problem is that credit markets have thwarted much of the Fed stimulus; private sector borrowing rates have either risen or declined only modestly and lending standards have tightened dramatically.

Bottom line: The Fed can never sound alarmist on the economy, but internally may be overly complacent on growth.

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  M O R E. . .

Normxxx    
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The contents of any third-party letters/reports above do not necessarily reflect the opinions or viewpoint of normxxx. They are provided for informational/educational purposes only.
The content of any message or post by normxxx anywhere on this site is not to be construed as constituting market or investment advice. Such is intended for educational purposes only. Individuals should always consult with their own advisors for specific investment advice.

Tuesday, July 8, 2008

The Bear's Back

The Bear's Back

By Bespoke.Com, Barrons | 8 July 2008

It's official: the bear has arrived. The Dow Jones Industrial Average last week qualified for the widely accepted definition of a bear market of a 20% drop from the highs. The good news is that once the decline reaches that arbitrary 20% mark, based on history, the market has suffered most of its losses. The bad news is that the decline typically drags on for some time, and time may be the worst enemy. Investors may initially try to grab erstwhile highfliers that have crashed and burned but rarely regain their former status. And as the decline wears down investors' psyches, they tend to bail out at the market's nadir, when things look bleakest— and when the greatest opportunities present themselves.

The post-1940 average bear market (as defined by the Standard & Poor's 500 index) produced a decline of 30.4% from a peak that took 386 days to reach its trough, according to data compiled by Bespoke Investment Group. By the time the market was down the requisite 20%, the average bear market was 74% completed. Based on those averages, the bear market would have another 118 days to run and would face losses of another 14% from current levels. Rarely does the market get a short, sharp shock, as in 1987, when the bear market lasted just 101 days— with most of the total damage of 22.51% done on Black Monday, Oct. 19. The longest march downward was the 1973-74 decline, which took 630 days and sliced 48.2% off the S&P.

But Bespoke defines two separate bear markets following the bursting of the technology bubble— an initial 36.77% drop from March 2000 to September 2001, punctuated by a brief, post-9/11 recovery until the next decline of January-July 2002 of 31.97%. In the minds of most investors who suffered through that period, it was three long years of false starts and frustration until the recovery really got under way, in March 2003. Signs of bear-market fatigue already are becoming evident. Investors have yanked more than $80.4 billion from domestic equity funds in the past 12 months, according to Investment Company Institute data parsed by Bianco Research. Overseas funds drew $75.7 billion from American mutual-fund investors, leaving a net equity fund outflow of $4.7 billion.

What's more, there have been few hiding places other than commodities, observes Jack A. Ablin, chief investment officer at Harris Private Bank. Even Warren Buffett isn't immune, with Berkshire (ticker: BRKA) off 21% from its peak. The foreign stocks Americans have been flocking to lost nearly as much as U.S. equities, despite help from the falling dollar.

The MSCI EAFE, the benchmark for developed markets outside the U.S., suffered a negative 10.58% total return in the first half, according to Bianco Research, compared with a negative 11.91% for the S&P. Emerging markets were slightly worse than the EAFE, with a negative 11.64% return, according to MSCI's measure. Even the once hotter-than-hot China market has gone into a deep-freeze; the FXI exchange-traded fund, a popular way for Americans to play that market, is down 43% from its high last October. Bonds other than Treasuries lost money in the first half, especially corporates, junk bonds and municipals. Meanwhile, the Dow Jones-AIG Commodity Index returned 27.23% in the first six months of 2008.

Yet there's little prospect for relief in the near term, especially as the second-quarter earnings reporting season is about to kick off. Despite its near 20% retreat, the S&P 500 remains too high relative to prospective earnings, says Ablin. Even though analysts have slashed their 2008 earnings forecasts to just 5.8% gains from 15% at the beginning of the year, he thinks they're still too optimistic. Based on his estimated profit gains this year of 3%, and an earnings yield (the inverse of the price-earnings multiple) equal to triple-B corporate bonds' 6.8%, Ablin's model indicates the S&P should shed another 5%.

But others see the current decline as another phase in a longer-term secular bear market. "We are still in the super bear of 2000," asserts Jeremy Grantham, chairman of money manager GMO. In a bear market, stocks fall back to, or below, their long-term trend line. But after the great bull market from 1982 to 2000, equities never flushed out their excesses "because of the Greenspan-inspired chain of bubbles, from growth stocks to real estate to commodities," referring to former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan.

"Great bear markets always take their time, and the most likely end is 2010," Grantham continues. If the S&P 500 were to fall to 1100 in 2010, that would be about a 13% decline from here, about 1263, and would put the index back on its long-term trend line. He adds: "Chances are we will overshoot on the downside. We always do. We will be lucky if it is 1100."

Like Tolstoy's unhappy families, every bear market is different, observes John De-Gulis, a portfolio manager at the Sound Shore Fund. Citing data from Ned Davis Research, he notes that the S&P has been down an average of 4.83% six months after the start of a recession and up 3.15% 12 months on. "Of course, we haven't entered the recession officially yet," he adds, which may happen late this year or early 2009. But, he adds, "the two recessions where the market was down big time 12 months after the recession started were '73, minus 27%, and '81, down 18%— both periods when oil prices spiked."

What seems consistent among bear markets is the tendency of investors to despair in their later stages, dumping everything indiscriminately. For instance, Bespoke Investment found that in the early stages of a decline, from the peak to the down 20% bear print, the traditional defensive redoubts— consumer staples and health care— hold up relatively well, shedding about 4% each. But after the bear market becomes "official" at minus 20%, the two actually do slightly worse through the rest of the decline— down 11.6% for consumer staples and down 13.9% for health care, versus minus 10% for the S&P at that stage, as investors tend to dump anything and everything.

There's no surprise about what did best during past bear markets tracked by Bespoke. During the first phase on the way to the minus 20% mark, gold prices were virtually unchanged while oil was up 18.7%. Bond yields, as measured by the 10-year Treasury, actually were up by about 7% in the early phase, which would result in negative returns. But after the S&P was down 20%, gold gained an average of 6.6%, oil was up 19%, and bond yields were down 0.5% for a positive return.

What's less clear is what will be the signal leader when a new bull phase starts. Rarely, however, is it the group that led the previous advance. Energy stocks, for instance, did not return to the lead position until the recent bull run, about a quarter century after their last heyday. After the dot-com bust, technology stocks did not take the lead in the subsequent bull market; indeed, the Nasdaq recovered only a bit more than half its decline from its bubble peak of 5048.

The late bull market was, of course, led by financial stocks— on the way up as well as down. Critics charge that was because the Fed slashed rates too far, to 1% at their low, and kept them too low for too long. This effectively free money fueled the subprime mortgage bubble and burst, which reverberated throughout the credit markets and eventually led to the emergency rescue of Bear Stearns in March. [[Even less than free! With inflation at ~2% (government figures), Fed was essentially paying borrowers 1% to come and take that hot money off their hands! : normxxx]]

But after all too many declarations that the worst of the credit crisis is over, and with the latest round of "kitchen sink" write-downs of bad assets by banks and brokers, few pros at this point want to bottom-pick in financials. "I know what I don't want to own," says David Sowerby, portfolio manager of Loomis Sayles— "'toxic subprimes', which one day will be "great trades," but not yet.

Bank stocks are nowhere near as cheap as in the early '90s, contends Frederic Marks, president of Cheviot Value Management, which manages $236 million in separate accounts. For instance, WFC had been cut in half by the fall of 1990 to just 75% of its book value. Today, Wells' shares trade for closer to 1.75 times book, and book values are far less than certain, given the potential for write-downs. Wells traded in 1990 at about six to seven times its long-term earnings power (not that year's published earnings), compared with 12 times long-term earnings today.

Despite the ongoing housing woes and credit strains, inflation has moved to the top of the Fed's worry list. So, too, with the stock market. "The critical variable lies with the [consumer-price index]. It's the biggest driver of the market multiple for the S&P 500," says Francois Trahan, strategist with ISI Group.

He adds that if gains in the CPI slacken in the second half, "then multiples start to expand. Some 80% of the CPI items looks great, like rents and wages, but 20%— oil and food and import prices— looks horrible. If commodities just level off, then the CPI will come down." On that score, the Economic Cycle Research Institute's Future Inflation Gauge, a leading indicator for the CPI, fell to a four-year low in June.

With crude soaring past $145 a barrel and prices at the gas pump well past $4 a gallon, investor and consumer psychology is the glummest in decades. So much so, in fact, that the market might be setting itself up for a short-term trading bounce, says Woody Dorsey, proprietor of Market Semiotics. It would be akin to the short-lived rebound from the March lows following the passing of the Bear Stearns phase of the credit crisis.

Marks of Cheviot, who says his composite portfolio of client accounts is up 4% in the past 12 months against the 13% slide in the S&P, has had one-third in precious metals and other vehicles that benefit when the dollar or the market declines, one-third in cash, and one-third in strong U.S. companies not tied to the domestic economy. Two exceptions are WMT, "which is one of our largest holdings a couple of years running because of our thesis that buyers will be more price conscious and will be more attracted than ever to this store."

And, another retailer Cheviot has been buying recently is WAG, says Marks, because "two-thirds of its revenues are from pharmacy sales, the company is enormously profitable with zero debt, and its shares are as cheap as they've been in well over a decade." BCA Research's Global Investment Strategy Weekly Bulletin advises subscribers to batten down the hatches to ride out the "perfect storm" resulting from spiking oil prices by reducing equities and boosting bonds, especially European securities. (The BWX provides exposure to foreign government bonds.) "This latest oil surge is canceling out the impact of the Federal Reserve's policy easing, crippling economic growth and causing share prices to relapse," writes Chen Zhao, BCA's managing editor. It is no time for heroics, he adds.

The key to surviving bear markets is capital preservation, concludes GMO's Grantham. You want to "live to fight another day." You may see amazingly cheap asset opportunities in the next couple of years as distressed pricing might become more commonplace. "It would be nice to have the money to take advantage."

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Normxxx    
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The contents of any third-party letters/reports above do not necessarily reflect the opinions or viewpoint of normxxx. They are provided for informational/educational purposes only.
The content of any message or post by normxxx anywhere on this site is not to be construed as constituting market or investment advice. Such is intended for educational purposes only. Individuals should always consult with their own advisors for specific investment advice.

Monday, July 7, 2008

The Market Message

The Market Message: Sector Rotation Says Bearish

By John Murphy | 6 July 2008

SECTOR ROTATION MODEL... One of our readers asked where we are in the Sector Rotation Model. That model shows the normal sector rotation that takes place at various stages in the business cycle. The chart shows that basic materials and energy are market leaders at a market peak. As the economy starts to slow, money starts to rotate out of those two inflation-sensitive groups. Basic materials peak first and energy last. This week's downturn in basic material stocks suggests that the topping process is moving even further along.

Energy may be the next to roll over. As the economy slows, money flows into consumer staples, healthcare services, and utilities. That's where we appear to be right now. One way we can tell that a bottom is near is when money starts to flow into financial and consumer discretionary stocks. So far, there's no sign of that happening. That leaves us in the midst of a bear market with money flowing toward staples, healthcare, and utilities.

http://stockcharts.com/commentary/archives/20080706/images/20080703006-sc.png


STOCKS LEAD THE ECONOMY... Everytime I show the Sector Rotation Model, I feel the need to point out that the stock market (red line) peaks well before the economy (green line). Although most of us are aware that the stock market is a leading indicator of the economy, that point keeps getting lost on Wall Street and the media. Ever since the market peaked last fall, the media has presented a parade of economists arguing that the economy was still on sound footing. I remember seeing a headline "fear versus fundamentals" back in January (that was repeated again this week on CNBC).

The implication being that the market was falling on "fear" instead of "fundamentals". With the stock market having had one of the worst first halfs in decades, we're now starting to get confirmation that the economy is in bad shape [[and the financial companies in even worse shape: normxxx]]. It's a little late for that to do anybody any good. That's why we study the market and pretty much ignore the media, economists, and Wall Street suits.


Bear Market Expands!

By Arthur Hill | 7 July 2008

Sector performance in May and June shows the bear extending its grip into other key sectors. The Financials SPDR (XLF) and the Consumer Discretionary SPDR (XLY) woke up the bear with dismal performances in May. The first PerfChart shows sector performance from 1-May until 2-June, which is basically the month of May. XLF and XLY led the way lower in May. Notice that the Industrials SPDR (XLI), Materials SPDR (XLB) and Technology SPDR (XLK) held up relatively well in May. In fact, selling pressure in May was pretty much limited to the financial and consumer discretionary sectors.


Click Here, or on the image, to see a larger, undistorted image.


The second PerfChart shows sector performance from 3-June to 1-July, which is basically the month of June. There are two items worth noting here. First, the Technology SPDR, Industrials SPDR and Materials SPDR declined rather sharply in June. These three held up in May, but fell apart in June as selling pressure expanded among the sectors. Second, the Utilities SPDR (XLU), Consumer Staples SPDR (XLP) and Healthcare SPDR (XLV) held up the best in June. Well, outside of the Energy SPDR (XLE) that is.


Click Here, or on the image, to see a larger, undistorted image.


Utilities, healthcare and consumer staples represent the defensive sectors. No matter what happens in the economy, we still need electricity (XLU), toothpaste (XLP) and medicine (XLV). While the S&P 500 moved lower in May and June, XLU edged higher both months and showed relative strength. XLV and XLP are down over the last two months, but less than the S&P 500 and this shows less weakness, which can also be interpreted as relative strength. Fund managers that are required to be fully-invested in stocks are no doubt watching these relative performance numbers and looking for the sectors that are holding up the best.



Panic And Fear? No Signs Just Yet

By Thomas J. Bowley | 7 July 2008

I'm the conservative type. I'm also nervous. I never like to see the market fall precipitously while market participants yawn. In a nutshell, that's what we've been seeing. Yes, the talking heads will say the sky is falling, but unfortunately for bulls, that's not the case amongst those actually trading the market. I've provided in previous articles how the put call ratio correlates to market tops and bottoms. I won't go into the details again.

However, everyone needs to understand that market participants are not panicking yet. That is a very big clue to me that we've got more work to the downside before we can declare a bottom. It doesn't mean we can't bounce and I'll provide an argument below that suggests a near-term bounce is imminent. But it will likely be just that— a bounce.

First, let's talk sentiment. Thursday, the put call ratio printed a closing reading of 1.21. Finally! It was the 3rd highest end of day reading since the mid-March lows. That's the good news. The bad news is that one day of negative sentiment doesn't mark a bottom. Below is a favorite chart of mine, measuring the 5 day moving average of the put call ratio against the 60 day moving average.

It simply plots the short-term pessimism against the longer-term pessimism, and provides us with a measure of relative pessimism. I like to see the short-term 20%-30% higher to begin to mark bottoms (and 20%-30% lower to mark tops). From Chart 1, you'll see we're simply not there yet so strap on your helmets and buckle your seatbelts.


Click Here, or on the image, to see a larger, undistorted image.


We could continue lower, the pessimism could build, and a significant bottom could form in the near-term. Given the severely oversold conditions though, I expect to see a bounce first and that will likely return the 5 day put call ratio down closer to the 60 day moving average, possibly even below the 60 day.

Furthering my belief of a short-term bounce is the positive divergence that has printed on the 60 minute charts. The major indices have put in new lows the last 3 days, and with each new low has come a higher MACD reading on the 60 minute chart. Take a look at the NASDAQ below in Chart 2.


Click Here, or on the image, to see a larger, undistorted image.


I'll leave you with one more chart to ponder. Normally when the market sells off, the Dow outperforms the NASDAQ. That makes perfect sense as investors flock to high quality, "safer" investments. From Chart 3 below, you can see that the ratio between the Dow and the NASDAQ moved much higher during the summer of 2006 and again in fall of 2007 into the first quarter of 2008 as the market sold off hard.

Any time this ratio moves up, it indicates relative outperformance by the Dow. A declining ratio suggests relative outperformance by the NASDAQ. Here's the interesting part: Since the May 19th top, this ratio has actually declined. We just suffered through the worst June in many decades, yet the money did not gravitate towards the Dow— interesting indeed. Is this a short-term phenomenon that will rectify itself in due time? I say yes. I've highlighted the recent move up in the ratio and believe that the move above the recent high is technically significant.


Click Here, or on the image, to see a larger, undistorted image.


We'll find out in time. In the meantime....

Happy trading!


ß§

Normxxx    
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The contents of any third-party letters/reports above do not necessarily reflect the opinions or viewpoint of normxxx. They are provided for informational/educational purposes only.
The content of any message or post by normxxx anywhere on this site is not to be construed as constituting market or investment advice. Such is intended for educational purposes only. Individuals should always consult with their own advisors for specific investment advice.

A Look Ahead

A Look Ahead (And Behind)

By normxxx | 7 July 2008

Impaired institutions are likely to experience failures in the course of this year. There will not likely be more bailouts like Bear Stearns (the coffers are empty). It's rumored that even Merrill Lynch couldn't raise funds from the Arabs recently— everyone burned is already twice-shy. We think Paulson is sort of taking the high road to saying 'we're in trouble', and making it sound appropriate not to let banks and brokers think they'll get bailed out, rather than flat-out say… no more dough.

There is an ongoing loan 'contraction' in the U.S.— everyone knows that by now. However, some officials act like matters are improving. They're not. Rather, everyone is adjusting to ratcheting things down and living with it. Credit card and home equity loan delinquencies are rising, not shrinking, and that too is worrisome as the Summer and Fall proceed.

When things are this bad, inflation often precedes deflation. (Selective) commodity price rises reflect an arrangement of changes, rather than negating a developing deflation (eg, as in housing and the real, inflation adjusted, price of many things). Eventually, as the emerging markets succumb following a series of heavy equity market declines overseas, you'll get wider commodity price breaks. That's why 'decoupling' is bad for the U.S.; you won't break the hold of our anticipated 'stagflation' without taking down demand (and prices) for overseas commodities.

Deleveraging is a bitch. Contracting credit is one of the forms of deleveraging. That has already occurred with housing of course, but is now spreading to commercial and industrial loans. It is reportedly the case that dozens of banks are paying 'way over' the Fed Funds rate (and concealing this fact) just for interbank borrowing. (While it's still a small number, it's not happened in recent memory.) That alone deflects all the nonsensical arguments about the banks being past the crisis, and now being attractive investments. We'll get there someday, but not nearly yet.

For those familiar with Term Auction Facility transactions, things are no better in Europe than here in the United States, and the ECB is at risk of substantial TAF-Europe defaults. The truth is, the entire international banking system, many national banking systems, and many banking behemoths are poised very, very precariously at this time— knowledgeable people are worried about what's really going on in banking, domestically and overseas.

Some weeks ago, London's LIBOR rate was way above normal spread ranges, and I suspect this was a signal of what was/is to come. It's bad, not good, and not likely to get better anytime soon. This is why bank stocks aren't yet seen as a great 'bargain', given that some are selling under what is (purportedly) book value. Well maybe the marketplace isn't as nuts as some say.

It would appear that those with the money, the 'real' analysts, expect more writedowns, and other costly 'events'. Such doings by the banks are by no means 'cleaned-out' and, while much has occurred, bank transparency is still like 'looking through a glass, darkly', not anywhere near full-disclosure. The worst shock may be behind us (and then again, may not be), but the worst results are still ahead (if a bank or broker goes even broker, then I guess the results are worse than now).

The credit markets are barely functional (and that only because of the massive intervention by the CBers— well over $1 TRillion, $1000 billion, plus other 'innovations'). We have contended that many of the banking behemoths are in trouble, basically insolvent, with various measures being used to conceal reality from the investing public (well, the Japanese banks pulled it off during the '90s). Whether it's failing Auction Rate Securites, Alt-A or Option ARMs mortgages, credit cards, home equity or other asset backed loans, or a host of forthcoming foreclosures, this is a phenomenal, massive contraction of credit (aka, 'ersatz-money'). It is all deleveraging— essentially deflation. (And, as BB desperately tries to inflate the money supply to compensate, the prices of commodities go parabolic.)

In a democracy, 'passion' often tends to gravitate to some immediate happening, rather than being applied to the long-term realities of the situation. 'Passion' now cares about gasoline prices— when it should be focused on our financial independence, as individuals, as institutions, and as a country. Oil at a price, 'set' by a cartel, and paid for by destroying our Trade Balance, is not in our interest. We'd be better off paying more but making it here, and keeping the revenue here, with prohibition against siphoning-off the profits to overseas investors. Not merely tax adjustments, but the overall profits. (Or, maybe, we should start a grain cartel.) It would help expedite the Nation's ability to rescue itself from this incredible quagmire of mis-governance and societal lack of interest (didn't say deterioration) that predominate. The time has come for drilling off-shore, in the ANWAR, and for building as many nuclear power plants as fast as we can! I don't think our children will appreciate the bounties and beauties of nature much if they are starving.

I have been warning that this Goldilocks porridge was toxic for several years, at least— with the most probable date for the dénoument in 2009. It remains so. The price of oil is merely a symptom, and should the price of oil take a dramatic fall (eg, as the recession draws upon us), it will change little.

Normxxx    
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The contents of any third-party letters/reports above do not necessarily reflect the opinions or viewpoint of normxxx. They are provided for informational/educational purposes only.
The content of any message or post by normxxx anywhere on this site is not to be construed as constituting market or investment advice. Such is intended for educational purposes only. Individuals should always consult with their own advisors for specific investment advice.

Sunday, July 6, 2008

Stagflation Grips Eurozone

Stagflation Grips Eurozone As Interest Rates Look Set To Rise

By Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, Telegraph.Co.UK | July 2008

Eurozone inflation surged to an all-time high of 4% in June despite worrying signs of a slump in manufacturing, confronting the European Central Bank with the toughest challenge since its creation a decade ago. Soaring oil and food prices guaranteed the quarter-point rise in interest rates to 4.25% on Thursday, further widening the gulf in rates between Europe and America. The only question is whether the ECB opts for a "one-and-done" move or sets the course for yet more rises in the autumn.

Jean-Claude Trichet, the bank's president, has warned of an "acute risk" of a wage-price spiral unless inflation is wrung out of the system. But a growing chorus of critics fears that overkill could tip the eurozone into a severe downturn at this delicate juncture, and risk a dangerous chain of political events in southern Europe and Ireland— where voters have already thrown the EU into chaos by rejecting the Lisbon Treaty.

The Irish economy contracted at a rate of 1.5%